Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-5065.
June 6, 2004
ORDER AND REASONING
AND NOW, this day of June, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants City of Philadelphia's and William Giannetti's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 5), Plaintiff's response, and Defendant's reply, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants William Giannetti and the City and against Plaintiff Samuel Fielding. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Evidence (Doc. 9) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. Every sentence after the first one in paragraph four of Exhibit A (testimonial affidavit) to Giannetti's Motion for Summary Judgment shall be stricken as inadmissable hearsay. The reasons for the Court's decision are stated below.
I. Background
This case arises from the events of January 12, 2003. That afternoon, while Plaintiff was parked outside of Hollywood Car Wash at 2628 N. Broad Street in Philadelphia, an unidentified women exited the washing area in her car and struck Plaintiff's vehicle damaging the rear fender. Fielding approached the woman and attempted to exchange name, address, and vehicle information with her. The woman, however, began cursing and yelling at Plaintiff and an argument ensued.
Shortly thereafter, Defendant Giannetti, a City of Philadelphia Police Officer, arrived on the scene. Plaintiff informed Giannetti that he would like to file a police report for insurance purposes. Following a brief conversation, Fielding provided Giannetti with his name and date of birth, at which point Defendant relayed the information to police dispatch. Dispatch transmitted information back to a Mobile Data Terminal indicating a bench warrant existed for a name and date of birth matching Plaintiff's. Dispatch also informed Giannetti that Plaintiff had a suspended driver's license. Based on this information, Giannetti arrested Fielding, transported him to the 22nd District at 17th and Montgomery, and impounded his car. While en route to the station, Giannetti allegedly placed a phone call to inform an unknown party that he locked up Fielding and allowed the woman involved in the collision to go.
There is a dispute as to who contacted the police, however, this dispute is not material to the outcome of the case.
Although Plaintiff claims he showed Giannetti his Limited License Authorization letter, the Court notes that this letter does not license Fielding to drive where he was, when he was, or the type of vehicle in his possession.
Once at the station, Giannetti left Plaintiff in the police car and contacted the Warrant Unit of the First Judicial District. The Warrant Unit communicated to Defendant that the warrant for Plaintiff was inactive. At that point, Giannetti released Fielding. Following a brief conversation between Plaintiff and Giannetti's captain, during which the Captain expressed some concern over the incident and attempted unsuccessfully to free Plaintiff's vehicle from impound, Giannetti took the Plaintiff home.
Fielding brought this suit alleging § 1983 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and a state false arrest claim. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Giannetti; that Defendant was deprived of his liberty and property in a violation of his constitutional right to be free from unlawful arrest, detention, and seizure. Count II raises Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the City of Philadelphia. Count III is a state false arrest claim against Giannetti.
II. Standard for a Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c)(2002). A genuine issue is one in which the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
III. Count I: 42 U.S.C § 1983 Claims Against Defendant Giannetti
Plaintiff claims that Giannetti is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claims. Following Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), there is a two-step test by which district courts are to determine qualified immunity. Prong one asks "whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show a constitutional violation." Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court need not proceed beyond prong one if the plaintiff "fails to make out a constitutional violation." Id. In the present case, Plaintiff has not established the existence of a constitutional violation for either claim.
A. Fourth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Giannetti violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting and detaining him without probable cause. The issue of probable cause centers on Defendant's receipt of notification, via police dispatch, that a bench warrant had been issued for Plaintiff. An officer who reasonably relies on the existence of a warrant when making an arrest has probable cause and is entitled to qualified immunity.See Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d. Cir. 1997) (holding police officer who reasonably relied upon facially valid written bulletin indicating warrant for arrest existed was entitled to qualified immunity). In Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455 (3d. Cir. 1997), the Third Circuit held that "where a police officer makes an arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity . . . provided it was objectively reasonable for him to believe . . . that probable cause for the arrest existed."
In the instant case, Officer Giannetti established probable cause by reasonably relying on warrant information obtained from police dispatch. Giannetti properly obtained Fielding's name and date of birth; Fielding provided this information voluntarily and without objection. Defendant then radioed dispatch to process the information. Dispatch responded through the Mobile Data Terminal that a bench warrant matching Plaintiff's name and date of birth had been issued. Reliance on this standard channel of police communication is reasonable. Moreover, no evidence suggests that the communication from dispatch or Giannetti's reliance on it was in any way fabricated. Giannetti acted within the bounds of his duty as a police officer by reasonably relying and acting on information concerning the existence of an outstanding warrant. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation and Defendant Giannetti is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Defendant Giannetti is also entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim of deprivation of property without due process regarding Plaintiff's car. Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6309.2, also known as the "Live Stop" program, orders law enforcement officers to "immobilize" a vehicle operated by an individual whose driving privileges are suspended "as verified by an appropriate law enforcement officer." 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6309.2(a)(1). Fielding argues that because Giannetti never saw him operating the vehicle, the impoundment was without probable cause and thus unconstitutional. This argument, however, is inconsequential, because the impoundment of the car was constitutional as incident to Fielding's arrest.
Police officers are allowed to impound vehicles that are parked or abandoned for any number of reasons under the public safety exception of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The Supreme Court held that "The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge."Id. at 368. Furthermore, the Third Circuit has not found constitutional violations in cases where vehicles are impounded following arrests. See U.S. v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991), U.S. v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988).
Upon Fielding's arrest, his vehicle remained unattended, obstructing the car wash's exit and creating a potential hazard for both the public and car. This certainly would have impeded traffic at, and perhaps around, the car wash and may have led to additional vehicle collisions. Moreover, leaving Fielding's vehicle unattended placed it at risk of theft or vandalism. Finally, the vehicle's location placed a limitation on business at the car wash, thus causing a public inconvenience. The temporary deprivation of Fielding's property falls within theOpperman holding, and accordingly, does not violate Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, Giannetti is entitled to qualified immunity on this count.
IV. Count III: State Law False Arrest Claim
Plaintiff also asserts a state law claim of false arrest against Giannetti. This Court finds that Plaintiff is barred from making this claim by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act) and common law. Because Giannetti does not fall within any of the statutory exceptions to the restriction of liability under the Tort Claims Act, to defeat the overall restriction of liability imposed by the Act and a defense of official immunity, Plaintiff must show that Defendant's actions constituted "a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct." Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8550. To make such a showing in the false arrest context, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show "that there was no probable cause to make the arrest and that the officer knew that there was no probable cause." Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994).
Presently, the Court need not even reach prong two of Renk. Because probable cause existed for the arrest, Defendant is able to maintain his immunity from civil liability under the Tort Claims Act. See III(B), supra. Accordingly, the false arrest claim must fail.
V. Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims Against the City
Summary judgment is granted and judgment entered in favor of the City and against Plaintiff, as Plaintiff did not oppose this motion.
VI. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Evidence
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Evidence is granted in part and denied in part. Every sentence after the first one in paragraph four of Exhibit A (testimonial affidavit) to Giannetti's Motion for Summary Judgment shall be stricken. Paragraphs seven, eight, and fourteen go to the officer's state of mind and are not hearsay. Paragraph fourteen is also admissible for its effect on the listener. Exhibits two, four, five, six, and seven to Exhibit A are records of regularly conduced business activity under Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and thus an exception to the hearsay rule.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.