Opinion
CIVIL 4:24-CV-00055
02-23-2024
SEAN FAIRWEATHER, Plaintiff, v. COMFORT SUITES, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
The plaintiff, Sean Fairweather (“Fairweather”), brings multiple state claims against the Comfort Suites hotel in Sayre, Pennsylvania (“Comfort Suites”). Because we do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter on the face of the complaint, we recommend that the Court dismiss the complaint and give Fairweather leave to file an amended complaint.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Fairweather initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint on January 12, 2024. Doc. 1. Fairweather also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. 6), which we granted (doc. 8). The following facts are taken from the complaint.
According to Fairweather, on or about November 4, 2023, a Comfort Suites employee called the local police department looking for Fairweather, despite the fact that Fairweather was in police custody since November 3, 2023. Doc. 1 at 3. Fairweather states that he “was not even there, nor did [he] commit any crime.” Id. at 4. In his complaint, Fairweather wonders, “What would or why would a[n] employee [at] the [ ]Comfort Suites[ ] call the local police looking for me[?]” Id. at 3. He explains, “they seen [sic] his car park there and proceeded to harass and shame him.” Id. (cleaned up).
About a week later, Fairweather's girlfriend informed him on a phone call that his car, a gray Dodge charger, “ha[d] been viciously keyed and damage[d].” Id. According to Fairweather, a Comfort Suites employee is responsible for keying his car. Id. Although Fairweather's girlfriend “handed photos of the damages to management[,]” nothing was done Id.
Fairweather brings the following state claims against the sole defendant, Comfort Suites: (1) harassment; (2) defamation of character; (3) property damage; (4) slander; (5) mental stress; and (6) endangerment. Id. at 5. Where the form complaint prompts Fairweather to state his injury, he states that he is undergoing counseling after these events and his car is damaged. Id. For relief, Fairweather seeks money damages and “charges on whoever done [sic] these things.” Id.
III. Standard of Review.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “[T]hey have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). “Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). “Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868). This jurisdictional rule “‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is ‘inflexible and without exception.'” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). “[F]ederal courts have an ever-present obligation to satisfy themselves of their subject matter jurisdiction and to decide the issue sua sponte.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Co., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d Cir.1995); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-84 (1999) (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 (1998) (noting that “subject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative”)). Consequently, this Court is required to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.
IV. Discussion.
On the first page of the form complaint, Fairweather checked the box indicating that the nature of his complaint was a “Civil Rights Action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[.]” Doc. 1 at 1. But when listing his claims Fairweather does not list § 1983 or any other federal claim. See id. at 5. Further, Fairweather does not allege even an arguable § 1983 claim, as he fails to allege any state actor violated his constitutional rights. Thus, the Court does not have federal-question jurisdiction. Accordingly, we turn to whether the Court has diversity jurisdiction.
This case also does not fall within any of the other categories of the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1333-69.
The Court has diversity jurisdiction over civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and is between inter alia citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. §1332. Section 1332 requires complete diversity. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). There is complete diversity only when “the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” Id. “A plaintiff invoking a federal court's diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of stating ‘all parties' citizenships such that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.'” Kissi v. Gillespie, 348 Fed.Appx. 704, 705-06 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 222 n. 13 (3d Cir.1999)).
Fairweather fails to allege facts from which it can reasonably be inferred that there is complete diversity. Although he alleges that he is currently incarcerated in SCI Dallas in Pennsylvania and that Comfort Suites is located in Sayre, Pennsylvania, he has not alleged the citizenship of either himself or Comfort Suites. Accordingly, as pleaded, the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
We recommend, however, that the Court give Fairweather leave to amend his complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies in his pleading regarding subjectmatter jurisdiction, if he can do so honestly. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (“Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.”); Pierro v. Kugel, 386 Fed.Appx. 308, 310 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating that “a court should ordinarily allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint to properly allege the parties' citizenship, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”). Before deciding whether to amend his complaint, Fairweather should consider the following principles regarding diversity jurisdiction.
“It is well-settled that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, citizenship means domicile, not residence.” Pierro, 386 Fed.Appx. at 309. “To acquire a domicile, a person must be physically present in a state and intend to remain in that state.” Id. (emphasis in original). “Prisoners presumptively retain their prior citizenship when the gates close behind them.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2013). “That presumption, however, may be rebutted by showing a bona fide intent to remain in the state of incarceration on release.” Pierro, 386 Fed.Appx. at 309. But the presumption is not easily rebutted, and “a prisoner must ‘show truly exceptional circumstances' to overcome the presumption.” Id. at 310 (quoting Jones v. Hadican, 552 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1977)).
As to the corporate defendants, we note that a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State . . . by which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). A corporation's principal place of business is the place “where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities,” i.e., its nerve center. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010). To properly plead the citizenship of a corporation, the plaintiff must allege both its principal place of business and its state of incorporation.
VI. Recommendations.
Based on the foregoing, we recommend that the Court dismiss Fairweather's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but grant him leave to amend his complaint.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.