Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-2682-L.
June 8, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are Defendants Jane Keith and Delta Air Lines, Inc.'s Motion to Transfer Venue, filed November 24, 1999; and Plaintiff's First Amended Motion to Remand ("Motion to Remand"), filed December 14, 1999. After careful consideration of the motions, responses, supplemental responses, replies, supporting affidavits, and the applicable law, the court denies both motions.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This action arises out of events surrounding the termination of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant Delta Airlines, Inc. ("Delta") and the events leading to the termination. Plaintiff Sharon Fields ("Plaintiff") was employed by Delta as a flight attendant from 1969 until her discharge on October 7, 1999. Defendant Jane Keith ("Keith") is the Manager of In-Flight Services at Delta's Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport facility. As the In-Flight Services Manager, Keith is responsible for the overall operation of the In-Flight department, including handling job performance issues involving flight attendants assigned to Delta's Dallas/Fort Worth base.
Plaintiff alleges that on September 19, 1999, she served as a flight attendant on a flight from Dallas, Texas to Honolulu, Hawaii. Because Delta did not provide flight attendants with cash to make change, it was customary for Plaintiff to carry excess cash on her flights to make change for customers who purchased beverages on the flights. Prior to her flight to Honolulu, Plaintiff stopped at a grocery store and cashed three checks — each in the amount of $50 and drawn on her checking account at Delta's Employees Credit Union. Plaintiff alleges that when she boarded her flight, she had a total of $200 ($150 from the cashed checks and an additional $50 already on her person). After she arrived in Honolulu, Plaintiff cashed two more checks each in the amount of $50 at her hotel in Honolulu. According to Plaintiff, she therefore had $300 when she boarded the flight back to Dallas.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Daryl M. Bryant ("Bryant") and a female associate were on her return flight to Dallas. According to Plaintiff, Bryant marked four $20 bills and used them to entrap Plaintiff for stealing money paid by passengers for in-flight beverages. At the conclusion of the flight, Plaintiff deposited $300 in her account at Delta Employees Credit Union. At that time, Bryant appeared and accused Plaintiff of having stolen in-flight beverage funds. Plaintiff was later terminated by Keith who had informed her that Delta had reviewed and accepted the decision by Delta's Corporate Security Department that she be discharged for theft.
Plaintiff initially brought this action in the 101st Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas on October 27, 1999, alleging claims for defamation, theft and conversion and invasion of privacy. Defendants removed the case to this court on November 24, 1999, and now move to transfer the case to the Fort Worth Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff seeks to remand the action to state court.
In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Plaintiff argues that the court may not transfer the case without subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants urge the court to transfer the case and forward the Motion to Remand to the transferee court for consideration by that court. If this court denies the motion to remand and then transfers the case to Fort Worth, argue Defendants, the district judge in Fort Worth would be free to reconsider the jurisdictional issues raised in the motion to remand, which could lead to duplicative work by both courts. The court disagrees. As the parties have submitted their arguments and briefs concerning subject matter jurisdiction, the court believes that this issue should be decided by this court. In the interest of judicial economy, the court will address Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before addressing Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue.
II. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
Defendants removed this case to federal court, asserting subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332. Plaintiff, according to her affidavit, resides in Rockwall, Rockwall County, Texas. Delta is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Keith is a resident of Texas. Bryant is a resident of Georgia. Despite the lack of complete diversity between the parties, Defendants maintain that removal was proper because Keith has been fraudulently joined for the purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction. Conversely, Plaintiff contends that Keith is a proper defendant to this action and therefore the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case, requiring remand to state court.
Bryant joined in the removal of this case subject to his objections to service.
On a motion to remand, all disputed factual contentions are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonremoving party. Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995). For Defendants to avoid remand, they must establish that Keith, a non-diverse defendant, was fraudulently joined. A party alleging fraudulent joinder must show by clear and convincing evidence either that based upon the plaintiffs factual allegations (as pleaded in the state court petition on file at the time of removal) there is no possibility that the plaintiff could establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant, or that the jurisdictional allegations in the plaintiffs pleadings are fraudulent. Burden, 60 F.3d at 217; Dodson v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 951 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1992). In resolving a fraudulent joinder issue, the district court must evaluate all of the facts presented in the light most favorable to the nonremoving party. Burden, 60 F.3d at 216; B, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. (Unit A) 1981). The court is also permitted to consider evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, deposition transcripts, and other documentation. Burden, 60 F.3d at 217.
