Opinion
23A-CT-1749
06-25-2024
Derek D. Fingers, Appellant-Defendant v. James Basinger, et al., Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorneys for Appellees Basinger, Carter, Vanihel, Allen, Smith and Holcomb Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellees Byrd and Riggs Jeb A. Crandall Travis W. Montgomery Bleeke Dillon Crandall, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court The Honorable Robert E. Hunley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 77C01-2209-CT-516
Attorneys for Appellees Basinger, Carter, Vanihel, Allen, Smith and Holcomb Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Abigail R. Recker Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellees Byrd and Riggs Jeb A. Crandall Travis W. Montgomery Bleeke Dillon Crandall, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PYLE, JUDGE
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Derek D. Fingers ("Fingers"), an inmate in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), appeals pro se the trial court's dismissal of his prisoner complaint raising a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") against various prison employees and prison medical providers. Fingers argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2, which provides a screening procedure for prisoner's complaints. Concluding that there was no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In his complaint, Fingers identified the prison employees and prison medical providers as the following: Commissioner Robert Carter, Jr. ("Commissioner Carter"); Deputy Commissioner James Basinger ("Deputy Commissioner Basinger"); Warden Vanihel ("Warden Vanihel"); Correctional Officer Allen ("Officer Allen"); Correctional Officer Smith ("Officer Smith"); Lieutenant Holcomb ("Lieutenant Holcomb") (collectively, "the State Defendants"); Dr. Byrd ("Dr. Byrd"); Nurse Riggs ("Nurse Riggs"); Nurse Jenifer ("Nurse Jenifer"); and Nurse Leann ("Nurse Leann") (collectively, "the Medical Defendants") ("State Defendants" and "Medical Defendants" collectively referred to as "the Defendants).
[¶2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Fingers' complaint.
Facts
[¶3] This appeal stems from the trial court's order dismissing Fingers' complaint pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2. Therefore, we set forth the underlying facts as contained in Fingers' complaint, which our standard of review requires us to accept as true.
[¶4] In August 2022, Fingers was an inmate in the DOC's Wabash Valley Correctional Facility ("WVCF") and was housed in a restrictive housing unit. From August 4 to August 11, 2022, Fingers refused to eat any food or drink any liquids. On August 10, 2022, at 12:20 p.m., Fingers fainted while he was in the shower. Officers Smith and Allen took Fingers back to his cell. That same day, around 4:30 p.m., Fingers was taken to have his vitals checked. Nurse Jenifer took Fingers' vitals and saw that Fingers' heart rate was "around 160" and his oxygen level was "low[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 21). Nurse Jenifer called Dr. Byrd, and they decided to send Fingers to the WVCF infirmary. When Fingers was at the infirmary, Nurse Leann offered fluids to Fingers. However, Fingers refused treatment because he believed he would be poisoned by DOC staff in retaliation for previous complaints he had made.
[¶5] The following day, Fingers was taken to a Terre Haute hospital ("the Terre Haute hospital") after it "was discovered" that Fingers' heart rate and oxygen level put him "on the verge of cardiac arrest." (App. Vol. 2 at 25). As soon as Fingers arrived at the Terre Haute hospital, Fingers asked to be transferred to a hospital in Indianapolis. A nurse at the Terre Haute hospital read the hospital's policy for inmates from the WVCF, and Fingers was placed in restraints. Thereafter, upon Fingers' request, he was discharged from the Terre Haute hospital without being seen by a doctor.
[¶6] In September 2022, Fingers filed a "Prisoner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Complaint" against the Defendants. (App. Vol. 2 at 13). Fingers alleged that the Defendants had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Fingers sought compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants in their official and individual capacities.
[¶7] In Fingers' complaint, he separated his deliberate indifference claim into two parts. In the first part, he alleged that two of the State Defendants, Officers Allen and Smith, had shown deliberate indifference to Fingers' medical needs when they returned him to his cell after he had fainted instead of calling for a "medical emergency signal[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 19). Fingers alleged that the two officers were "aware of [Fingers'] medical issue of his insides eating its self [sic] due to not having eaten, or drinked [sic] any liquids" and that they "knew that [Fingers] was at risk of cardiac arrest." (App. Vol. 2 at 18).
