Opinion
Case No. 3:00 CV 7387.
December 5, 2001
Fred Farris, North Central Correctional Institution, Marion, OH, PRO S.E.A., Plaintiff.
John H. Jones, Assistant Attorney General Corrections Litigation Section, Columbus, OH, Defendant Sgt. McNicols, Mrs. Yoder, Case Mgr., Mr. Marquis, Unit Mgr.
Philip A. King, Office of the Attorney General State of Ohio Columbus, OH., Defendant Sgt. McNicols Mrs. Yoder, Case Mgr., Mr. Marquis, Unit Mgr.
ORDER
This is a civil rights case in which plaintiff alleges defendants subjected him to unlawful treatment. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that he has incurred irreparable injury as a result of defendants' deliberate indifference and inadequate classification procedures. Jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343. Pending is defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendants' motion shall be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Fred Farris is presently a prisoner of the State of Ohio and, at all times relevant hereto, was incarcerated at North Central Correctional Institution ("NCCI"). On or about May 4 or 5, 1999, while doing routine bed moves, defendant Sergeant McNicols ("McNicols") assigned Inmate McGraw to plaintiff's cubicle. On learning of this assignment, plaintiff immediately requested that either he or McGraw be moved. Plaintiff testified that this oral request was made because he did not get along with McGraw. Plaintiff also testified that he requested a bed change because McGraw was a thief and had a history of violent activity. Plaintiff admits that, on making this initial request, McGraw had not threatened him and no grudge existed between the two. McNicols determined that no valid reason existed to grant the bed move and denied plaintiff's request.
The proper procedure for requesting a bed change requires that an inmate give a written request to the Unit Sergeant. If the Unit Sergeant determines that the request is legitimate, a request form will be given to the Unit Manager for approval.
Plaintiff alleges that, after the initial denial, he repeatedly requested a bed change. Defendant Yoder ("Yoder") acknowledges that on May 14, 1999, plaintiff made such a request. Yoder and plaintiff testified that these continued requests were made because McGraw played his music loudly, kept the cell in a disorganized manner, and always had friends coming and going. Plaintiff, however, never told Yoder about any threats of physical harm.
Plaintiff admits in his brief that he did not tell defendants of the threats of violence because he feared being labeled as a "snitch." (Doc. 40 at 8).
Plaintiff also testified that he made verbal requests for a bed move to defendant Marquis ("Marquis"). Plaintiff, however, did not inform Marquis that he was threatened or feared for his safety. Marquis testified that if plaintiff had told defendants of these threats and fears, plaintiff would have been placed in protective custody.
On or about May 30, 1999, plaintiff and McGraw were involved in a physical altercation. In early June 1999, plaintiff filed an informal complaint with NCCI alleging that he sustained injuries on May 30, 1999, as a direct result of defendants' deliberate indifference to his safety. Plaintiff also alleged that the prison's inadequate classification system caused his injury. After further investigation, it was determined that there was insufficient evidence to support plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff subsequently appealed this decision to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. These appeals were unsuccessful. After the administrative appeals were exhausted, plaintiff filed this action on June 27, 2000.
An inmate classification system establishes criteria for housing inmates together.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
Once the burden of production shifts, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is insufficient "simply [to] show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings" and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
In deciding the motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party will be believed as true, all doubts will be resolved against the moving party, all evidence will be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences will be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
DISCUSSION I. Failure to Protect
Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution by failing to protect him. Defendants contend that plaintiff's failure to protect claim fails as a matter of law. I agree.
The conditions under which a prisoner is confined are subject to examination under the Eighth Amendment. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment for failure to prevent harm if: 1) the conditions under which plaintiff is incarcerated pose a substantial risk of serious harm; and 2) prison officials had the state of mind of "'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety."Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations ommited). This standard is imposed on state and federal correctional officers. See Marsh v. Arn, 937 F.2d 1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 1988)).
In Farmer, the United States Supreme Court determined that courts should judge "deliberate indifference" to inmate health or safety on a subjective standard. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The Court further stated:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.Id. at 837.
The deliberate indifference standard "describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence" and less than purposeful. Id. at 835. The Court stated, "It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk." Id. at 836.
A. Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
As previously indicated, plaintiff learned of McGraw's impending transfer to his cell in early May 1999. Over the next couple of weeks, plaintiff made numerous requests for a bed change. Plaintiff insisted on this change because McGraw: 1) had a history of violence against other inmates; 2) had stolen from inmates in the past; 3) played his music at disturbingly loud levels; 4) was unorganized and messy; and 5) disrespected his previous cell-mates and their personal property. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' failure to grant his bed change on those grounds amounts to deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm.
Grounds two through five listed above clearly do not articulate a legitimate foundation for a potential risk to inmate health or safety. They merely allege that plaintiff's surroundings are not as comfortable as he would prefer. "The Constitution [however] does not mandate comfortable prisons." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Plaintiff is not entitled to his preference; he is entitled to be free from substantial risk of serious harm. Because his last four grounds deal only with his preferences in a cell-mate, these four grounds do not establish a substantial risk of serious harm.
