Opinion
No. 3-226 / 02-1207
Filed May 14, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, Margaret L. Lingreen, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment entered, following jury trial, in their personal injury action against the defendant. AFFIRMED.
Bruce Braley and James Cook of Dutton, Braun, Staack, Hellman, P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
David Riley of Yagla, McCoy Riley, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Plaintiffs, Marcia and Hoss Foadian, appeal from the final judgment entered, following jury trial, in their personal injury action against the defendant, Ronald Boevers. The Foadians contend the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on multiple specifications that were confusing, inconsistent, misleading, unduly emphasized Marcia's fault, and were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on Saturday, July 8, 2000. On that date Marcia Foadian was in a vehicle traveling east on Highway 3 in Fayette County with her two minor daughters in the backseat. Just before the collision Ronald Boevers was also traveling east on Highway 3, behind Marcia's vehicle. The vehicles collided at the intersection of Highway 3 and County Road V-68 at approximately 4:15 p.m. Boevers's vehicle struck Marcia's on the driver's side door causing her vehicle to end up in a field on the northeast corner of the intersection. The parties disagree regarding the facts surrounding the accident, the cause of the accident, and who was at fault. There were no independent eyewitnesses to the accident.
The Foadians filed a petition against Boevers on July 20, 2001 alleging Boevers was negligent in the operation of his vehicle at the time of the collision and that his negligence caused damages to Marcia. Hoss asserted a claim for loss of spousal consortium resulting from Marcia's injuries sustained in the accident. Marcia further asserted claims of loss of parental consortium and bystander emotional distress on behalf of her two minor daughters who were in the vehicle at the time of the collision. Boevers filed an answer denying the Foadians' claims and asserting Marcia was at fault in the accident and that her fault should operate to bar or reduce the Foadians' claims.
Jury trial commenced on June 26, 2002. The jury instructions included instructions relating to fault against Boevers, as well as his claims of comparative fault against Marcia. Instruction 16, the marshalling instruction on Boevers's comparative fault claim against Marcia, informed the jury that Boevers claimed Marcia was at fault in (A) failing to maintain a proper lookout, as explained in Instruction No. 18, (B) making an unsafe turn from a direct course, as explained in Instruction 19, (C) making an improper left turn, as explained in Instruction 20, and (D) stopping on the traveled portion of the roadway, as explained in Instruction 21. The instruction further instructed the jury that in order for Boevers to prevail on his defense of comparative fault he would have to prove both that Marcia was at fault in one or more of the ways listed and that her fault was a proximate cause of her damages.
The jury returned two verdict forms on July 2, 2002 and the court entered judgment on both the same date. In Verdict Form No. 1 the jury found Boevers forty percent at fault and Marcia sixty percent at fault for the accident and found the fault of each was a proximate cause of Marcia's damages. Based on Iowa's comparative fault statute the jury's assignment of a greater percentage of the fault to Marcia resulted in no recovery of any damages for Marcia. SeeIowa Code § 668.3(1) and (2) (1999). The jury found that Hoss and the Foadians's daughters had not suffered damages for loss of consortium. Verdict Form No. 2 found in favor of Marcia on her bystander liability claims on behalf of her minor daughters and found each daughter had suffered $2,000 of damages. The Foadians appeal from Verdict Form No. 1, contending the instructions on specifications of Marcia's fault were confusing, inconsistent, misleading, unduly emphasized her fault, and were not supported by substantial evidence. Verdict Form No. 2 is not contested in this appeal.
Scope and Standard of Review. We review jury instructions for the correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; Herbst v. State, 616 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2000). The standard of review for jury instructions is whether prejudicial error by the trial court has occurred. Thavenet v. Davis, 589 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 1999). Jury instructions must be considered as a whole, and if the jury has not been misled there is no reversible error. Id. Merits. The Foadians' challenge Instruction 16, the marshalling instruction listing Boevers's claims of comparative fault against Marcia. They also challenge the explanatory instructions that followed, including Instruction 18 (keeping a proper lookout), Instruction 19 (making an unsafe turn from a direct course), Instruction 20 (making an improper left turn), and Instruction 21 (stopping on the traveled portion of the roadway).