[¶8] In the second part of his claim, Fingers generally alleged that the remaining State Defendants and the Medical Defendants had shown deliberate indifference to Fingers' medical needs. Fingers specifically alleged that Lieutenant Holcomb, who was the supervisor of Fingers' housing unit, was required to document Fingers' refusal to eat and drink and that it was the lieutenant's responsibility "to assure that [Fingers] was receiving the necessary medical treatment[,] which was [to] be[] force fed at a hospital, and actually being sent to a hospital" after it "was discovered" that Fingers had had a heart rate of 160 and a low oxygen level. (App. Vol. 2 at 21). Fingers also alleged that Nurse Jenifer knew of Fingers' heart rate and oxygen level and had consulted Dr. Byrd. He also alleged that Nurse Jenifer and Dr. Byrd showed deliberate indifference when they transferred Fingers to the infirmary instead of transferring him to an outside hospital. Fingers also alleged that Nurse Leann, who had offered fluids to Fingers while in the infirmary, "knew that . . . Fingers['] insides were eating its self [sic], and his heart rate was at risk of cardiac arrest[.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 23). Additionally, Fingers alleged that Warden Vanihel, Commissioner Carter, Deputy Commissioner Basinger, Dr. Byrd, and Nurse Riggs had been "kept up dated [sic] as to [Fingers'] worsening serious medical condition" and that they knew that Fingers should have been taken to an outside hospital "to be force fed because his insides were already eating its self [sic][.]" (App. Vol. 2 at 24).
[¶9] In January 2023, State Defendants filed a motion to screen and stay the matter ("motion to screen"). State Defendants sought to have the trial court screen Fingers' complaint under INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2, which provides a screening mechanism for a complaint filed by an offender. Medical Defendants filed a motion to join in State Defendants' motion to screen. The trial court granted the joint motion to screen Fingers' complaint.
An offender is a "person who is committed to the department of correction or incarcerated in jail." I.C. § 34-6-2-89(b).
[¶10] Thereafter, in July 2023, the trial court screened Fingers' complaint and issued an order dismissing it. The trial court's order provided, in relevant part, that "[t]he claims set forth in [Fingers'] Complaint are determined to be frivolous, fail to state a claim[,] and seek[] relief from a defendant who is immune" and that Fingers' complaint "fail[ed] to set forth sufficient factual detail to notify [the] Defendants of the claims against them." (App. Vol. 2 at 12).
[¶11] Fingers now appeals.
Decision
[¶12] Fingers contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his complaint under INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2. We disagree. We note that the trial court identified various reasons for the dismissal of Fingers' complaint; however, we will focus on the trial court's conclusion that Fingers had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that his claim was frivolous because it lacked an arguable basis in fact or law. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 853 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (explaining that our Court may affirm the trial court's dismissal of an offender's complaint on any theory or basis supported by the record), trans. denied.
[¶13] At the outset, we note that Fingers has chosen to proceed pro se. "[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented." Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). "[O]ne acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets." Id. (cleaned up). Pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), reh'g denied. We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood. Id. at 984.
[¶14] We now turn to Fingers' argument that the trial court erred by dismissing his Section 1983 complaint under INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2. Our legislature enacted the offender complaint screening procedure in INDIANA CODE § 34-581-2 "to prevent 'abusive and prolific offender litigation in Indiana.'" Taylor v. Antisdel, 185 N.E.3d 867, 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (quoting Smith v. Indiana Dep't of Correction, 883 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied. Our Indiana Supreme Court has referred to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2 as "the Frivolous Claim Law[.]" See Smith, 883 N.E.2d at 803-04.
[¶15] INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) A court shall review a complaint or petition filed by an offender and shall determine if the claim may proceed. A claim may not proceed if the court determines that the claim:
(1) is frivolous;
(2) is not a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from liability for such relief.
