Opinion
Case No. C03-0278L
May 14, 2003
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss (Dkt. #7) filed by defendant International Association of Machinists, District 141 ("the Union") The Court grants the Union's motion for the reasons set forth in this Order.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Background.
Plaintiffs Dennis Flathau, et al ("Plaintiffs"), are former employees of United Air Lines ("United"). Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, United offered certain employees an early retirement package. See Flathau Decl. Ex A Plaintiffs allege that the Union made certain representations regarding the benefits to which Plaintiffs would be entitled after the Union established a new collective bargaining agreement with United and that Plaintiffs relied upon those representations in deciding to retire early. (Complaint ¶¶ 7, 8). Specifically, the alleged representations were that Plaintiffs' medical insurance premiums would be "capped" and that Plaintiffs would receive the improvements in the collective bargaining agreement that active Union members employed at United would enjoy. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiffs accepted United's early retirement offer in the fall of 2001.
On May 14, 2002, United and the Union entered into a new collective bargaining agreement Contrary to the Union's alleged representations, the collective bargaining agreement did not cap Plaintiffs' medical insurance premiums or provide Plaintiffs with exactly the same benefits that active Union members employed at United enjoyed.
On November 1, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in United States District Court for the Western District of Washington alleging the Union's breach of the duty of fair representation pursuant to the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). See Flathau, et al v. IAM, District 141, C02-2224P. On January 7, 2003, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(i). See id. Dkt. #12. On January 17, 2003, Plaintiffs filed the present action in King County Superior Court. Plaintiffs assert two causes of action against the Union: (1) breach of the common law duty of fair representation due to the Union's failure to secure a cap on medical insurance premiums, and (2) a promissory estoppel claim. (Complaint ¶¶ 6, 8) On February 7, 2003, the Union removed the action to this Court.
The Union contends that both Plaintiffs' common law duty of fair representation claim and the promissory estoppel claim are preempted by the federal duty of fair representation pursuant to the RLA.
B. Standard.
In the context of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must (1) construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and (3) determine whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). When the facts and dates alleged in the complaint indicate that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted Jablon v. Dean Witter Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980).
In support of their response in opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs submit a declaration by Dennis Flathau and contend that "[w]ith the submission and the Court's consideration of Mr. Flathau's declaration, defendant's motion to dismiss will necessarily be treated as a motion for summary judgment." (Response at 7).
Fed. R Civ. P. 12(c) provides in relevant part that "[i]f, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment" However, Flathau's declaration adds nothing to the Court's analysis regarding whether Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by federal law and time-barred. Therefore whether the motion is termed a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is immaterial Cf. North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1983) (when court does not rely upon supplemental material and expressly states that it is dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, court may treat motion as motion to dismiss and is not required to follow summary judgment procedures).
C. Preemption.
1. First Cause of Action.
Plaintiffs' first cause of action consists of the following:
In failing to secure for plaintiffs a capping of the medical insurance premiums and other benefits hereinafter stated in this complaint, defendant, as the collective bargaining agent, breached its common law duty of fairly representing plaintiffs and was guilty of discrimination and unequal treatment of plaintiffs as against the other UAL employees who did not seek such early retirement.
(Complaint ¶ 6). The Union contends that Plaintiffs' purported breach of the common law duty of fair representation is preempted by federal law "because it is bluntly pleaded in the very language that gives rise to the federally-created duty of fair representation." (Motion at 8).
Plaintiffs state that there is currently "no appreciable difference" between the medical premiums of Plaintiffs and current Union members working at United and therefore "the Court is justified in concluding that . . . plaintiffs' first cause of action [is] premature" (Response at 5). Additionally, plaintiffs appear not to contest that the first cause of action is preempted by federal law. See Response at 6 ("The issue presented to the Court is whether plaintiffs' second cause of action, predicated on promissory estoppel, is preempted by the Railway Labor Act."). However, to the extent that Plaintiffs' response addresses the Union's preemption argument, the Court considers that as it applies to Plaintiffs' first cause of action.
