Opinion
Case No. 00-CV-72289-DT
July 24, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on Thomas Figueroa's pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is a state inmate currently confined at the Huron Valley Men's Facility in Ypsilanti, Michigan.
In 1996, a circuit court jury in Oceana County, Michigan convicted Petitioner of armed robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.349; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.797, and kidnapping, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.349; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 20.521. The convictions
stem from [Petitioner's] actions on the night of March 7, 1996, when he robbed an eighteen-year-old woman at gun point while she was working at a convenience store. At this time, the woman was four months pregnant, and she asked him not to hurt her because she was pregnant. [Petitioner] used his gun and threats to force her to accompany him in his car, where she claimed that he later raped and sodomized her after they crossed the county line. The woman testified that [Petitioner] was inebriated and drove the car into a ditch while driving. Later, [Petitioner] let her go. DNA evidence taken from semen found in the woman's undergarments was used in part to identify [Petitioner] as the perpetrator.People v. Figueroa, No. 201719 (Mich.Ct.App. Mar. 9, 1999).
Petitioner was charged with criminal sexual conduct in Newago County, Michigan, but those charges ultimately were dismissed.
The trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of fifteen to forty-five years in prison for the armed robbery and twenty-five to seventy-five years in prison for the kidnapping. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions in an unpublished per curiam opinion. See id. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. See People v. Fergueroa, No. 114557 (Mich.Sup.Ct. Nov. 29, 1999).
On May 19, 2000, Petitioner filed the pending habeas corpus petition. The supporting brief raises one question:
WAS THE PETITIONER DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVIDE THE PETITIONER WITH THE NARRATIVE OF THE DNA EXPERT IN TIMELY FASHION?
The habeas petition, however, alleges that: (1) Petitioner was denied due process and the right to present a defense when the trial judge refused discovery of certain laboratory scientists' notes; (2) the prosecutor and lawyers refused to obtain notes from laboratory workers; (3) Petitioner was denied due process and equal protection of the law because he was treated differently from similarly situated defendants who have had notes of questionable laboratory procedures withheld from them; and (4) Petitioner was denied a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses when the State hid laboratory notes. Respondent argues in an answer to the habeas petition filed through counsel that Petitioner's claim is not cognizable on habeas review or is unexhausted.
II. Exhaustion of State Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies requires state prisoners to present their claims to the state courts before raising those claims in a federal habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) and (c); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). "[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
The federal courts do not have jurisdiction to consider a claim in a habeas petition that was not "fairly presented" to the state courts. Franklin v. Rose, 811 F.2d 322, 324-25 (6th Cir. 1987). A claim may only be considered "fairly presented" if the petitioner asserted both the factual and legal basis for his claim to the state courts. Id. at 325. [There are] four actions a defendant can take which are significant to the determination whether a claim has been "fairly presented": (1) reliance upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) reliance upon state cases employing federal constitutional analysis; (3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) alleging facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law. See id. at 326. General allegations of the denial of rights to a `fair trial' and `due process' do not `fairly present' claims that specific constitutional rights were violated. Petrucelli v. Coombe, 735 F.2d 684, 688-89 (2d Cir. 1984).McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000).
Petitioner raised his habeas claim about the untimely disclosure of laboratory notes as a state law claim in the Michigan Court of Appeals and in the Michigan Supreme Court. He argued, on the basis of state law, that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering a remedy for late disclosure of discovery material. Although he alleged that he was denied a fair trial, this general allegation was insufficient to alert the state courts of a federal constitutional claim. McMeans, 228 F.3d at 681. Additionally, Petitioner did not argue in state court, as he does here, that his right to equal protection of the law and his rights to present a defense and to confront witnesses were violated.
The Court concludes that Petitioner did not fairly present all his claims to the state courts as federal constitutional issues. The Court, nevertheless, will adjudicate the habeas petition, rather than dismiss it on exhaustion grounds, because Petitioner's arguments lack merit, and the habeas petition must be denied in its entirety. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
III. Discussion A. The State Law Claim
Petitioner alleged in state court that the trial court abused its discretion in not fashioning a remedy for a violation of a discovery rule or order. Petitioner alleges here that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecution failed to provide an expert witness' laboratory notes in a timely manner. To the extent that Petitioner is asserting the same claim that he raised in state court, his claim is not cognizable here because habeas relief is available only for violations of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Allegations that the state court abused its discretion or violated state law are not grounds for habeas relief. Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 300 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)); Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1995). B. The Federal Constitutional Claims
Moreover, the Michigan Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion in admitting DNA evidence at trial because it did "not believe MCR 6.201(A)(3), which requires a party to disclose only an expert's `report' after a proper request by an opponent, also encompasses the preliminary notes a laboratory technician makes while performing DNA testing." Figueroa, Mich. Ct. App. No. 201719, at 1. In the state court's opinion, "[s]uch notes lack the permanence and conclusory nature of a report, which adequately fulfills the purpose of discovery to inform the defendant about the evidence the prosecutor intends to use against him" and "[e]ven if [Petitioner] could show a discovery violation by the prosecutor, he would be unable to show prejudice resulting from the trial court's refusal to exclude the DNA evidence or grant a continuance." Id. at 1-2.
The Court has construed Petitioner's other arguments as federal constitutional claims. Petitioner asserts that his rights to equal protection of the law and his rights to present a defense and confront witnesses were violated. In support of these claims, Petitioner alleges that the lawyers refused to obtain notes from laboratory workers, the State hid favorable laboratory notes, and the trial judge refused to give laboratory notes to him. Petitioner also asserts that the state court treated him differently from other defendants who have had notes of questionable laboratory procedures withheld.
The Court may grant the writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's adjudication of Petitioner's claim on the merits —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).
The state court adjudicated Petitioner's claims on the basis of state law. Accordingly, this Court is
obligated to conduct an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. That independent review, however, is not a full, de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is not in keeping with the strictures of the [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Sat. 1214 (1996)].Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court has held that defendants in criminal cases possess a constitutional right to a fair trial, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986), the right to defend against the State's accusations, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), and the right to confront witnesses, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987). Petitioner also possessed the right to equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. However, none of these rights were violated in this case.
The expert witness in question was Heather Spillane, a laboratory scientist for the Michigan State Police at the time of trial. Spillane testified about her DNA analysis of a vaginal swab taken from the victim, seminal stains found on the victim's underwear, and known blood samples taken from the victim and Petitioner. Spillane concluded that DNA in the sperm cells found on the vaginal swab and on the victim's underwear matched the DNA found in Petitioner's blood. According to Spillane, the odds that the sperm cells came from someone other than Petitioner were, at best, one in twenty-five million. See T II at 117-31.
"T" refers to the transcript of trial, which consists of three volumes: T I (December 5, 1996); T II (December 6, 1996); and T III (December 7, 1996).
Spillane's written report on her DNA analysis was given to defense counsel more than a month before trial. Defense counsel requested Spillane's narrative, or supporting notes, just three days before trial. The notes were "faxed" to the prosecutor on the following day, and defense counsel obtained them on the morning of the day before trial commenced. See T I at 171-73. The record does not support Petitioner's claims that Spillane's notes or any other laboratory notes were withheld from him.
Additionally, no prejudice appears to have resulted from the late receipt of Spillane's notes, which consisted of eight to ten pages. Special counsel for Petitioner was able to cross-examine Spillane thoroughly about technical aspects of her analysis and conclusions despite his assertion that he lacked adequate time to prepare for trial. The cross-examination covers thirty-six pages of transcript. See T II at 131-67.
Furthermore, there was other overwhelming evidence that Petitioner committed the crimes. The victim identified Petitioner in a photographic show-up and at trial as the man who robbed, kidnapped, and assaulted her at gunpoint. See T I at 221-22; T II at 31. An unbiased witness identified Petitioner without hesitation at a line-up and at trial as the person whose vehicle he pulled from a ditch on the night in question. See T I at 244-45; T II at 18. A yellow tow strap like the one used to pull Petitioner's vehicle out of the ditch was found in Petitioner's vehicle, see T I at 243; T II at 47, and a jacket similar to the one that Petitioner loaned the victim was found in his home, see T I at 218; T II at 15-17. One of Petitioner's friends testified that, on the day of the incident, Petitioner had said he had a gun. See T I at 269.
IV. Conclusion
Petitioner's federal constitutional rights were not violated. Therefore, the state court's denial of relief was not contrary to federal law, an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, and his habeas petition is DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); Harris, 212 F.3d at 943.