Defendants argue that Keith has been fraudulently joined because Plaintiffs Original Petition does not state any claim against Keith. Whether removal was proper is determined by the Plaintiff's live pleading at the time of removal. Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 145 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999); Brown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, the propriety of removing this case to federal court will turn on the allegations in Plaintiff's Original Petition ("Petition").
In her Petition, Plaintiff seeks to allege causes of action against Keith for defamation and invasion of privacy. The court first addresses Plaintiff's claim for defamation. Under Texas law, a defamatory statement is one in which the words tend to damage a person's reputation, exposing him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury. Einhorn v. La Chance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 410-11 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1135 (1996), Texas law recognizes two types of defamation: libel and slander. An action for libel requires the publication of a written defamatory statement about the plaintiff to a third party. M.N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 633-634 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist] 1992, writ denied). Slander is an oral defamation published to a third party without legal excuse. Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). To maintain a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must state facts which would show that the defendant (1) published a statement; (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff; (3) while acting with either actual malice, if the plaintiff was a public official or public figure, or negligence, if the plaintiff was a private individual, regarding the truth of the statement. Evans v. Dolcefino, 986 S.W.2d 69, 76 (Tex.App. — Hous. [1 Dist.] 1999, no pet.)( citing WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998)).
With respect to her defamation claim against Keith, Plaintiff alleges in her Petition that "Defendants defamed Plaintiff by accusing Plaintiff to Plaintiff's associates and to Delta management of theft by taking funds illegally from in-flight beverage service proceeds." Plaintiff's Petition, ¶ 5.02. Plaintiff further alleges that "Defendants have published the aforesaid charges and other slanderous and libelous statements either knowing that they were false, or with heedless and reckless disregard of whether they were false, and without factual basis." Plaintiff's Petition, ¶ 5.03. The only factual allegation wherein Keith is specifically named with respect to this claim is on page ten, where Plaintiff states that "[s]uch defamation was committed with malice, in that Bryant and Keith individually and as employees of Delta, acting in the course and scope of their employment, specifically intended to cause substantial injury to Plaintiff, or . . . committed acts or omissions which . . . involved an extreme degree of risk. . . ." Plaintiff's Petition, ¶ 5.06. In her Affidavit, which was submitted in support of her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff asserts that "[w]hile I was at the credit union with Daryl Bryant, his assistant and Jane Keith, Jane Keith published the statement to Bryant and his assistant that when on a flight there would not be enough money turned in." First Amended Motion to Remand and Brief, Exhibit B (Affidavit of Sharon Fields, ¶ 20). This statement was not pleaded in Plaintiff's Petition. Plaintiff also asserts that "[w]hen I was fired by Jane Keith, Louise Marker, another supervisor, was present. Jane Keith published the statement that Delta had accepted the Security Department's theft charges against me to Louise Marker." Id. at ¶ 21.
In her Petition, Plaintiff states no actionable conduct of Keith to support her claim of defamation. While Plaintiff uses the term "Defendants" in pleading facts regarding her defamation claim, she alleges no specific facts which indicate that Keith published a defamatory statement about her. In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff contends that because she was present and did not object to Bryant's defamatory statements accusing Plaintiff of theft, Keith ratified the publication of those statements and is therefore liable for defamation. As Plaintiff cites no authority for this proposition, the court finds it unpersuasive.