"[T]he statutory duty of fair representation arises when by statute the union is the employees' exclusive bargaining agent with the employer."Archer v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 609 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing International Bhd. of Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 46-47 (1979)) The parties do not dispute that the Union was Plaintiffs' exclusive bargaining agent with United or that such representation is governed by the RLA. When a plaintiff's claims are based on the union's failure adequately to represent her, the claims are preempted by the federal labor law governing the union's representation of the plaintiff.Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that to the extent plaintiffs claims were based on the union's failure to represent her, claims were preempted by the Labor-Management Relations Act).
"Federal courts that have considered the preemption doctrine in the duty of fair representation context have consistently held that state law claims of union misconduct are preempted where the conduct at issue is the subject to the union's statutory duties as exclusive representative, because that relationship is governed solely by the duty of fair representation" Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 1994 WL 247442, *6 (D. Kan. 1994) (citing opinions in which negligence, fraud, tortious interference, misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and conspiracy claims against unions were found preempted by federal law). "The one exception . . . to this policy of preemption has been common law torts involving violence or other intentionally wrongful, outrageous conduct unrelated to the union's representational functions and obligations" Id.
Here, Plaintiffs' claims that the Union breached its common law duty of fair representation and discriminated against Plaintiffs fall within the ambit of the federal duty of fair representation and therefore are preempted by the RLA. See BIW Deceived v. Local S6, 132 F.3d 824, 831-32 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that, though "garbed in state-law raiment," claims implicating the duty of fair representation are subject to preemption).
2. Second Cause of Action.
In their second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that they "reasonably relied to their detriment on the assurances and promises made to them made by" the Union. (Complaint ¶ 8). Plaintiffs characterize this claim as "predicated upon promissory estoppel." (Response at 5). Plaintiffs contend that their second cause of action is not preempted by the RLA because it does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement See id. at 8-13 (citing Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994) and other opinions).
Although Plaintiffs are correct in noting that certain claims for which no interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is necessary may not be preempted by federal labor law, Plaintiffs fail to address preemption of claims by virtue of their being within the ambit of the duty of fair representation. That failure is apparent in Plaintiffs' assertion that "[i]t doesn't take a quantum leap of logic for the Court to conclude that the Hawaiian Airlines case and its progeny apply equally to the case at bar where an employee sues his or her union for promissory estoppel" (Response at 10). Plaintiffs are incorrect. The cases upon which Plaintiffs rely involve claims for which the alleged preemption was based upon a collective bargaining agreement. However, preemption on the basis of a collective bargaining agreement is only one form of preemption; "[p]reemption also can occur by operation of the so-called duty of fair representation." BIW Deceived, 132 F.3d at 830. It would be a "quantum leap" for this Court to ignore preemption on the basis of the duty of fair representation where the claim is within the ambit of that duty. Plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim is within the ambit of the duty of fair representation, and therefore is preempted by the RLA. See Eisenberg v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 125, 128 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (finding that plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim is "so inextricably intertwined and identical in substance to [the duty of fair representation claim that it is] preempted by the RLA")
D. Statute of Limitations.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes a six-month limitations period for RLA-based duty of fair representation claims. Lea v. Republic Airlines, 903 F.2d 624, 633 (9th Cir. 1990). The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows of or should have known about the defendant's alleged wrongdoing. Stone v. Writers Guild of America, 101 F.3d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1996). Based upon the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint, Plaintiffs either knew of or should have known about the Union's alleged wrongdoing when the new collective bargaining agreement was signed on May 14, 2002. (Complaint ¶ 4) Plaintiffs did not file this action until more than eight months after the statute of limitations began to run and Plaintiffs have offered no reason why the statute of limitations period may have been tolled. This action is therefore time-barred, and will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Union's motion to dismiss (Dkt #7) Plaintiffs' action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Union and against Plaintiffs The Clerk of the Court is also directed to send copies of this Order to all counsel of record