The first ground, though, arguably has merit. For the purposes of this motion, I will assume that a history of violence against other inmates, at least arguably, poses a substantial risk of serious harm. This case then turns on the second part of the Eighth Amendment analysis-whether defendants showed deliberate indifference to plaintiff's health or safety.
B. Deliberate Indifference to Inmate Health or Safety
Plaintiff claims that the failure to grant a bed move demonstrates deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of harm because of McGraw's history of violence. This argument is not well-taken. Absent a claim of prison overcrowding, knowledge of prior incidents of assault on other inmates does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir. 1996); Marsh, 937 F.2d at 1061.
Plaintiff testified that he was threatened by McGraw on two to three occasions beginning a couple of days after the transfer. Plaintiff, however, admits he never told defendants of these threats or his fear of imminent violence because he was afraid of being labeled a "'snitch.'" (Doc. 40 at 8).
Plaintiff specifically testified that McGraw said he would "whoop [plaintiff's] ass." (Doc. 37 at 33 line 11, 35 lines 22-23).
Defendants, therefore, had no knowledge or evidence that McGraw's placement in plaintiff's cell would result in violence. Plaintiff also admits that there was no history of problems between himself and McGraw. It was defendants' understanding that plaintiff's motivations were those detailed above. Without knowledge of threats or a fear of imminent danger, defendants were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's health and safety. Defendants acted, therefore, reasonably in reaction to plaintiff's requests for a bed change. As the Court stated in Farmer, "[P]rison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause." 511 U.S. at 845.
Plaintiff also claims that there is an inadequate inmate classification with respect to violent individuals and bed transfers. Plaintiff essentially argues that the inadequate classification system is evidence of defendants' deliberate indifference.
In Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 1994), the court affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment when plaintiffs alleged prior instances of violence between inmates but provided no evidence that the violence was related to the lack of an inmate classification system. See also K.F.P. v. Dane County, 110 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1997) (defendants not liable because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that defendants were aware that the classification system subjected the plaintiff to harm); James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 1992) (defendants' motion for directed verdict granted when plaintiff failed to show the inmate classification system inflicted wanton and unnecessary pain on inmates);Marsh, 937 F.2d at 1062 (If plaintiff offers no evidence of pervasive risk of harm or connection between violence and inmate classification system, he has failed to show deliberate indifference.); United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 158 (6th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff must show affirmative evidence that the inmate classification system contributed to inmate violence).
In support of his argument, plaintiff provides the affidavit of a fellow inmate who states that he has "personal knowledge that there exists no comprehensive inmate classification procedures [sic] which would serve to protect older or weaker inmates from homosexual predatory inmates." (Doc. 40 Norris Aff. at 2). Plaintiff offers no concrete proof, such as statistical or comparative evidence, to show that the policy in effect on May 30, 1999, is the basis for the violence. The record contains no specific instances, aside from the one in question, that an inmate assault was attributable to the classification system.
The affidavit is of dubious admissibility here. The affiant's conclusory reference to "personal knowledge" fails to show the basis for his "knowledge"-i.e., that he is a competent witness.
Because plaintiff failed to reference the inmate classification system or show that it was the cause of the altercation that arose on May 30, 1999, he has failed to establish deliberate indifference. His fellow inmate's affidavit is not sufficient to support the claim that the inmate classification system is connected to the violence. Without such evidence, summary judgment in favor of defendants is justified. See Thompson, 29 F.3d at 243.
Plaintiff also infers that defendants should be liable for the policies that govern NCCI. Defendants, however, are not policy-makers and are not responsible for the policies governing NCCI.
Defendants finally argue that they are immune from this action. I decline to address the issue of immunity because there was no constitutional violation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
Plaintiff's brief spends much time discussing an allegation that defendants enforce different protocols for bed moves based on race. (Doc. 40 at 6 ("Plaintiff strongly avers that not only have defendants acted with malice and deliberate indifference, but of greater importance here, defendants operate two separate and distinctly different protocol(s) when dealing with african americans and known homosexuals and white inmates.")). Plaintiff also attaches an affidavit from another inmate attesting to preferential treatment given to white and homosexual inmates in bed moves. (Doc. 40 Norris Aff. at 1 ("I further certify that white inmates and homosexual inmates are routinely given 'preferential treatment' in bed moves and assignments once in the housing units. . . .")). This affidavit is also of questionable admissibility due to its failure to disclose the basis of the affiant's "knowledge."
Plaintiff's complaint, however, fails to state the basis for this claim other than a broad assertion that defendants "violat[ed] . . . the Eighth Amendment right to be free from 'cruel and unusual punishment,' and . . . deni[ed] [plaintiff] of both equal protection and due process of law . . . by reason of the defendant's [sic] 'systemic' deliberate indifference and inadequate classification procedures." (Doc. 1).
This statement is insufficient as a basis for an equal protection claim because of alleged preferential treatment based on race in bed moves. Plaintiff's complaint sets forth a different type of law suit-one based on defendants' alleged failure to protect him, not one based on race discrimination. Defendants were, therefore, not put on notice as to a race discrimination claim through plaintiff's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8.
I note, however, that the ruling in this case based on plaintiff's complaint as brought does not bar a subsequent claim wherein plaintiff adequately pleads an equal protection claim based on race discrimination.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore,ORDERED THAT
Defendants' motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is, granted.
So ordered.