(b) A claim is frivolous under subsection (a)(1) if the claim:
(1) is made primarily to harass a person; or
(2) lacks an arguable basis either in:
(A) law; or
(B) fact.I.C. § 34-58-1-2.
[¶16] When reviewing the dismissal of an offender's complaint pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2, we employ a de novo standard of review. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), trans. denied, cert. dismissed. "Like the trial court, we look only to the well-pleaded facts contained in the complaint[.]" Id. Moreover, we determine whether the complaint "contains allegations concerning all of the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. We may affirm the trial court's dismissal of an offender's complaint on any theory or basis supported by the record. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 853 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied.
[¶17] Here, Fingers filed his complaint under Section 1983 and sought compensatory and punitive damages against the Defendants in their official and individual capacities. Section 1983 provides, in part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (emphasis added). "Section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own but was designed to prevent the states from violating the [C]onstitution . . . and to compensate injured plaintiffs for deprivations of those federal rights." Melton v. Indiana Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 649 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (cleaned up), reh'g denied, trans. denied. See also Hill v. Chesterfield, 227 N.E.3d 949, 951 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024) ("Section 1983 provides a vehicle by which plaintiffs can sue persons who abuse state power in a way that violates federal law.") (cleaned up).
[¶18] To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States[;] and (2) the defendant acted under the color of state law." Melton, 156 N.E.3d at 649 (cleaned up). However, "before evaluating a plaintiff's [Section 1983] claim, it is necessary to determine whether a particular defendant is a 'person' within the meaning of [Section 1983] and thus, amenable to suit." Id.
[¶19] There are three factors to be considered in determining whether a particular entity is a "person" for the purpose of a Section 1983 claim: (1) "the type of governmental entity being sued[;]" (2) "whether the plaintiff seeks retrospective (monetary) or prospective (injunctive) relief[;]" and (3) "whether the suit is brought against a state official in an official or individual capacity." Id. Based on these factors, five general rules have emerged regarding whether an entity is a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983:
1) a municipality, municipal official, or other local governmental unit or political subdivision may be sued for retrospective or prospective relief; 2) a state or state agency may not be sued under [S]ection 1983 regardless of the type of relief requested; 3) a state official cannot be sued in his official capacity for retrospective relief but can be sued for prospective relief; 4) a state official can be sued in his individual capacity for retrospective relief; and 5) an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court is not considered a [S]ection 1983 "person" in state court.Id. at 649-50 (cleaned up).
[¶20] In Fingers' Section 1983 complaint, he sought retrospective relief-in the form of compensatory and punitive damages-against the Defendants in their official and individual capacities. Because "a state official cannot be sued in his official capacity for retrospective relief[,]" Fingers could not state a valid Section 1983 claim for relief against the Defendants in their official capacities. See id. at 649.
[¶21] Therefore, we turn to Fingers' claim for retrospective relief against the Defendants in their individual capacities. See id. (explaining that "a state official can be sued in his individual capacity for retrospective relief"). Fingers alleged that the Defendants had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
[¶22] "The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment by prison officials[,]" including "prison guards" and "prison doctors[.]" Zaragoza v. Wexford of Indiana, LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 154-55 (Ind. 2024) (cleaned up). "This guarantee safeguards the prisoner against a lack of medical care that may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose." Id. (cleaned up). The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual 'conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual 'punishments.'" Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Moreover, "[d]eliberate indifference is not medical malpractice; the Eighth Amendment does not codify common law torts." Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
[¶23] "To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim [for deliberate indifference], a plaintiff must show that the responsible prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs." Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2000). To establish a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show an objective and a subjective element. Zaragoza, 225 N.E.3d at 155. Specifically, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the medical condition was objectively serious; and (2) the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. Under the objective element, "[a] medical need is considered sufficiently serious if the inmate's condition has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or . . . is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention." Elyea, 631 F.3d at 857 (cleaned up). "A condition is objectively serious if the failure to treat it could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Sherrod, 223 F.3d at 610 (cleaned up). For the subjective element, "a plaintiff must prove . . . a 'sufficiently culpable state of mind'-meaning 'the defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.'" Zaragoza, 225 N.E.3d at 155 (quoting Elyea, 631 F.3d at 857). "[A]cting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. "[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
[¶24] Turning to the objective element of Fingers' claim, we note that, in his complaint, Fingers alleged that he had a high heart rate and low oxygen levels that put him "on the verge of cardiac arrest." (App. Vol. 2 at 25). Fingers had refused to eat any food and drink any liquids for almost one week, and he suggests that this refusal led to his medical condition of a high heart rate and low oxygen levels. The Defendants do not dispute that Fingers' complaint alleged that he had a medical condition that was objectively serious.
[¶25] However, Fingers did not sufficiently allege the subjective element necessary to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fingers generally alleged that the Defendants had shown deliberate indifference to his medical needs, but his complaint lacked an arguable basis in fact and law to support a deliberate indifference claim, thereby making it frivolous.
[¶26] In the first part of Fingers' deliberate indifference claim, he alleged that, after he had fainted in the shower, Officers Allen and Smith had shown deliberate indifference to Fingers' medical need because they returned him to his cell instead of calling for a medical emergency. He does not allege that they knew that he had a high heart rate and low oxygen levels. Instead, he alleges that they were aware that his insides were eating themselves and that he was at risk of a cardiac arrest. Aside from this broad statement, Fingers failed to allege any facts to support such a statement or to allege that the officers, who were not medical professionals, knew of a substantial risk of harm to Fingers and disregarded the risk. See Zaragoza, 225 N.E.3d at 155.
[¶27] The crux of the second part of Fingers' deliberate indifference claim was that he had a serious medical condition of having a high heart rate and low oxygen that could have led to a cardiac arrest and that prison officials knew of the medical condition and should have transported him to an outside hospital to force feed him. However, Fingers did not provide factual allegations to show that some of the Defendants had personal involvement in the alleged violation of his constitutional right. Fingers alleged that Warden Vanihel, Commissioner Carter, Deputy Commissioner Basinger, Nurse Riggs, and Lieutenant Holcolmb were aware of his medical condition, but he makes no specific factual allegations as to how they personally acted to disregard any substantial risk of harm. "An individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in [the] alleged constitutional deprivation." Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 574 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Section 1983 creates a cause of action based upon personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation."), cert. denied. Moreover, Fingers' claim against Warden Vanihel, Commissioner Carter, Deputy Commissioner Basinger, and Lieutenant Holcolmb is not supported by the law because prison officials who are not medical professionals are entitled to rely on the professional judgment of medical professionals without subjecting themselves to Section 1983 liability. See Estate of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 458 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied.
[¶28] Additionally, Fingers' claim against the remaining Medical Defendants was not sufficiently supported by fact and law. "For a claim against a prison medical provider, the plaintiff must show that the medical professional's response was so inadequate that it demonstrated an absence of professional judgment." Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up), reh'g denied, reh'g en banc denied, cert. denied. Fingers alleged that Nurse Jenifer had checked Fingers' vitals and learned that he had a high heart rate and low oxygen level. Nurse Jenifer then consulted Dr. Byrd, and they transferred Fingers to the infirmary, where Nurse Leann offered fluids to Fingers, but he refused. The following day, Fingers was transported to the Terre Haute hospital, where he again refused treatment. In his complaint, Fingers alleged that the Medical Defendants had violated his constitutional rights because they first took him to the infirmary instead of an outside hospital. However, "[a] mere difference of opinion about a treatment decision will not suffice; [a] medical professional is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances." Id. (cleaned up). "Put slightly differently, where a prisoner has received at least some medical treatment[,] . . . he must show a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards." Id. (cleaned up).
[¶29] Because Fingers did not sufficiently state a claim upon which relief could be granted and his complaint was frivolous because it lacked an arguable basis in fact and law to support an Eight Amendment deliberate indifference claim, we conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing Fingers' complaint under INDIANA CODE § 34-58-1-2. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶30] Affirmed.
Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.