Lookout Instruction. The Foadians allege in their appeal brief that the trial court "erroneously concluded that the facts of the case supported giving a lookout to the rear fault specification against Marcia Foadian." They contend the duty of lookout to the rear does not require a constant lookout to the rear but only requires "an awareness of the presence of others" and under this standard Marcia had no duty of observation to the rear at the time of the collision because she had the right to assume Boevers would obey the law.
There was testimony Marcia had driven off onto the right shoulder, or at least partially onto the right shoulder, slowed to a stop or practically to a stop, and that she then pulled back onto the highway and was making a left turn onto an intersecting highway. If this was in fact what happened, which the jury was free to find, Marcia clearly had a duty to look to her rear before performing such a maneuver. See Vanderheiden v. Clearfield Rentals, Inc., 210 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 1973) (holding lookout to the rear was an issue where there was evidence the plaintiff was struck from the rear when returning to the traveled lane from the shoulder). We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the submission of an instruction on a driver's duty of lookout to the rear and the trial court did not err in giving Instruction 18.
Unsafe Turn From a Direct Course. Instruction 19 explained to the jury Boevers's second specification of comparative fault, Marcia's alleged "unsafe turn from a direct course." The instruction stated in part, "A driver shall not turn a vehicle from a direct course on a road unless the movement can be made with reasonable safety and after giving an appropriate signal if any other vehicle may be affected by the movement." This mirrors the language of Iowa Code section 321.314. The Foadians contend this Code provision was intended only to protect oncoming traffic in the opposite lane and because Marcia's left-turn movement did not interfere with oncoming traffic the court erred in instructing on this theory.
The Foadians base their argument on language found in Ruby v. Easton, 207 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1973). In Rubyour supreme court discussed the meaning of the phrase "direct course" as found in section 321.314. The Foadians rely solely on the portion of Rubywhich states, "Thus a vehicle turns from a direct course when it moves across the centerline into the opposite lane of a highway. . . ." Ruby, 207 N.W.2d at 17. However, this is but one example given by the court in Ruby of when a vehicle turns from a "direct course." Id.at 17-18. The court found a vehicle also turns from a direct course "when departing from one street to another at an intersection" and that the "statute is applicable to vehicles entering or leaving either leg of a `Y' intersection." Id.at 18. "A `direct course' on a highway is the motion or movement of the vehicle in the usual or natural course or line of the highway." Id. at 17.
We conclude section 321.314 is not inapplicable simply because no oncoming traffic was involved. The statue is not confined to the protection of oncoming traffic in the opposite lane as the Foadians argue here. Accordingly, the statute and instruction relating to Marcia's alleged fault in "turning from a direct course" were relevant and a correct statement of the law. The court did not err in instructing the jury on this duty.
Improper Left Turn. In the portion of their brief entitled "Problems with Improper Left Turn Instruction" the Foadians contend the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on two specifications of negligence on Marcia's part, the second and third specifications as defined and explained in Instructions 19 and 20, that essentially boiled down to the same allegation, making an improper left turn.
Instruction 19, as set forth above, in part requires a driver to signal before turning a vehicle from a direct course "if any other vehicle may be affected by the movement." It further states that any required "signal to turn left must be continuously given during at least the last 300 feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." This latter portion of Instruction 19 is based on language from Iowa Code section 321.315. Instruction 20 on the other hand is based on section 321.311 and deals with the portions of the roadway a driver is required to use in approaching and executing a left turn at an intersection. Instruction 20 states:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left at an intersection shall approach the turn in that portion of the right half of the road nearest the center line. After entering the intersection, the left turn shall be made by leaving the intersection to the right of the center line of the road being entered. A violation of this law is negligence.