With respect to the assertions contained in Plaintiff's Affidavit, the court finds that the statements are not defamatory. In Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. 1987), Smith, the owner of a security and polygraph testing firm wrote a letter to a former client in an attempt to attract that former client's business. Musser was a former employee and competitor of Smith. In his letter, Smith stated that "[w]hen Mr. Musser left us, he was able, as so many of our ex-employees have in the past, to relieve us of certain of our polygraph accounts." Musser brought a libel action against Smith based on statements contained in that letter. The court concluded that the letter was not defamatory as a matter of law, reasoning that libelous statements must be construed as a whole, in light of surrounding circumstances based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the entire statement. Although Musser was a libel action, the court finds it instructive in this case. Here, Keith's statement that "when [Fields] was on a flight there would not be enough money turned in," would not be perceived as defamatory by a person of ordinary intelligence. See Musser 723 S.W.2d at 655. The statement does not accuse Plaintiff of having committed a crime, of violating any law, or otherwise satisfy the definition of defamation. The court, therefore, concludes that Keith's statement is not capable of a defamatory meaning. Plaintiff also asserts that Keith published the statement that Delta had accepted the Security Department's theft charges against her to Louise Marker, another Delta supervisor. Importantly, this statement does not reflect that Keith called Plaintiff a thief nor does she accuse Plaintiff of theif. Plaintiff does not dispute that Delta did in fact accept the Security Department's theft charges against her. Keith merely truthfully stated to Plaintiff what Delta had done, and truth is a complete defense to defamation. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 73.005; Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995). As Plaintiff has not shown that the latter statement was false, the court finds Plaintiff's argument regarding intracorporate publication unpersuasive. Plaintiff cannot maintain an action for defamation based on the statements contained in paragraphs 20 and 21 of her affidavit. Given the allegations pleaded, Plaintiff has not stated facts, if true, from which one could conclude that she was defamed by Keith. As Plaintiff wholly fails to allege any conduct of Keith or any set of facts, if true from which we could infer she has been defamed, the court concludes that Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action against Keith for defamation. Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert an additional cause of action against Keith for defamation in her affidavit, she is precluded from doing so because the court must only consider the actions pleaded at the time of removal.
Defendants also assert in great detail information on their affirmative defenses and urges the court to consider the affirmative defenses in deciding the Motion to Remand. Defendants cite Sid Richardson Carbon Gasoline Co. v. Interenergy Resources, LTD., 99 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1996), in support of their position, and the court is aware of this case. Both parties also cite Moore v. Arthur Anderson, L.L.P., No. CIV. A. 3:98-CV-2773-L, 1999 WL 354235 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 1999), an opinion rendered by this court which also addresses the issue of fraudulent joinder. The court finds it necessary to clarify its position regarding the consideration of affirmative defenses when deciding the issue of fraudulent joinder.
In Moore, the court remanded the action to state court, concluding that defendants had failed to establish that p1aintiff had fraudulently joined a non-diverse defendant. In response to an affirmative defense raised, the court stated "[e]ven if it is ultimately a successful defense to Moore's claim, at this stage the court should only examine whether or not Moore could possibly maintain a cause of action against Mawhinney." Moore, 1999 WL 354235, at *2. The court used a poor choice of words and should have written with more clanty and specificity. What the court intended to articulate was that it would not engage in what would be a determination of the merits of the defense raised by defendants in Moore. The court further stated in Moore, "[w]hen the current factual record is viewed in the light most favorable to Moore, it is possible that Moore could establish a cause of action against Mawhinney for defamation." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court did not ignore the facts raised by the affirmative defense. Moreover, in the Moore case, the affirmative defense was properly pleaded by defendants as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Since Defendants have only answered by general denial and have not pleaded any affirmative defenses, they are not entitled to rely on any evidence constituting such a defense.
The court next addresses Plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy. To establish a cause of action for invasion of privacy for intrusion upon one's seclusion under Texas law, one must show that there was "an intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns that is highly offensive to a reasonable person." Cornhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 u.s. 818 (1997). Typically, an action for intrusion upon one's seclusion exists "only when there has been 'a physical invasion of a person's property or eavesdropping on another's conversation with the aid of wiretaps, microphones, or spying.'" Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 273 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989)( quoting Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he attempted Keystone Cop setup on the flight back from Honolulu to Dallas with marked bills, the monitoring of Plaintiffs bank accounts, and the theft of the four $20 bills from Plaintiff's checking account invaded Plaintiff's constitutional and common law right to privacy, resulting in substantial damages to Plaintiff, for which Plaintiff sues." Plaintiffs Petition, ¶ 7.02. In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff states that her "supervisor Keith stood by while Bryant removed from Plaintiff's credit union account four marked $20 bills which Plaintiff had just deposited." Motion to Remand at p. 21. Although Plaintiff cites to ¶ 4.12 of her Petition, there is no allegation in her pleading that Keith "stood by" as Bryant removed the funds from her account. Plaintiff argues that Keith ratified Bryant's action in invading her personal property. Plaintiffs argument, however, is unavailing. As Defendants point out, the doctrine of ratification generally applies to principal-agent relations, Disney Enters., Inc. v. Esprit Finance, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.), and there is no evidence in the record that either Keith was Bryant's principal or that Bryant was Keith's agent. Plaintiff has alleged no facts regarding Keith's conduct that will show that Plaintiff can recover under Texas law on a claim for invasion of privacy.
