Opinion
Civil Action No: 04-2740 Section: "R" (3).
December 14, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Transocean Offshore USA Inc. moves to dismiss plaintiff Charles Fleming's claim relating to "prior knee injuries" for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In the alternative, Transocean moves for a more definite statement of that claim under Rule 12(e). Plaintiff has not opposed the motion. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Transocean's motion.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Charles Fleming was employed by Transocean aboard the Transocean Rather. On June 25, 2002, Fleming suffered "serious painful injuries to his knees" while employed by Transocean and allegedly as a result of its negligence, which rendered him unfit for duty. On October 5, 2004, Fleming sued Transocean. Fleming asserts that he is entitled to compensation for this injury from Transocean. Fleming also alleges, in paragraphs XI-XIII of his complaint, that he "had previously sustained an injury to his left knee." (Compl. at ¶ XI). Fleming asserts that he had an arthroscopy on that knee on May 7, 2002, and had fully recovered by June 25, 2002, the date he allegedly sustained the injury described earlier in the complaint. (Id. at ¶ XII). Finally, Fleming asserts that he did not know the nature and extent of the pre-existing injury until April 2002 and that, to the extent he had injuries before June 25, 2002 and was not aware of them, he is entitled to damages for those injuries.
Transocean now moves to dismiss Fleming's complaint or, in the alternative, requests a more definite statement. Fleming has not filed an opposition to this motion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
Transocean argues that Fleming has failed to state a claim for relief as to injuries he sustained before June 25, 2002, because Transocean cannot tell from Fleming's complaint "whether it is even being sued for damages as a result of any prior knee injuries." In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiff's favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
The Court cannot conclude at this stage that Fleming has no claim for injuries sustained before June 25, 2002. Transocean's motion to dismiss is denied.
B. Motion for More Definite Statement
In the alternative, Transocean requests a more definite statement as to the date and circumstances of the injuries Fleming allegedly sustained before June 25, 2002. A district court will grant a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) when the pleading at issue "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). The motion must state the defects in the pleading and the details desired. See id. A party, however, may not use a Rule 12(e) motion as a substitute for discovery. See Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959). Given the liberal pleading standard set forth in Rule 8, Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored. See id., 269 F.2d at 132; Gibson v. Deep Delta Contractors, Inc., No. Civ.A. 97-3791, 2000 WL 28174 at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 14, 2000). At the same time, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]f a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice," then a Rule 12(e) motion may be appropriate. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002). In deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion, the trial judge is given considerable discretion. See Newcourt Leasing Corp. v. Regional Bio-Clinical Lab, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-2626, 2000 WL 134700 at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2000) (citing MedRehab v. Evangeline of Natchitoches, Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-1663, 1998 WL 671287 at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 24, 1998)).
Here, the information Transocean seeks about injuries Fleming sustained before June 25, 2002 can be easily obtained through discovery. Because a party may not use a Rule 12(e) motion as a substitute for discovery, and because Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored, Transocean's motion for a more definite statement is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies both Transocean's motion to dismiss and its alternative motion for a more definite statement.