The Foadians first challenge the signaling portion of Instruction 19. The testimony as to whether Marcia in fact signaled prior to making her left-hand turn was disputed. However, the Foadians argue that even assuming Marcia did not signal and Boevers is telling the truth she had no duty under the statute to signal because (1) there was no oncoming traffic and thus her attempted left-hand turn could be made with reasonable safety and (2) the only vehicle whose movement may have been affected by the movement of Marcia's vehicle was Boevers's vehicle, and Boevers testified Marcia was at least 400-500 feet ahead of him when she pulled off to the side of the road. We disagree with the Foadians' apparent contentions that the evidence could not support a finding Marcia had a duty to signal.
First, as discussed above, the duty of a driver not to turn from a direct course unless they can do so with reasonable safety is not applicable only to oncoming traffic. A left-hand turn from a direct course such as the jury could find Marcia attempted here could affect traffic approaching from other directions, including traffic approaching from the rear as Boevers undisputably was. We do not believe the legislature intended to protect only oncoming traffic from other vehicles' unsafe movements and the Foadians attempt to limit section 321.314 only to oncoming traffic results is too narrow a reading of the statute.
Second, Boevers did testify Marcia was at least 400-500 feet ahead of him when she pulled off to the right. However, he also testified he was "probably only a hundred to a hundred and fifty feet" from Marcia's vehicle when she started her move to the north by making a left-hand turn, the skid marks from where he applied his brakes began approximately seventy-five feet from the point of impact, and Marcia never signaled her left-hand turn. Thus, Marcia's movement could have affected Boevers's vehicle and there is evidence he was well within 300 feet of her vehicle when she attempted to turn left. Accordingly, presuming Boevers's version of the movements of Marcia's car is true, a finding the jury was free to make, Marcia had a statutory duty to signal. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on Marcia's duty to signal in Instruction 19.
In the alternative the Foadians appear to be contending that even if the court properly instructed on this specification of comparative fault, the combination of the portion of Instruction 19 dealing with giving a proper signal to turn left and Instruction 20 was confusing, inconsistent, misleading, and repeated the same allegation of making an improper left turn to the point of undue emphasis. We find that Instructions 19 and 20 deal with completely different allegations of fault based on separate statutory duties. The duty to signal, found in section 321.315, is separate and distinct from a driver's duty to make a left turn in an intersection from the appropriate portion of the roadway, as set forth in section 321.311. These instructions were not confusing, inconsistent, or duplicative to the point of undue emphasis. The court did not err in instructing both on a driver's duty to make a left-hand turn from the proper portion of the roadway at an intersection and to safely turn from a direct course with the proper signal.
Stopping on Traveled Portion of Roadway. Finally, the Foadians argue the trial court erred in submitting Instruction 21 to the jury because there was not substantial evidence in the record to support such an instruction. This instruction dealt with Marcia's alleged stop on the traveled portion of the roadway. Instruction 21 states, "A driver of a vehicle shall not stop any vehicle, whether attended or unattended upon the paved part of the highway when it is practical to stop off the highway. A violation of this law is negligence." The language of the instruction is drawn from Iowa Code section 321.354.
Boevers testified repeatedly at trial that Marcia had pulled off to the right, with approximately a third of her vehicle still on the roadway, and stopped or nearly stopped. The weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are matters for the trier of fact, the jury in this case. Eventide Lutheran Home v. Smithson Elec. and Gen. Constr., Inc., 445 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Iowa 1989). The very function of the jury is to sort out the evidence and place credibility where it belongs. State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993). We find this testimony provided sufficient evidence to support submitting a jury instruction on this specification of fault.
Conclusion. The instructions challenged by the Foadians were supported by sufficient evidence in the record, accurately stated the applicable law, and were not confusing, inconsistent, misleading or duplicative to the point of undue emphasis. We conclude the trial court did not err as claimed in instructing the jury.