Opinion
53268.
SUBMITTED JANUARY 6, 1977.
DECIDED JANUARY 11, 1977.
Aggravated assault. Madison Superior Court. Before Judge Williford.
William D. Smith, for appellant.
Clete D. Johnson, District Attorney, for appellee.
For a prior appearance of this case see Foote v. State, 136 Ga. App. 301 ( 220 S.E.2d 786) (1975), where we reversed Foote's conviction of aggravated assault because a postponement to assure effective assistance of counsel had not been granted. Foote was again convicted upon retrial, and this appeal followed.
1. Enumeration of error 1 complains that the court erred in denying Foote's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence which was directed to identification testimony of the state's witnesses anticipated to be adduced at trial. This enumeration is without merit since a pre-trial motion to suppress is available only to a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure (Code Ann. § 27-313; Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 735 (7) ( 182 S.E.2d 779) (1971)) and in any event cannot be directed solely to testimony at trial. Baker v. State, 230 Ga. 741, 742 (1) ( 199 S.E.2d 252) (1973); Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 (2b, c) ( 200 S.E.2d 456) (1973) and cits.
2. Enumeration of error 2 urges that the court erred in failing to require the state to produce a photograph used in a pre-trial identification procedure. It appears, however, that the district attorney submitted all the photographs and composites in his possession, and that the photograph referred to by defendant's counsel was a mug shot in the files of the police in Clarke County. The district attorney offered to tell defendant's counsel how a copy could be acquired, but counsel was not interested, stating "I just wanted him to produce it." We find no reversible error in these circumstances since there has been no suppression of evidence as condemned in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ( 83 SC 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215) (1963).
Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Marshall, J., concur.