Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-2463 (RBW).
May 12, 2005
ORDER
Currently before the Court is the defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Defs.' Mot.") [D.E. # 46] and the plaintiffs' opposition thereto. Also before the Court is the plaintiffs' Motion for Certified Copy of the Judgment [D.E. # 59]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the defendants' motion and grant the plaintiffs' motion.
The Court is aware that a Motion for Judgment for Liquidated Damages [D.E. # 40] and a Motion for Attorney's Fees [D.E. # 45] have been filed by the plaintiffs. The Court will address these motions in a separate order.
I. Background
The defendants, Advance Tenant Services ("ATS") and James Douglas, request that this Court alter or amend the judgment entered against the defendants following a jury verdict pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defs.' Mot. at 1. The plaintiffs brought this action to recover unpaid back wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201et seq. (2000) and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"), Md. Code Ann., Lab. Empl. §§ 3-501 et seq. (1999). Second Amended Complaint ("Compl.") at 1. As a result of the verdict entered by the jury, judgment was entered for the plaintiffs in the amount of $324,143.36 on November 10, 2004.See Judgment on the Verdict [D.E. # 44].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) states that "[a]ny motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Because the Judgment on the Verdict was entered on November 9, 2004, see [D.E. # 43], and defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was filed nine days later on November 18, 2004, see [D.E. # 46], the defendants have satisfied the time requirement provided in Rule 59(e).
II. Analysis
A. Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
The defendants seek relief under the false assumption that they were found liable for over $587,000.00 in damages, $324,143.36 for violating the MWPCL and $263,416.52 for violating the FLSA. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Defs." Mem.") at 1. Although the Court initially issued a Judgment on the Verdict [D.E. # 43] in the amount of $263,416.52 on November 8, 2004, after further review this Court realized that this amount was not correctly calculated and therefore issued a Minute Order Vacating Judgment on the Verdict and issued another Judgment on the Verdict [D.E. # 44] on November 10, 2004 in the amount of $324,143.36. In any event, the Court never entered a judgment against the defendants in the amount of $587,000.
In further support of their motion to amend or alter the judgment, the defendants argue that this Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the FLSA claim for the year 2000 because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of the defendants' gross sales for that year. Id. at 2. Therefore, the defendants conclude that this Court should vacate the judgment for damages awarded pursuant to the FLSA for the year 2000. Id. Moreover, the defendants contend that the judgment for damages awarded pursuant to the MWPCL for the year 2000 should also be vacated because this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear that claim which was made against a Maryland employer for payroll activities occurring in Maryland for work that was also performed there. Id. The defendants further contend that the individual judgment against defendant Douglas should be vacated because it was never proven at trial that he acted as an employer. Id. at 3. According to the defendants, Douglas could not have been an employer since there was no evidence to suggest that he was an officer, shareholder, or director of ATS, hired or fired the plaintiffs, or supervised any of their work. Id. The defendants reason that because some of the plaintiffs performed some of the same functions as Douglas and could not themselves claim to be employers, then neither could Douglas be found to be an employer.Id. at 2-3. The defendants add that the plaintiffs "failed to provide enough evidence within the statute or case law to prove that Douglas was also an employer who should be held individually liable for violations of the FLSA." Id. at 3. Accordingly, the defendants argue that Douglas should not be held individually liable pursuant to MWPCL. Id.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs respond that the damages awards for the year 2000 were proper because this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' claims for that year. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Pls.' Opp'n") at 3. The plaintiffs contend that they presented ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that the annual gross sales for 2000 exceeded the $500,000 FLSA jurisdictional threshold. Id. The plaintiffs further contend that there was evidence presented at trial from which the jury could conclude that annual gross sales for each of the years from 2000-2002 was between $2 and $2.5 million. Id. Specifically, the evidence showed that ATS' annual payroll for 2000-2002 was in excess of $1 million per year, from which the jury could infer that the annual gross sales were at least $500,000. Id. at 3-4. Based on this evidence, the plaintiffs conclude that the defendants have not and could not have argued that ATS did not have at least $500,000 in sales for each year from 2000-2002.Id. at 4.
Moreover, in response to the defendants' argument that the Court should vacate the judgment that was entered against Douglas in his individual capacity, the plaintiffs contend that the jury properly entered a verdict against him because he was correctly classified as an employer for purposes of the plaintiffs' FLSA claims. Id. at 4, 6. According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Douglas qualified as an employer because he was the president of ATS during the relevant 2000-2002 time period, id. at 5, he determined the rates of pay for ATS employees, he supervised their work, he was responsible for hiring and firing all ATS employees, he was solely responsible for obtaining contracts for ATS, and he made all the important decisions concerning ATS's operations. Id. at 6.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a motion to reconsider or vacate judgment need not be granted unless the Court finds (1) that there is an intervening change of controlling law; (2) that new evidence is available; or (3) that a need to correct a clear error or to prevent manifest injustice is present. "A Rule 59(e) motion is not a second opportunity to present argument upon which the Court has already ruled, nor is it a means to bring before the Court theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier." "Motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) are disfavored and relief from judgment is granted only when the moving party establishes extraordinary circumstances." The movant bears the burden to "clearly establish either manifest error of law or fact or . . . present newly discovered evidence."Schrader v. Tomlinson, No. 00-2804, 2005 WL 327130, at *2 (D.D.C. February 9, 2005) (internal citations omitted). InSchrader, the plaintiff argued that this Court should vacate its prior judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because the court did not consider the Supreme Court's decision in Nat'l Passenger R.R. Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Schrader, 2005 WL 327130, at *1. The plaintiff argued that the "`ramifications' of the decision merit[ed] a reversal of [the c]ourt's judgment." Id. at *2. However, this Court held that for several reasons the plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment did not satisfy the requisite standard for obtaining relief under Rule 59. Id. First, the plaintiff neither argued nor could have argued that new evidence was available or that an intervening change of controlling law justified consideration of the plaintiff's motion by the Court because Morgan was decided prior to the court's decision in Schrader. Id. Thus, the plaintiff could have asserted her theory based on Morgan well in advance of the court's decision, and relief was therefore not required because a "Rule 59(e) motion is not . . . a means to bring before the Court theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, even assuming that the plaintiff's motion was properly before the Court, the Morgan decision did not require the Court to alter its prior decision because this Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. Id. In other words, "[b]ecause she failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination for her timely filed claim, this Court concluded that such a claim could not form the basis of a continuing violation which could in turn revive stale claims." Id. Accordingly, this Court concluded that the plaintiff's stale claims could not have been revived under Morgan. Id.
As further justification for the denial of the plaintiff's motion to vacate in Schrader, the Court noted that Morgan actually supported its prior opinion. Id. *3. The Court reached this conclusion because the plaintiff could not employ the "continuing violation" theory of discrimination to avoid dismissal of her Title VII claims. In Morgan, the Supreme Court had held that the plaintiff there could only bring charges for discrete acts that transpired within the requisite time period, and the remaining untimely filed discrimination claims were no longer actionable. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114-115.
Here, as in Schrader, there is no basis to grant the defendants' motion. The defendants have not presented any new evidence that would merit altering the judgment. As previously discussed, the defendants have mistakenly concluded that the amount of the judgment was $587,000. Rather, the judgment entered by the Court was in the amount of $324,143.36. Additionally, the evidence at trial clearly established that the defendants' gross annual sales in 2000 was well above the jurisdictional requirement of $500,000. Moreover, the judgment against Douglas was also appropriate because he was properly classified as an employer. See Pls.' Opp'n at 4-6. Furthermore, the defendants have not presented any new controlling law that would impact the judgment entered by the Court. Finally, there is no manifest injustice or error of law that needs to be corrected by amending or altering the judgment awarded to the plaintiffs. See also Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest v. FDA, No. 03-1962, 2004 WL 2218658, at *2 (D.D.C. September 17, 2004) (concluding that the plaintiffs' motion failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because there had been neither a change in the applicable law or the presentation of any new evidence after the plaintiffs filed their complaint). Accordingly, the defendants Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment must be denied.
The Court allowed the plaintiffs to reopen their case specifically for the purpose of permitting them to establish the $500,000 jurisdictional amount. According to the plaintiffs, on direct examination Mr. Douglas did not deny that ATS had more than $500,000 in annual gross sales in the year 2000. Pls.' Opp'n at 4. The jury obviously accepted the plaintiffs' supposition. Thus, the defendants' position that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' FLSA claims for the year 2000 wages is without merit.
The FLSA defines an "employer" as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2005). An "employee" is defined as "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). Douglas qualified as an employer because the evidence established that he was the president of ATS during the years 2000-2002, determined the rates of pay for ATS employees, supervised employees' work, was in charge of hiring and firing for all employees, was solely responsible for obtaining contracts for ATS, and made all the important decisions for ATS. Pls.' Opp'n at 6.
B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Certified Copy of Judgment
The plaintiffs have requested a certified copy of the judgment in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000) "so that [p]laintiffs may commence enforcement action in Maryland against [d]efendants." Plaintiffs' Motion for Certified Copy of Judgment at 1. The plaintiffs state that defendant ATS is a Maryland corporation headquartered in Maryland and that defendant Douglas resides and owns property in Maryland. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Certified Copy of Judgment ("Pls.' Mem.") at 1. Moreover, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants' Rule 59 motion has precluded the entry of a final judgment which would enable him to obtain a certified copy of the judgment from the Court's Clerk's Office. Id. According to the plaintiffs, a certified copy of the judgment will enable the plaintiffs to begin the process of collecting on the judgment in Maryland.Id. at 2.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 a judgment for the recovery of money in any district court "may be registered by filing a certified copy of the judgment in any other district . . . when the judgment has become final by appeal . . . or when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause shown." "`Good cause' can be established by `an absence of assets in the judgment forum, coupled with the presence of substantial assets in the registration forum.'" Cheminova A/S v. Griffin, L.L.C., 182 F. Supp. 2d 68, 80 (D.D.C. 2002) (citation omitted). Id. InCheminova, the court denied Cheminova's request to extend the judgment outside of the District of Columbia because the respondent had made a good faith effort to pay the award or post a bond if so ordered by the court. Id. However, in Johns v. Rozet, 143 F.R.D. 11, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1992) the court granted the request to register a judgment in another jurisdiction because the plaintiffs demonstrated the existence of good cause. TheJohns Court found good cause because the plaintiffs' recovery was at risk since the "defendants failed to post the supersedeas bond ordered by the court and the defendants had more assets in California than in the District of Columbia." Id. at 12; see also Pereira v. Cogan, No. 00 Civ. 619, 2003 WL 22510410, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) (holding that good cause existed within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1963 enabling the plaintiff to register the judgment in another jurisdiction because substantial assets were located there and sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment had not been located within the court's jurisdiction).
Here, in contrast to the situation in Cheminova but similar to the circumstances in Johns and Pereira, the plaintiffs have demonstrated "good cause" for this Court to allow the registration of their judgment in Maryland. The plaintiffs have made their good cause showing by indicating that the defendants have not made an effort to pay the judgment but have instead made it increasingly difficult for the plaintiffs to collect on their judgment. Specifically, ATS commenced operating under the new name of Single Point Construction, L.L.C. two days before the judgment was entered. Pls.' Mem. at 1-2. Moreover, James M. Douglas is allegedly the resident agent for Single Point Construction. Based on these allegations, the Court finds that there is "good cause" to certify the judgment, so that it can be registered in other districts such as Maryland where it is likely that the defendants have substantial assets. See Pls.' Mem. at 1. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is Denied and the plaintiffs' Motion for a Certified Copy of the Judgment is Granted.