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Fontaine v. Town of Foster

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jul 1, 1999
Nos. 96-0072, 96-1876, 96-0793 (R.I. Jul. 1, 1999)

Opinion

Nos. 96-0072, 96-1876, 96-0793.

July 1, 1999

Appeal from the Superior Court of Providence County.


DECISION


In considering a motion for a new trial, the trial justice acts as a seventh juror, if you will, and exercises his independent judgment and reviews the evidence in light of his charge to jury passing on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. If he concludes that the evidence is so evenly balanced that reasonable minds could differ, he must approve the verdict, even though he may have doubts about its correctness. If, however, the trial justice concludes that the jury's verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence, he must grant the motion for new trial. Applying this test to the evidence presented, I am constrained to deny the motion for new trial filed by each of the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs have urged the Court to grant a new trial because reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of the negligence of the Town of Foster in the supervision and training of Robert Sabetta. Although the jury responded YES to Interrogatory No. 1:

"Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Town of Foster was negligent in the hiring of Robert Sabetta?"

the jury responded NO to Interrogatory No. 3:

"Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Town of Foster was negligent in the supervision of Robert Sabetta?".

and NO to Interrogatory No. 5:

"Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Town of Foster was negligent in the training of Robert Sabetta?".

Much was made of the Foster Police Department's failure to account for the weapon that proved to be used in causing the injuries and death to the plaintiffs. The fact the Police Department had no knowledge that Sabetta had possession of that weapon is not conclusive evidence of their negligence in training and supervising him as plaintiffs would suggest. I believe the jury could, based on the evidence presented, understandably respond in the negative.

Negligence, in the circumstances of this case, would be the failure to do something that a reasonably prudent police department would have done, if it possessed the same information available to the Foster Police Department prior to the tragedy of April 14, 1993. The evidence presented is that the Town of Foster did not know since 1988 who had possession of the missing lugar. Reasonable minds could differ whether the Town should have foreseen in 1993 that Robert Sabetta would have possession of that missing lugar and use it to kill three innocent young men. Although I might have concluded the Town was negligent in not knowing where the lugar was, that fact — in itself — does not require a finding the Town was negligent in the training or in the supervision of Robert Sabetta. One who was properly trained and adequately supervised could still commit an act — such as the theft of a weapon — without any negligence being imputed to his employer. Foreseeability is still a critical factor in determining whether a party or institution is negligent when acts of its employees or agents causes harm to others. Testimony was presented by Chief Kettelle about the manner in which Sabetta was trained and supervised. Expert opinion testimony was offered by both parties on the issue of supervision and training. The jury apparently found the testimony of the Chief and Michael Brave, who was qualified as an expert in police administration procedures, to be more persuasive than that of Dr. James Fyfe offered by the plaintiffs. With that assessment, I agree.

One must also keep in mind that in finding the Town of Foster negligent in the hiring of Robert Sabetta (Interrogatory No. 1), the jury found the plaintiffs failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the negligent hiring was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. The jury obviously believed that the injuries inflicted by Sabetta on April 14, 1993, were not the result of the negligent hiring by the Town of Foster. Simply put, the jury apparently concluded, as I do, that when Chief Kettelle suspended Sabetta in January 1993, and when Chief Kettelle assisted the Attorney General in obtaining an Indictment against Sabetta for assaulting Frank Sherman, the Town of Foster did all it reasonably could to relieve Sabetta from any powers as a Foster police officer.

No doubt what happened on April 14, 1993, was a tragedy. The jury properly concluded that Robert Sabetta was responsible for the injuries inflicted. No reasonable person could find otherwise. However, the jury, based on the evidence presented and on the law given, could find that the Town of Foster was not negligent in the training or in the supervision of Robert Sabetta. Further, the evidence supported the jury's finding that even though the Town was negligent in hiring Robert Sabetta, that negligence was not a proximate cause of the acts of Sabetta on April 14, 1993.

For the reasons stated, the motion for new trial filed by each of the plaintiffs is denied.

The defendant Sabetta moves the Court enter a judgment for him as a matter of law on plaintiffs' claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the reason that no competent evidence was presented to support the allegation Sabetta was acting "under color of law" on April 14, 1993. For the reasons stated in the Court's earlier decision denying his motion to dismiss, this Court declines to grant such motion.

Counsel shall prepare and submit a Judgment consistent with this Decision.


Summaries of

Fontaine v. Town of Foster

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jul 1, 1999
Nos. 96-0072, 96-1876, 96-0793 (R.I. Jul. 1, 1999)
Case details for

Fontaine v. Town of Foster

Case Details

Full title:CHARLOTTE SHERMAN FONTAINE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER CAPACITY AS…

Court:Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date published: Jul 1, 1999

Citations

Nos. 96-0072, 96-1876, 96-0793 (R.I. Jul. 1, 1999)

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