Opinion
March 24, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County, John Dickinson, J.
Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General and Francis C. Millican, Special Assistant Attorney General, for appellants.
Thomas V. Kiernan, St. Petersburg, for appellee.
The question before us on this appeal is the interpretation of the Massage Registration Act of 1943, being Chapter 22034, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1943, as amended by Chapter 23751, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1947, and now appearing as Chapter 480, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A. The particular section of the Act which we must interpret is that section defining a "masseur" or "masseuse," being Section 480.01, Florida Statutes 1941, as amended, F.S.A., which section reads as follows: "As the following subjects and methods of treatments besides study of underlying principles of anatomy and physiology are generally included in a regular course of study by a recognized and accredited school of massage or like institution, viz: The art of body massage, either by hand or with any mechanical or electrical apparatus for the purpose of body massaging, reducing or contouring, the use of oil rubs, salt glows, hot and cold packs, tub, shower, sitz and similar baths, cabinet baths, excluding fever therapy. Therefore under the meaning of this chapter the term `masseur' or `masseuse' shall be deemed to be a person who practices, administers or teaches all or any one or more of the above named subjects and methods of treatments."
The appellee sought a declaratory decree, and other relief, in the court below, alleging that she was engaged in a business which consists of mechanical equipment, electrically operated, being applied to the human body for the sole purpose of slenderizing thereof; that the equipment so used consisted of a hip chair, arm chair, hobby horse, foot table, couch composed of three adjustable panels, and a cushion; that the equipment does not massage the human body, but sets up or causes a gentle vibration to the human body; that there is no massage of the human body by hand, nor does her business involve the use of oil rubs, salt glows, hot or cold packs, tub, shower, sitz or similar baths, or cabinet baths, nor any disrobing of the customer, nor the use of towels, except paper towels for the head rest on the couch and on the platform of the foot table.
The Chancellor, after hearing the evidence of the parties and viewing the operation of the mechanical equipment used in appellee's business, entered his final decree, in which he found that the term "massage" has a well-defined meaning; that the generally accepted meaning of the term "massage" is a "rubbing, stroking or kneading" of the body; that the electrical equipment used by appellee causes, through electrical impulses or by some other means, a vibration to the body, but that "said equipment does not massage, rub, stroke or knead the body," and decreeing that the appellee is not engaged in the practice of massage as contemplated by the provisions of Chapter 480, Florida Statutes 1941, as amended, F.S.A.
The appellant contends, on this appeal, that the lower court erred in applying the general definition of the word "massage" in its interpretation of the statute, and that the Legislature, by amending the Act in 1947, Chapter 23751, to add to the definition the words "electrical apparatus" and "reducing or contouring" thereby expressly defined the term "massage" to include such equipment as that used by appellee. With this contention we cannot agree.
The statute regulates the practice of "the art of body massage, either by hand or with any mechanical or electrical apparatus for the purpose of body massaging, reducing or contouring * * *" It is our opinion that, by appending the term "electrical apparatus" as a descriptive phrase to "the art of body massage," the Legislature has clearly limited such electrical apparatus to that which rubs, strokes or kneads the body, according to the general definition of the term "massage". It is true that the Legislature has also included in its definition other practices, ordinarily found in a massage establishment, which do not involve a rubbing, stroking or kneading of the body, such as hot and cold packs, tub, shower, sitz, and cabinet baths, but this merely reinforces our opinion, since the Legislature could have added "electrical apparatus" to this group of practices not involving an actual massage of the body.
Moreover, it is provided by Section 480.09, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., that the minimum educational requirements for a registered masseur or masseuse are 100 hours of physiology, 100 hours of anatomy, 100 hours of massage, 200 hours of hydrotherapy, and 100 hours of hygiene and practical demonstration in an approved massage school. Since, by no stretch of the imagination, can it be said that a knowledge of such subjects is essential to the purely mechanical operation of the electrical equipment here involved, or that such knowledge would add to the competency of the operator of such equipment, we think it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to include the use of the electrical equipment here involved in its definition of a masseur or masseuse.
For the reasons stated, the final decree of the court below is
Affirmed.
ADAMS, C.J., and TERRELL and THOMAS, JJ., concur.