Although Plaintiff states that Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff and seek relief from all Defendants, the court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs Petition as pleaded at the time of removal does not state a cause of action against Keith for defamation or invasion of privacy. The court, therefore, concludes that Keith has been fraudulently joined as a defendant in this case. As such, her status as a Texas resident will be ignored for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See Burden v. General Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 217-18 (5th Cir. 1995) (when there is no possibility that the state court would recognize a valid cause of action against non-diverse defendant, then that defendant has been fraudulently joined and must be ignored for purposes of diversity jurisdiction).
Having determined that Keith was fraudulently joined in this action, the court now addresses whether Defendants have satisfied the second requirement for diversity jurisdiction — the amount in controversy. District courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where complete diversity of citizenship exists, and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defendants, as the removing parties, bear the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865 (1995). In this case, Plaintiff's Petition does not allege a specific amount in damages. Therefore, Defendants must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. at 1409. In determining whether Defendants have satisfied this burden, the court must first examine Plaintiff's Petition and assess whether it is facially apparent that the claims exceed the jurisdictional amount. St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998). If, however, the "facially apparent" test fails the court may rely on summary judgment type evidence to ascertain the amount in controversy. Id.
Defendants argue that based upon Plaintiffs allegations and request for damages, it is facially apparent from Plaintiffs Petition that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Defendants' Notice of Removal at p. 5. Plaintiff is silent on this issue. The court agrees with Defendants. In her Petition, Plaintiff asserts that at the time of her discharge she was earning in excess of $60,000 per year. Based on Plaintiff's allegation that her date of birth is January 11, 1948, the court concludes that she is now 52 years old. Plaintiff seeks damages for past and future lost earnings and benefits and damages to past and future earning capacity; past and future damages to her reputation; damages for past and future mental anguish, emotional distress and physical distress; exemplary damages; and attorneys fees. See Plaintiff's Petition at p. 14. The court finds that it is facially apparent that the damages sought by Plaintiff are more likely than not to meet the jurisdictional amount. Plaintiffs claims for past and future lost earnings in addition to her claims for lost earning capacity, mental anguish, emotional distress, physical distress, punitive damages and attorneys fees all support the conclusion that if she ultimately prevails on all of her claims, Plaintiff's damages exceeded $75,000 at the time of removal. See, e.g., Allen v. RH Oil Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336 (5th Cir. 1995) (claim for punitive damages supported conclusion that it was facially apparent that damages exceeded the jurisdictional minimum). Moreover, Plaintiff has not expressly stipulated that she seeks damages for an amount less than the jurisdictional amount or that the requisite amount in controversy is not present. See, e.g., Callaway v. BASF Corp., 810 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (case not remanded on ground that amount in controversy did not meet jurisdictional amount considering plaintiff expressly declined to stipulate to damages less than jurisdictional amount and sought both actual and punitive damages); Johnson v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 390, 395 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (case not remanded where plaintiff failed to submit a sworn, unrebutted affidavit indicating that the requisite amount in controversy is not present, refused to stipulate that her damages did not exceed the jurisdictional amount, and refused to waive any damages in excess of that amount). For the reasons previously stated, the court finds that Defendants have met their burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and that removal of this case to federal court was proper. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is, therefore, denied. III. Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue
Defendants also contend that the court has federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim, arguing that Plaintiffs assertion that she supported Delta's unionization drive and was retaliated against for supporting the drive assert a violation of section 2, Fourth of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth). Plaintiff contends that there is no private right of action to recover against an employer for violation of the RLA; and in any event, she has neither pleaded a claim under the RLA nor referenced the statute in her Petition. Because the court has determined that it has jurisdiction based on Plaintiff's fraudulent joinder of Keith, the court need not determine whether a private right of action exists for violation of the RLA. It, therefore, assumes without deciding that a private cause of action exists for such conduct.
