Opinion
March 22, 1960.
April 13, 1960.
Unemployment Compensation — Appeals — Timeliness — Claimant unintentionally misled by official — Absence of specific findings on crucial point.
1. Generally neither court nor administrative board has the power to extend statutorily fixed time limits for taking appeals in unemployment compensation cases.
2. In unemployment compensation cases, the time for appeal may be extended in cases of fraud or its equivalent.
3. In cases where a claimant is unintentionally misled by an official who is authorized to act in the premises, the time may also be extended when it is possible to relieve an innocent party of injury consequent on such misleading act.
4. In this case, in which it appeared that claimant did not appeal from the action of the bureau in rejecting her claim until after the time prescribed for appeal; that claimant testified before the referee that within the ten-day period allowed for appeal she had talked to an interviewer for the bureau, who had previously handled her claim, and was advised by the latter that "she could not make an appeal" and that "she did not have a leg to stand on"; and that the referee, to whom the matter had been referred for the limited purpose of determining whether the appeal had been filed within the period prescribed, made no specific findings of fact on the issue of whether the bureau interviewer had misled claimant concerning her right of appeal, and dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds that claimant's formal appeal (as well as an earlier informal one) had been filed beyond the ten-day statutory period; it was Held that, although it might be inferred that the board (which affirmed the action of the referee) resolved the issue of deception adversely to claimant from the fact that her appeal was dismissed, the referee and the board should have made specific findings on this crucial and controversial point, and, therefore, since no findings were made in the instant case, the decision of the board dismissing claimant's appeal should be reversed and the record remanded to the board, for specific findings on the questions of whether the interviewer had made any statements that misled claimant from filing her appeal, whether the interviewer had the authority as an official to act in the premises, and whether claimant was innocent in the situation.
Before RHODES, P.J., GUNTHER, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, ERVIN, WATKINS, and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
Appeal, No. 24, Oct. T., 1960, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-54052, in re claim of Helen O. Flynn. Decision reversed and record remanded.
George J. O'Neill, for appellant.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anne X. Alpern, Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.
Argued March 22, 1960.
Appellant's claim for unemployment compensation was rejected by the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation on May 15, 1959. A notice of the Bureau's action, having been mailed to her on the same day, was received by her in due course. The notice advised her of her ineligibility for compensation, the reason therefor, and her right to appeal within ten days or not later than May 25, 1959.
Although the appellant claims that through her counsel she initiated an appeal as early as July 1, 1959, she did not file an appeal until September 1, 1959.
The matter was thereupon referred to a referee for the limited purpose of determining whether the appeal had been filed within the ten-day period allowed by Section 501(e), Article 5 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, approved December 5, 1957, P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended ( 43 P.S. 821). The referee conducted a hearing and resolved the matter adversely to appellant by dismissing her appeal. His action was sustained by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and the appeal to this court followed.
In order to avoid the strict application of Section 501(e) aforesaid and to excuse her tardiness in filing her appeal, appellant testified before the referee that within the ten-day period allowed and before May 25, 1959, she called at the local office of the Bureau and discussed the matter of her claim and right of appeal with Mrs. Cassano, the interviewer for the Bureau, who had previously handled her claim; and she was advised by Mrs. Cassano that "she could not make an appeal" and that "she did not have a leg to stand on." Mrs. Cassano also testified before the referee and denied ever dissuading appellant or anyone else from taking an appeal and further testified, "We do not make decisions like that in the office, concerning cases." However, Mrs. Cassano did recall a visit by appellant and a conversation with her concerning her appeal but could not recall the details of that conversation.
The referee made no specific findings of fact on the issue of whether Mrs. Cassano misled appellant concerning her right of appeal; and he dismissed the appeal solely on the grounds that the formal appeal filed September 1, 1959, as well as the informal one initiated on August 14, 1959 (not July 1, 1959, as contended by appellant), were filed beyond the ten-day statutory period. The difference in the dates for the initiation of the informal appeal would be immaterial since both were beyond the ten-day period.
Generally neither court nor administrative board has the power to extend statutorily fixed time limits for taking appeals in such cases. However, there are recognized exceptions. The time may be extended in cases of fraud or its equivalent. Bee Unemployment Compensation Case, 180 Pa. Super. 231, 119 A.2d 558. In cases where a claimant is unintentionally misled by an official who is authorized to act in the premises, the time may also be extended when it is possible to relieve an innocent party of injury consequent on such misleading act. Tuttle Unemployment Compensation Case, 160 Pa. Super. 46, 49 A.2d 847; Layton v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 156 Pa. Super. 225, 40 A.2d 125. Appellant seeks to bring herself within this second exception to the general rule. Although we may infer that the Board resolved the issue of deception adversely to appellant from the fact that her appeal was dismissed, we think the better practice is to have the referee and Board make specific findings on such a crucial and controversial point. Specific findings were made in Tuttle Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, and in the case of Horton v. West Penn Power Co., 119 Pa. Super. 465, 180 A. 56. They were also recommended in Kaylock Unemployment Compensation Case, 165 Pa. Super. 376, 67 A.2d 801; and in Schneider Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Super. 427, 62 A.2d 99, the record was remanded for that purpose. Therefore, since no findings were made in the present case, the decision of the Board of Review dismissing appellant's appeal will be reversed and the record remanded to the Board for that purpose, viz., to make specific findings on the questions of whether Mrs. Cassano made any statements that misled appellant concerning the filing of her appeal, whether Mrs. Cassano had the authority as an official to act in the premises, and whether the appellant was innocent in the situation.
The decision of the Board of Review is reversed and the record remanded to it with direction to proceed in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion, and for that purpose, to take further testimony, if necessary, to establish the findings of fact suggested herein.