Opinion
C/A 9:21-cv-1654-DCN-MHC
07-08-2021
Ronjrel M. Farmer, Plaintiff, v. Colleton County Sheriff's Office and Robert A. Strickland, Jr., in his official capacity as Sheriff of Colleton County, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Colleton County, South Carolina, alleging three causes arising under South Carolina law: (1) False Imprisonment; (2) Negligence and Gross Negligence; and (3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. ECF No. 1-1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 2, 2019, deputies of the Colleton County Sheriff's Office (“CCSO”) falsely accused him of being involved in a shooting in Jacksonboro, South Carolina, and arrested him on numerous charges, including Attempted Murder. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 4-5. Plaintiff alleges that he spent forty-six days in jail as a result of the false arrest, had to pay monthly monitoring fees after being released, and has been unable to obtain gainful employment since his arrest. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew or should have known that he was not involved in the shooting, they failed to exercise due care in executing their duties, and their negligent and reckless conduct proximately caused his damages. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 6, 9. Defendants CCSO and Sheriff Robert A. Strickland, Jr. removed the case to this Court on June 3, 2021. ECF No. 1. All pretrial proceedings in this matter were referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). For the reasons set forth below, this case is subject to sua sponte remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Doe v. Blair, 819 F.3d 64, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a district court may remand a case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may remove a civil action brought in state court if the case originally could have been brought in a federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”). “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is placed upon the party seeking removal.” Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and a district court is charged with ensuring that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction, In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Doe v. Blair, 819 F.3d 64, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “a district court may remand a case sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
The court is “obliged to construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the ‘significant federalism concerns' implicated.” Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151). “Therefore, if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state court is necessary.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[C]ourts should resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of retained state court jurisdiction.” (quotation marks omitted)).
DISCUSSION
In their Notice of Removal, Defendants state that removal is appropriate because this Court has original federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 5. Specifically, Defendants contend that although “the Complaint appears to be brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act on state law theories of False Imprisonment, Gross Negligence and a claim styled Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, ” the Complaint's naming the Sheriff in the caption, use of the language “acting ‘under color of law, '” and request for punitive damages all suggest that Plaintiff “inten[ded] to bring a Federal claim in this matter.” Id. at 3 ¶ 6. Defendants assert that they had a phone conversation with Plaintiff's counsel to confirm that a federal claim was intended. Id. at 3 ¶ 7. Defendants further aver that they submitted the Notice of Removal “[s]o as not to waive the right of removal” and “to avoid waiver of their substantial rights.” Id. Upon review of the allegations in the Complaint, the undersigned concludes that Defendants have failed to carry their burden of establishing federal jurisdiction over this case. See Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151.
Section 1331 grants district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal question jurisdiction exists “only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly-pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see King v. Marriott Int'l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Under the venerable well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction lies under section 1331 only if a claim, when pleaded correctly, sets forth a federal question[.]”).
Plaintiff is the master of his claim, and he may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law. Donaldson v. City of Walterboro Police Dep't, 466 F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (D.S.C. 2006); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809, n.6 (1986) (“Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced.”). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, courts “ordinarily . . . look no further than the plaintiff's complaint in determining whether a lawsuit raises issues of federal law capable of creating federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, “a claim in which the federal question arises only as a defense to an otherwise purely state law action does not ‘arise under' federal law, and hence jurisdiction would not lie under section 1331.” King, 337 F.3d at 424 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983)).
A mere reference to federal law in the complaint is not sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The mere assertion of a federal claim is not sufficient to obtain jurisdiction[.]”) (citing Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1988) (dismissing § 1983 claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the federal claims were insubstantial and were pretextual state claims)); see also Ashby v. Isle of Wight Cty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.Supp.2d 616, 631 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“A mere allegation that a federal statute has been violated is not sufficient.”) (citing Mulcahey, 29 F.3d 148). Rather, federal question jurisdiction “requires that a party assert a substantial federal claim.” Lovern, 190 F.3d at 654 (emphasis in original). Moreover, a plaintiff's claim arises under federal law “only when every legal theory supporting the claim requires the resolution of a federal issue.” Dixon, 369 F.3d at
816 (emphasis in original). “In other words, if the plaintiff can support his claim with even one theory that does not call for an interpretation of federal law, his claim does not ‘arise under' federal law for purposes of § 1331.” Id. at 817. Accordingly, a defendant seeking to remove a case on the basis of federal question jurisdiction must establish two things: “(1) that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a question of federal law, and (2) that the question of federal law is substantial. If either of these two elements is lacking, removal is improper[, ] and the case should be remanded to state court.” Id. at 816.
Here, Defendants have failed to establish either requirement. First, Plaintiff has not expressly invoked any federal law or right in his Complaint, and his mere reference to acting under the color of law and punitive damages is insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. See Lovern, 190 F.3d at 654; Davis, 856 F.2d at 650. Further, even if Plaintiff's Complaint could be read as raising a question of federal law, Defendants have failed to show that any claim “necessarily depends on” a question of federal law, such that “every legal theory” advanced by Plaintiff in that claim requires resolution of a federal issue. Dixon, 369 F.3d at 816. To the contrary, each claim alleges a theory of liability that sounds in state law. Simply put, Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiff raised “a substantial federal claim” in his Complaint. Lovern, 190 F.3d at 654. Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter and that this action should be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Doe, 819 F.3d at 66-67.
Plaintiff did not file a Motion to Remand; however, if Plaintiff, in fact, intended to assert a federal claim in his Complaint, as suggested in Defendants' Notice of Removal and the referenced telephone call, ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶ 7, he has not done so in the Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the case be REMANDED to state court.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).