The court finds interesting and unusual that Defendants would seek to add a cause of action against themselves when Plaintiff has not pleaded a cause of action under the RLA. Nonetheless, having carefully considered the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Petition, the court finds the conclusory allegation that "Delta has retaliated against Plaintiff for supporting [the unionization] drive," Plaintiff's Petition, ¶ 4.17, does not of itself assert a violation of the RLA. Citing Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 109, 110-11 (E.D. Tex. 1997) and Flowerette v. Heartland Healthcare Ctr., 903 F. Supp. 1042, 1044-45 (N.D. Tex. 1995), Defendants argue that Plaintiff's failure to cite the RLA or identify her claims under the RLA in a separate cause of action are irrelevant, because Plaintiff's allegations necessarily assert a federal claim under the RLA. The court finds that the authorities relied on by Defendants are not controlling in this case, as Plaintiff has made no claim for retaliation. In the cases relied on by Defendants, while the plaintiffs in those cases did not specify the statute under which they were seeking relief, the substance of the claims asserted were exclusively federal or character, and it was clear that plaintiffs were making claims of discrimination. In this case, Plaintiff is not seeking relief based on retaliation for engaging in protected conduct under the RLA.
Defendants contend that venue is proper in the Fort Worth Division because all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred at the Delta terminal at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, which is located in Tarrant County. See Defendants' Motion to Transfer Venue at pp. 1-2. Defendants further contend that had this action been filed in accord with the Texas general venue statute, it would have been filed in Tarrant County, the county where the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred. Defendants contend Tarrant County is the correct venue and therefore a transfer of venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff contends that transfer is inappropriate in this case, maintaining that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Plaintiff also contends that if the court does decide that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the case should remain in this court because Plaintiff chose to bring this action in Dallas County. As the court has determined that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, Plaintiff's first argument is moot.
Defendants contend that the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in Tarrant County, and therefore the action should have been initially brought in a state court in Tarrant County. Plaintiff does not dispute this contention. The court, however, disagrees.
Plaintiff asserts, inter alia, claims against Defendants for defamation and invasion of privacy. In Texas, "[a] suit [claiming] damages for libel, slander, or invasion of privacy shall be brought and can only be maintained in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, or in the county in which the defendant resided at the time of filing suit, or in the county of the residence of defendants, or any of them, or the domicile of any corporate defendant, at the election of the plaintiff" Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 15.017 (emphasis added). Since the record does not reflect that any of Defendants reside or are domiciled in Tarrant County or Dallas County, Plaintiff should have, under this statute, brought the action in Rockwall County, which is part of the Dallas Division. of course, Defendants were not going to object to improper venue when the case was in the state system and insist that it be tried in Rockwall County because they want the case tried in Tarrant County. Based on the nature of the claims asserted against Defendants, the court is unpersuaded by their reliance on the general venue provision, as it only applies when there is no mandatory venue provision.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer any civil action to any district or division where it might have been brought for (1) the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and (2) in the interest of justice. No one can seriously argue that it is more convenient for the case to be tried in the Fort Worth Division than the Dallas Division. In fact, Defendants have produced no evidence to establish that it is more convenient for this action to be transferred to or tried in Fort Worth, and in effect concede that it is not more convenient for the action to be tried in Tarrant County. The court notes that the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in Tarrant County and Delta's terminal facility is located in Tarrant County. Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201, the court also judicially notices that the distance from the United States courthouse in Dallas and the United States courthouse in Fort Worth is approximately 32 miles, and that Delta's facilities at the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport are roughly the same distance from the federal courthouses in Dallas and Fort Worth. Plaintiff avers that she lives in Rockwall and some of her witnesses live closer to courts in Dallas than Fort Worth. Further, counsel for the parties both maintain offices in Dallas. Accordingly, based on these facts, the court finds that convenience of the parties and the interest of justice do not favor the case being transferred to the Fort Worth Division. While any court always desires to reduce its docket, the interests of justice preclude this case from being transferred to the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas. Defendant's Motion to Transfer Venue is denied.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons previously stated, Plaintiff's First Amended Motion to Remand is denied and Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is denied as moot. Defendants' Motion to Transfer is denied.