Summary
regarding U.S.C. § 1983 action
Summary of this case from Santiago v. New York City Board of HealthOpinion
99 Civ. 12457 (RWS), 99 Civ. 12458 (RWS)
October 30, 2002
GERALD A. ROSENBERG, ESQ., KERRI B. FOLB, ESQ., KATTEN MUCHIN ZAVIS ROSENMAN, New York, NY, Attorney for Plaintiffs.
HONORABLE ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General of the State of New York, VALERIE SINGLETON, Assistant Attorney General, PETER B. SULLIVAN, Assistant Attorney General, Buffalo, NY, Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION
Defendant Helen Dean sued as Deputy Superintendent for Programs at the Wende Correctional Facility (the "Deputy Superintendent") has moved pursuant to Rules 56 and 12(b)3, Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss the above actions or alternatively to retransfer these actions to the Western District of New York. Inmate plaintiffs William Figueroa ("Figueroa") and Jon Duquin ("Duquin") have opposed the motions and alternatively sought to have their complaints treated as a motion to have the Deputy Superintendent held in contempt. For the reasons set forth below, the Deputy Superintendent's motion is denied, and the complaints will be treated as motions for contempt.
Prior Proceedings
Figueroa filed his complaint on July 23, 1999. In the complaint he alleged that the Deputy Superintendent violated his rights under the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA") because she (1) did not provide qualified sign language interpreters for medical, educational, and vocational programs; (2) did not provide visual fire alarms; (3) limited his access to the text telephone; and (4) denied his request for a television with a closed-caption device. Figueroa is currently housed at Wende Correctional Facility ("Wende"), and his claims related to that facility.
Duquin filed his original complaint on November 5, 1998. The complaint was thereafter amended on August 9, 1999. The amended complaint names several other defendants and alleges that the defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide (1) a qualified sign language interpreter during sick call, orientation, grievance hearings, confidential communications with facility staff, and vocational and GED programs; (2) an effective visual fire alarm; (3) use of television sets equipped to permit closed-captioned viewing comparable to those enjoyed by hearing inmates; and (4) reasonable access to a text telephone. The complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and money damages. Duquin's complaint relates to his time spent in Wende, although he is currently housed in Woodbourne Correctional Facility ("Woodbourne") and has claims related to that facility as well.
Glenn Coord, Commissioner of New York State Department of Correctional Services; Edward Donnely, Superintendent; Mr. Cook, Lieutenant; Mr. Amato, Lieutenant; Mr. Zydel, Sergeant; Mr. Blask, Sergeant; Mr. Nowak, Corrections Officer; Mr. Mann, Corrections Officer; Mr. Rizzo, Corrections Officer; Mr. MacEvoy, Corrections Officer; Ms. Roe, Nurse Administrator, whose identity was unknown; Mr. Menadez, Corrections Officer; Mr. Hurley, Sergeant; and Mr. Kurek, Supervisor of Education, Wende Correctional Facility.
Duquin seeks to amend his complaint to the extent that it does not include events at Woodbourne. If his pleading is deemed a motion to hold defendant in civil contempt of the June 1996 order, then such amendment is not necessary as the Clarkson class includes all present and future deaf and hearing impaired inmates of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). Woodbourne is a DOCS facility.
On October 27, 1999, the attorney then representing Figueroa and Duquin filed a motion in the Western District of New York seeking a change of venue to the Southern District of New York, and on December 21, 1999, the Honorable William M. Skretny of the Western District upon consent granted the motion. The motion was premised on this Court's consent order in Clarkson v. Goord, 91 Civ. 1792.
Clarkson was commenced in this Court as a class action, brought on behalf of hearing-impaired inmates in the custody of Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). In 1995 this Court granted summary judgment awarding declaratory relief, Clarkson v. Goord, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), and on June 6, 1996, the Court approved a consent judgment and order granting extensive relief on behalf of the class.
The class was defined to consist of two sub-classes. The first of these is defined to be comprised of:
(a) all present and future deaf and hearing-impaired male inmates of the New York State Department of Correctional Services who have been, are, or will be discriminated against, solely on the basis of their disability, in receiving the rights and privileges accorded to all other inmates[.]
Figueroa and Duquin are members of that sub-class.
On March 22, 2000, a pretrial conference was held in these cases seeking to determine whether Figueroa, Dean and Robert Rohs, a plaintiff in a companion case, 99 Civ. 12459, should be represented by class counsel in Clarkson, counsel for Figueroa and Dean being unable to continue in her representation after the transfer to this Court. Discovery was stayed, and additional pretrial conferences were held seeking to sort out the issue of representation.
On February 8, 2001, the Pro Se Office was requested to seek counsel for Figueroa and Dean and present counsel were assigned and appeared on May 8, 2001. Additional conferences were held while counsel investigated the issues of representation and procedure.
On May 14, 2002, the Deputy Superintendent made the instant motions which were heard and marked submitted on June 26, 2002.
Clarkson Bars Relitigation Of Issues Disposed Of By Its Consent Degree
As a member of the class of plaintiffs certified in Clarkson, Figueroa and Duquin have the benefit of the resolution of that case, and cannot relitigate any issue which was addressed in that case:
There is of course no dispute that under elementary principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action is binding on class members and any subsequent litigation. Basic principles of res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) apply a judgment in favor of the plaintiff class extinguishes their claim, which merges into the judgment granting relief. A judgment in favor of the defendant extinguishes the claim, barring a subsequent action on that claim. A judgment in favor of either side is conclusive in a subsequent action between them on any issue actually litigated and determined, if its determination was essential to that judgment.
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (citations omitted). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985) ("Whether it wins or loses on the merits, [defendant] has a distinct and personal interest in seeking the entire plaintiff class bound by res judicata just as [defendant] is bound"); Eisen v. Carlisle Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) ("Rule [23] was intended to insure that the judgment, whether favorable or not, would bind all class members who did not request exclusion from the suit"); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) ("members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present").
This rule was applied to a situation analogous to that in the instant case in Muhammad v. Warithu-Deen, 98 F. Supp.2d 337 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). There, inmates in DOCS custody sued, alleged various violations of their rights to exercise their religion while in custody. These inmates had been, however, members of a plaintiff class in an action settled in the Southern District of New York "which addressed claims similar to those brought by the plaintiffs in this case." Id. at 340. Relying to a great extent on the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper, the court in Muhammad noted:
Class actions are predicated on the notion that the interests of all class members are fully represented through the class representatives and through class counsel. It is as if each sued individually in a consolidated action. All party-members, including absent members and future members, are equally bound by the strictures of the class action judgment. Id. at 340-41. The only question, therefore, was whether, to be barred by res judicata, the claims in the prior and successive actions are "integrally related."
Id. at 342.
Clarkson dealt with all the claims currently being raised, i.e., fire alarms, telephones, and television, which were directly addressed by this Court in its decision awarding summary judgment, 898 F. Supp. at 1046-47, where the Court specifically held that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" (id. at 1047).
Since all of the claims raised by Figueroa and Duquin were those directly addressed and resolved in favor of the class, of which they are members, they are, therefore, barred from separately pursuing these claims.
The Complaints Will Be Treated As Motions For Contempt Of The Clarkson Decree
It is established in this Circuit, as well as numerous other Circuits, that an individual's claim for money damages are not precluded by a class action where the consent judgment did not by its terms dispose of individual damage claims. See e.g., Jones-Bey v. Caso, 535 F.2d 1360, 1362 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing district court's dismissal of complaint); Norris v. Slothouber, 718 F.2d 1116, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's dismissal of complaint); Herron v. Beck, 693 F.2d 125, 127 (11th Cir. 1982) (reversing summary judgment for defendants), Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1008 (7th Cir. 1982) (reversing in part and remanding district court's decision that complaint was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel respectively).
The Court in Crowder stated that:
We agree . . . that it would be "a harsh and improper application of res judicata to hold, on the basis of the notice sent out in [a previous class action suit] that prisoners forfeited their rights to personal redress for lack of knowledge that federal law . . . required that injunctive and monetary relief be sought in one action.". . . And we find it unacceptable, in this context, to require an inmate to elect between joining an ongoing class suit and thereby forfeiting his right to seek individual damages, on the one hand, and removing himself from the class (and hence risking exclusion from any equitable relief granted) in order to preserve the possibility of bringing a subsequent damage action, on the other.
Crowder, 687 F.2d at 1008-09.
Similarly, in Jones-Bey, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint alleging cruel and unusual punishment and denial of equal protection and due process while in a county jail. The complaint sought money damages, injunctive and declaratory relief. Notwithstanding that a prior class action complaint alleged substantially the same constitutional violations, the Court reversed the lower court's decision because the class had sought only declaratory and injunctive relief. See Jones-Bey, 535 F.2d at 1361.
Where class members are unaware that their membership in a class could foreclose subsequent actions to recover money damages, due process requires that judgment preclusion doctrines such as res judicata and collateral estoppel not apply. See Morgan v. Ward, 699 F. Supp. 1025, 1034 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs' claims were not barred).
Therefore, plaintiffs' claims will not be dismissed on the ground that they are precluded by Clarkson, especially because, if their allegations are true, Deputy Superintendent is violating the June 1996 Order. See Jordan v. Jones, 563 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1977).
The purpose of civil contempt is to compel a reluctant party to do what was ordered of her. See Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1986) (ordering compliance with a consent judgment and directing district court to hold defendant in contempt and to assess compensatory damages in event of a subsequent failure to implement the consent judgment). Sanctions may be ordered to either coerce defendant to comply with the district court's orders or to compensate the victim of the defendant's noncompliance. See e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Local 638, 81 F.3d 1162 (2d Cir. 1996); A.V. by Versace, Inc. v. Gianni Versace S.p.A., 87 F. Supp.2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Once a plaintiff has shown harm, he is entitled to seek an award of compensatory damages. See Milburn v. Coughlin, No. 97 Civ. 5077, 1993 WL 190279, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1993) ("The Second Circuit has repeatedly upheld the availability of compensatory damages to individual class members who establish that prison officials have violated the terms of class consent decrees and judgments.").
The Deputy Superintendent has agreed that contempt is the appropriate remedy. (Movant's Memo, p. 7).
Construing the complaints as motions to have defendant held in contempt, then venue is appropriate as this Court has the power to enforce its consent decree even though the violations occurred without the district. See, e.g., United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 666 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that Southern District was proper venue for contempt proceedings against individual alleged to have violated consent decree entered in that district). Thus, although Figueroa's claims arise from events at Wende, which is in the Western District of New York, this Court has jurisdiction to remedy noncompliance with the June 1996 Order. Further, to the extent that Duquin's claims arise from events at Wende, venue is proper as to those claims as well, and is clearly proper as to any claims arising from events at Woodbourne, which is in the Southern District.
Although the monitoring period expired in June of 2001, (see Movant's memo, p. 11), a court's ability to enforce its orders does not expire absent an express provision in the order to that effect.
Conclusion
The complaints will be treated as motions for contempt, the motion to transfer is denied, and the parties will confer on any discovery issues and a pretrial conference will be held on a date selected by counsel before December 13, 2002.
It is so ordered.