Opinion
February 20, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.).
Ordered that the appeals from the orders are dismissed, and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment, as amended, is affirmed, and it is further,
Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.
The appeals from the intermediate orders must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action ( see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeals from the orders are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment ( see, CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
Although the mortgage in this case was initially given to Dollar Dry Dock Bank (hereinafter the bank), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hereinafter FDIC) was appointed the receiver of the bank. Therefore, the FDIC succeeded to all of the bank's rights and privileges including title to all of the bank's assets ( see, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 [d] [2] [A] [i]; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Timms, 60 F.3d 972; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 45 F.3d 665, 669, cert denied sub nom. Solomon v. Resolution Trust Corp., ___ US ___, 115 S Ct 2609, citing O'Melveny Meyers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86).
The FDIC established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this action to foreclose the appellants' mortgage by offering proof of the mortgage and the appellants' default in paying it ( see, Dime Sav. Bank v. Rand, 204 A.D.2d 261; European Am. Bank v. Strab Constr. Corp., 196 A.D.2d 479). Since the appellants' failed to establish by proof in admissible form the existence of a triable issue of fact, the FDIC's motion for summary judgment was properly granted ( see, Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320; Mlcoch v. Smith, 173 A.D.2d 443).
The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit. Santucci, J.P., Krausman, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.