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Fizzinoglia v. Town of Austerlitz

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Jun 7, 2012
96 A.D.3d 1142 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

Opinion

2012-06-7

Frank J. FIZZINOGLIA et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF AUSTERLITZ et al., Defendants, and Dorothy Bakker, Defendant and Third–Party Plaintiff–Appellant; Asbjorn Lunde, Third–Party Defendant, and Serge Bervey, Individually and Doing Business as Bervey Excavation, Third–Party Defendant–Respondent. (And Another Third–Party Action.).

Pemberton & Briggs, Schenectady (Paul Briggs of counsel), for defendant and third-party plaintiff-appellant. O'Connor, O'Connor, Bresee & First, P.C., Albany (George J. Hoffman Jr. of counsel), for Charles W. Schroth and another, defendants and third-party plaintiffs-appellants.



Pemberton & Briggs, Schenectady (Paul Briggs of counsel), for defendant and third-party plaintiff-appellant. O'Connor, O'Connor, Bresee & First, P.C., Albany (George J. Hoffman Jr. of counsel), for Charles W. Schroth and another, defendants and third-party plaintiffs-appellants.
Francis J. Roche, Hudson, for third-party defendant-respondent.



Before: PETERS, P.J., ROSE, LAHTINEN, MALONE JR. and GARRY, JJ.

ROSE, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGrath, J.), entered April 27, 2011 in Columbia County, which granted third-party defendant Serge Bervey's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaints against him.

The underlying facts are more fully set forth in our prior decision in this action, in which we reversed an order granting third-party defendant Asbjorn Lunde summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaints against him (94 A.D.3d 1381, 943 N.Y.S.2d 267 [2012] ). Briefly, plaintiffs commenced this action in 2007 seeking damages in connection with defendants' construction and maintenance of culverts, trenches and drainage ditches under Dugway Road in the Town of Austerlitz, Columbia County and in the vicinity of a privately-owned road known as Blueberry Lane. Third-party defendant Serge Bervey constructed Blueberry Lane in 2003 pursuant to a contract with Lunde, who then owned the property. Defendant Dorothy Bakker now owns Blueberry Lane and, with defendants Charles W. Schroth, Carolyn F. Schroth, Jonathan R. Stotts and Shannon E. Stotts, is responsible for its maintenance. As relevant here, Bakker and the Schroths (hereinafter collectively referred to as third-party plaintiffs) commenced third-party actions against both Lunde and Bervey seeking contribution based on their alleged negligence in the design and construction of Blueberry Lane and its water runoff and drainage systems. After joinder of issue, but before discovery, Bervey moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party actions against him. Supreme Court granted the motion and third-party plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Bervey supported his motion with his affidavit detailing that, pursuant to a verbal contract with Lunde, he did the bulldozing, grading and related work on Blueberry Lane in 2003. Bervey also stated that Lunde's engineer and the Town's engineer periodically inspected his work and approved the completed road, and he was not made aware of any alleged defects in his work until he was served with the third-party complaint in 2009. Under these circumstances, Bervey met his initial burden of establishing that, as a contracting party, he could not be held liable to third parties in tort ( see Stiver v. Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 253, 257, 848 N.Y.S.2d 585, 878 N.E.2d 1001 [2007];Church v. Callanan Indus., 99 N.Y.2d 104, 111, 752 N.Y.S.2d 254, 782 N.E.2d 50 [2002];Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 138–139, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485 [2002] ). In response, third-party plaintiffs argue that issues of fact exist as to whether a legal duty can be imposed on Bervey based on two of the three recognized exceptions to this general rule: whether Bervey launched a force or instrument of harm, and whether they were entitled to rely on his obligation to construct and maintain the road ( see Stiver v. Good & Fair Carting & Moving, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d at 257, 848 N.Y.S.2d 585, 878 N.E.2d 1001;Kennedy v. Atlas Fence, Inc., 90 A.D.3d 1122, 1123, 933 N.Y.S.2d 766 [2011] ).

We agree with Supreme Court that third-party plaintiffs failed to come forward with any evidence to support their claim. While they point to plaintiff's testimony that he never experienced any debris running into his pond prior to the construction of the road, they fail to offer any evidence that the construction of the road was in any way negligent or rebut Bervey's evidence that the road was inspected and approved by the engineers. Absent such evidence, there is no basis for a finding that Bervey launched an instrument of harm so as to be held liable in tort on the contribution claim ( cf. Gordon v. Pitney Bowes Management Servs., 94 A.D.3d 813, 814, 942 N.Y.S.2d 155 [2012];see LaMoy v. MH Contrs., LLC, 78 A.D.3d 1311, 1313, 911 N.Y.S.2d 203 [2010];Dennebaum v. Rotterdam Sq., 6 A.D.3d 1045, 1047, 776 N.Y.S.2d 136 [2004] ).

As for their alleged reliance on Bervey to continue to maintain the road, third-party plaintiffs submitted estimates that Bervey provided to the Stotts' predecessors-in-interest in 2004 and the Schroths in 2005 for maintenance of the road. Supreme Court correctly held, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish reliance because the estimates were not supported with any proof in admissible form from someone with personal knowledge about the circumstances surrounding Bervey's alleged maintenance. Nor did third-party plaintiffs demonstrate that further discovery would reveal material facts within Bervey's exclusive control ( see Ingalsbe v. Chicago Ins. Co., 287 A.D.2d 939, 940, 731 N.Y.S.2d 782 [2001];Welsh v. County of Albany, 235 A.D.2d 820, 822, 652 N.Y.S.2d 384 [1997] ). As the parties responsible for the maintenance of the road, third-party plaintiffs clearly would have any information about its maintenance available to them. Furthermore, there being no evidence of a contractual obligation between Bervey and third-party plaintiffs to maintain the road, there is no basis to conclude that plaintiffs reasonably relied upon any such contractual obligation by Bervey ( see e.g. Church v. Callanan Indus., 99 N.Y.2d at 112, 752 N.Y.S.2d 254, 782 N.E.2d 50;Norton v. Albany County Airport Auth., 52 A.D.3d 871, 872, 859 N.Y.S.2d 296 [2008];Moran v. City of Schenectady, 47 A.D.3d 1001, 1003, 851 N.Y.S.2d 655 [2008] ).

Finding no evidence in the record that either of the claimed exceptions applies, we agree with Supreme Court that Bervey had no duty to plaintiffs. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment dismissing the third party actions for contribution against Bervey was properly granted.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, MALONE JR. and GARRY, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Fizzinoglia v. Town of Austerlitz

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
Jun 7, 2012
96 A.D.3d 1142 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
Case details for

Fizzinoglia v. Town of Austerlitz

Case Details

Full title:Frank J. FIZZINOGLIA et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF AUSTERLITZ et al.…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Date published: Jun 7, 2012

Citations

96 A.D.3d 1142 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
946 N.Y.S.2d 301
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 4451