Food Fair Stores, Fla. v. Vallarelli

Full title: FOOD FAIR STORES OF FLORIDA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v…

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District

Date published: Apr 7, 1958

101 So. 2d 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)

Opinion

No. 57-297.

February 25, 1958. Rehearing Denied April 7, 1958.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County, Harold R. Vann, J.

Brown, Dean, Adams Fischer and H. Eugene Fischer, Miami, for appellant.

Nichols, Gaither, Green, Frates Beckham and Sam Daniels, Miami, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is from a final judgment based upon jury verdicts for personal injuries sustained by the appellee-wife when she slipped upon a grape in the appellant's super-market. The appellant's principal contention is that the lower court should have directed a verdict in its favor because there was no evidence to support a finding that the substance or condition which occasioned appellee-wife's fall had been on the floor of the store a sufficient length of time so as to charge the appellant with knowledge of the dangerous condition.

The appellee-wife was a business invitee on the premises of the appellant. The rule is that the owner must use ordinary care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition and this duty is owed to a business invitee. See Messner v. Webb's City, Fla. 1952, 62 So.2d 66.

The record convinces us there was sufficient testimony and evidence to submit to the jury upon the question of fact as to whether or not the appellant had knowledge of the dangerous condition or that the condition had existed for a length of time sufficient to charge the appellant with such notice. Certainly every reasonable inference which can be drawn from the evidence favorable to the appellee-wife should be indulged, and in this case we cannot say that the record does not support the verdicts rendered by the jury. This court is reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of a jury where there is evidence tending to prove the issues or where the evidence is conflicting even though it might have arrived at a conclusion different from that of the jury.

We conclude that the judgment appealed from should be and it is hereby affirmed.

CARROLL, CHAS., C.J., and HORTON, J., concur.

PEARSON, J., dissents.

PEARSON, Judge (dissenting).

I concur in the principles of law stated in the opinion of the court, but do not feel that they are applicable to the facts in this case. A further discussion of the factual basis of the opinion would not be profitable and it is sufficient to state that I find a failure to prove facts from which it could be inferred that the defendant had knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition.