Opinion
04-18-2024
Nancy FALCON, Claimant–Appellant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant–Respondent.
Shimko Law P.C., Brooklyn (Daniel S. Shimko of counsel), for appellant. Letitia James, Attorney General, New York (David Lawrence III of counsel), for respondent.
Shimko Law P.C., Brooklyn (Daniel S. Shimko of counsel), for appellant.
Letitia James, Attorney General, New York (David Lawrence III of counsel), for respondent.
Renwick, P.J., Kapnick, Shulman, Rosado, O’Neill Levy, JJ.
Judgment of the Court of Claims of the State of New York (David A. Weinstein, J.), entered July 5, 2023, after a bench trial on the issue of liability, dismissing claimant’s personal injury claim, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
[1] A fair interpretation of the credible evidence supports the findings of the court that the State lacked actual or constructive notice of the small amount of water on which the claimant allegedly slipped while walking On a white tiled floor surface near a nurses’ station at defendant’s medical facility. No nonhearsay, noncontradictory, credible evidence was offered that would support a finding that the alleged water condition was observed by other passersby prior to the claimant’s fall at the location of the fall. Nor was there evidence the water condition on the floor was discolored or otherwise dirty that might support an inference the alleged hazard had existed for a sufficient length of time to be discovered and remedied or have warnings erected to give notice as to its existence (see Mercer v. City of New York, 88 N.Y.2d 955, 956, 647 N.Y.S.2d 159, 670 N.E.2d 443 [1996]; Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836, 836, 501 N.Y.S.2d 646, 492 N.E.2d 774 [1986]).
[2, 3] To the extent the claimant argues that water spills would regularly occur on the floor where she resided due to a facility policy that encouraged patients to carry around water containers for hydration purposes because of the medications they were prescribed, and that the medical staff therefore had actual knowledge of ongoing, reoccurring water-hazard conditions on the floor that would routinely be left unaddressed, such argument is unavailing (see Dennis v. Bartow Stationery, 28 A.D.3d 238, 811 N.Y.S.2d 566 [1st Dept. 2006]). There was no evidence that the spills re-occurred at any particular location (see Lance v. Den–Lyn Realty Corp., 84 A.D.3d 470, 471, 922 N.Y.S.2d 362 [1st Dept. 2011]; Colbourn v. ISS Intl. Serv. Sys., 304 A.D.2d 369, 757 N.Y.S.2d 291 [1st Dept. 2003]). A defendant’s general awareness that a dangerous condition may be present is legally insufficient to constitute constructive notice of a particular condition which caused a claimant’s injury (see Solazzo v. New York City Tr. Auth., 6 N.Y.3d 734, 735, 810 N.Y.S.2d 121, 843 N.E.2d 748 [2005]; Piacquadio v. Recine Realty Corp., 84 N.Y.2d 967, 969, 622 N.Y.S.2d 493, 646 N.E.2d 795 [1994]). On this record, there is no evidence, only speculation, offered in an attempt to establish a reasonable inference that the container practice identified by the claimant was the cause of and/or source of the spill on which she fell (see Castore v. Tutto Bene Rest. Inc., 77 A.D.3d 599, 909 N.Y.S.2d 452 [1st Dept. 2010]). We have considered claimant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.