Opinion
Case No. 2:06-cv-327.
July 13, 2007
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Defendant Search Cactus ("Defendant"). (Doc. # 212.) The Court conducted an informal telephone conference as mandated by S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 65.1(a) on July 13, 2007. After considering the pleading and arguments of the parties, the Court denies the motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. # 212.)
A. BACKGROUND
Defendant moves the Court for a temporary restraining order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. (Doc. # 212.) Specifically, Defendant asks to prohibit Plaintiff John W. Ferron ("Plaintiff") from seeking publicity regarding this case, encouraging others from bringing similar lawsuits, creating public websites or blogs, notifying the media about this lawsuit, and violating the Stipulated Protective Order. (Doc. # 11.) The Court finds Defendant's motion not well taken.
B. STANDARD INVOLVED
The standard for addressing a motion for a temporary restraining order is the same as the standard applied to a motion for a preliminary injunction. Rios v. Blackwell, 345 F. Supp. 2d 833, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Kitsonas, 118 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (S.D. Ohio 2000). In order to grant either form of injunctive relief, the Court must consider the following four factors: 1) whether the movant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 2) whether irreparable harm will result without an injunction; 3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction will result in substantial harm to others; and 4) whether the public interest is advanced by the injunction. Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997). The factors are not prerequisites, but are elements that the Court must balance. See Chabad of S. Ohio Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2004). As the party seeking the restraining order, Defendant has the burden of persuasion on each of those factors. Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978). The degree of proof necessary for each factor used in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction depends on the strength of Defendant's case on other factors. Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 657 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 807 (1996). The Court shall address each factor in turn.
C. EXAMINATION OF ELEMENTS FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Defendant concedes that it cannot specifically identify what Plaintiff plans to disclose. Defendant cannot state with any degree of certainty that Plaintiff will violate the protective order. Rather, Plaintiff's future actions remain entirely unknown to Defendant. Thus, the court finds that Defendant has failed to meet its burden of establishing that it will suffer irreparable harm. Rather, Defendant's assertions that it is likely that Plaintiff will disclose confidential information and violate the protective order does not rise above mere speculation.
Because Defendant's merely speculates as to its future harm, this Court cannot presently determine whether Defendant is likely to succeed on the merits or whether an injunction would serve the public interest or harm others.
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. # 212.) This matter will be scheduled for a hearing on Defendant's request for a preliminary injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.