Opinion
CIVIL 1:21-CV-349
04-29-2022
RONALD L. FLEMING, Plaintiff v. KELLY YATES, et al., Defendants.
MANNION JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definite statement, filed by one of the defendants named in the plaintiff's amended complaint, Correctional Officer Kerwin. The plaintiff, Ronald Fleming, is a prodigious, but prodigiously unsuccessful, pro se litigant who has filed multiple lawsuits over the past fifteen years, many of which have been summarily dismissed. Fleming, who has described himself in this case as both bipolar and schizophrenic, (Doc. 6-1), initially filed a pro se complaint which seemed to relate to a state criminal case in Adams County, Pennsylvania in which Fleming was he defendant. (Doc. 1). Following a screening review of Fleming's initial complaint, Fleming then filed an amended complaint, (Doc. 10), which is the subject of Defendant Kerwin's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement of his claim. (Doc. 33).
This motion highlights a particular challenge that the court and the parties are experiencing in this case. Simply put, Mr. Fleming's pleadings demand a great deal from the reader. They are often unintelligible and are set forth in a fashion lacks content, context, or factual continuity. Moreover, Mr. Fleming occasionally submits what appear to be internally inconsistent filings, fostering confusion regarding the true nature of the claims he wishes to bring and the parties he intends to sue.
The defense motion currently before the court aptly illustrates these challenges. With respect to C.O. Kerwin, Fleming's amended complaint contains the following cryptic averment:
(Unknown date)(Plaintiff Ronald Fleming Jr.), (Pro Se), avers that (Defendant C.O. Kerwin [sic]), sprayed the plaintiff with “(Oleors-In capsicum)” mace, “(in violation of Plaintiffs)” (8th) and, (14th) “(Amendment)” on seval [sic] occasions, dates will be proven as this civil case moves foreward [sic]...(Doc. 10, ¶ 7).
As to Kerwin, this passage is the totality of what Fleming has alleged in support of a constitutional tort claim. Thus, Fleming's allegations against this defendant consist of little more than the talismanic recital of the elements of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim that are unmoored in time and lack any factual specificity. Moreover, this already murky claim is further clouded by the fact that, following the filing of C.O. Kerwin's motion to dismiss, or for a more definite statement, Fleming submitted a second amended complaint, which no longer names Kerwin as a defendant. (Doc. 41). Thus, it is entirely unclear at this juncture whether Fleming continues to bring any claims against Defendant Kerwin.
However, what is clear is that Fleming's averments against Kerwin fail as a matter of law as they are currently pleaded. Therefore, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definite statement of this claim, be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __U.S__, 129 S.CT. 1937 (2009), Pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
B. Motion for More Definite Statement--Rule 12 (e)
In the alternative, citing the ambiguities in Flemings' amended complaint Defendant Kerwin has submitted a motion for more definite statement of this claim pursuant to Rule 12 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12 (e) provides in pertinent part that:
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (e).
Rule 12 (e) motions for more definite statements are governed by familiar legal standards. As we have noted:
[Defendants are entitled to such relief in a case . . ., where a plaintiff's complaint is vague and ambiguous on important factual matters. Indeed, as the courts have observed, the vehicle for gaining an understanding of the plaintiff's claims is a motion for more definite statement, made under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
Under Rule 12(e), a defendant may move for a more definite statement “[i]f a pleading . . . is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). The Rule 12(e) “motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Id. When a complaint fashioned under a notice pleading standard does not disclose the facts underlying a plaintiff's claim for relief, the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to frame a proper, fact-specific . . . defense .... The Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is perhaps the best procedural tool available to obtain the factual basis underlying a plaintiff's claim for relief.Thomas v. Independence Tp., 463 F.3d 285, 301 (3d Cir.2006). Hollinghead v. City of York, 912 F.Supp.2d 209, 227 (M.D. Pa. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Hollinghead v. City of New York, 592 Fed.Appx. 110 (3d Cir. 2015).
C. Defendant Kerwin's Motion Should Be Granted.
Judged against these benchmarks, Fleming's claims against Defendant Kerwin are fatally ambiguous and legally insufficient. Therefore, this motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definite statement of Fleming's claims, should be granted. Indeed, with respect to Defendant Kerwin presently ambiguities abound regarding the nature of Fleming's claims. In large measure, these ambiguities are a product of Fleming's approach to this litigation, an approach which compounds the confusion regarding his claims and the parties he intends to sue.
Indeed, we cannot even determine whether Fleming is still seeking to sue Kerwin since he has now tendered a new amended complaint which does not name Kerwin as a party. (Doc. 41). Given this newly filed amended complaint that does not identify Kerwin as a defendant, there is a genuine issue regarding whether Fleming has completely abandoned this claim against C.O. Kerwin. Given these patent ambiguities, at a minimum Fleming should be obliged to file a more definite statement of his claim clarifying whether he is even pursuing a complaint against this defendant.
Moreover, in its current form Fleming's allegations against Kerwin are woefully inadequate. As to C.O. Kerwin, Fleming simply recites in a cursory fashion that:
(Unknown date)(Plaintiff Ronald Fleming Jr.), (Pro Se), avers that (Defendant C.O. Kerwin [sic]), sprayed the plaintiff with “(Oleors-In capsicum)” mace, “(in violation of Plaintiffs)” (8th) and, (14th) “(Amendment)” on seval [sic] occasions, dates will be proven as this civil case moves foreward [sic].. .(Doc. 10, ¶ 7).
Upon consideration, Fleming's averments against Defendant Kerwin consist of little “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions [a form of pleading which] will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Since “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, this complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Furthermore, these allegations are presented without any factual detail beyond the averment that Kerwin sprayed Fleming with O.C. spray and the complaint provides no temporal context for these alleged events stating instead that “dates will be proven as this civil case moves foreward [sic].. .” (Doc. 10, ¶ 7). The failure of the plaintiff to even aver when these events are alleged to have occurred renders his complaint so vague and ambiguous that Defendant Kerwin is completely handicapped in endeavoring to response to these allegations. Plainly, more is needed here if the defense is to respond to these allegations. In such circumstances, an order dismissing this flawed complaint against Kerwin and directing Fleming to file a more definite statement of his claim through an amended complaint would be appropriate.
Fleming's isolated reference to the use of O.C. spray does not save this claim. In a correctional setting, it is clear that deploying O.C. spray does not per se constitute the use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Gibson v. Flemming, 837 Fed.Appx. 860, 862 (3d Cir. 2020). In short, in this setting, factual context matters. This is why Fleming's complaint, which is largely devoid of well-pleaded facts, fails.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendant Kerwin's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definite statement, (Doc. 33), be GRANTED.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.