Opinion
June 24, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Murphy, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendant's motion is denied, the plaintiff's cross motion is granted, and the complaint is reinstated.
General Municipal Law § 50-e (4) permits localities to require prior notice of defective, unsafe, dangerous, or obstructed conditions at any street, highway, bridge, culvert, sidewalk, or crosswalk as a condition to the commencement of an action to recover damages therefor ( see, Walker v. Town of Hempstead, 84 N.Y.2d 360; see also, Town Law § 67). The statute does not merely omit a grant of authority to localities to require notice of defect at locations beyond the six specified ( cf., Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 430), but rather in unmistakable terms provides that "[n]o other or further notice * * * shall be required" beyond those permitted by its terms (General Municipal Law § 50-e). The statute must be construed, therefore, as a flat prohibition not only of the Town's enactment of any notice of claim provision other than that provided for in the statute, but also a prohibition of any notice of defect enactment pertaining to locations beyond the six specified (see, Walker v Town of Hempstead, supra).
Accordingly, the Town of Hempstead Code § 6-1 cannot be construed as requiring prior written notice in the case of a defect in a boardwalk and it is no defense to the action that the defendant was not afforded prior written notice of the alleged defect. Bracken, J.P., Miller, Joy, Hart and Krausman, JJ., concur.