Opinion
No. CV 05 4004828 S
May 4, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 18, 2004, the plaintiff, Fairchild Heights Residents Association, Inc., filed a three-count complaint against the defendant Fairchild Heights, Inc. The plaintiff is a non-stock corporation. The plaintiff's membership consists of approximately forty-three of the one hundred nine owners of mobile manufactured home units located in the Fairchild Heights Mobile Home Park (Park) in Shelton. The defendant is the owner and landlord of the Park. The plaintiff brings this action on behalf of its members, and alleges that its claims are representative of all of the Park's residents.
Count one of the plaintiff's complaint alleges negligence per se in violation of General Statutes § 21-64 et seq., for negligence in the maintenance and upkeep of the roads and the mobile homes in the Park. Count two alleges negligence per se in violation of ordinances of the city of Shelton, and count three alleges unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes. §§ 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, money damages, return of rent paid by its members, punitive damages, attorneys fees and costs.
On November 4, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks standing. The defendant filed a memorandum in support of its motion. The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on December 12, 2005 and the defendant filed a reply. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted. CT Page 8499
DISCUSSION
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 544, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 485, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).As previously stated, the defendant moves to dismiss this action on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks standing. It argues that the harm the plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct is indirect and remote. It also contends that in order to determine or apportion any recoverable damages, the plaintiff's individual members must either join this action or institute their own actions.
The plaintiff counters that a non-stock corporation has standing in its representative capacity to bring a lawsuit on behalf of its members. More specifically, the plaintiff contends that it has satisfied the elements for "representational standing," particularly because it is seeking equitable as well as legal relief.
"Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghomohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 328, 852 A.2d 703 (2004). "[I]f the injuries claimed by the plaintiff are remote, indirect or derivative with respect to the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff is not the proper party to assert them and lacks standing to do so. Where, for example, the harms asserted to have been suffered directly by a plaintiff are in reality derivative of injuries to a third party, the injuries are not direct but are indirect, and the plaintiff has no standing to assert them." Ganim v. Smith Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 347-48, 780 A.2d 98 (2001).
The United States Supreme Court "identified three policy factors to guide courts in their application of the general principle that plaintiffs with indirect injuries lack standing to sue . . . First, the more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to determine the amount of plaintiff's damages attributable to the wrongdoing as opposed to other, independent factors. Second, recognizing claims by the indirectly injured would require courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, in order to avoid the risk of multiple recoveries. Third, struggling with the first two problems is unnecessary where there are directly injured parties who can remedy the harm without these attendant problems." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 353.
The plaintiff argues that it has standing to maintain this action because the allegations of the complaint satisfy the elements of associational or representational standing established in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) and adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 614-15, 508 A.2d 743 (1986). Under the test established in Hunt, an association has standing to bring an action on behalf of its members if "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 616.
The plaintiff does not seriously contend that it has standing in its individual capacity. The complaint alleges that the defendant's actions have caused "plaintiff's members, owners of mobile homes, to suffer ascertainable damage," but there is no claim of any damages or consequences flowing to the plaintiff itself. Consequently, the plaintiff lacks standing individually because it has not suffered any direct harm and " all of the injuries that the plaintiff allegedly suffered derive solely and exclusively from the harm allegedly visited upon the plaintiff's members by the defendant." (Emphasis in original.) Connecticut State Medical Society v. Oxford Health Plans (CT), Inc., 272 Conn. 469, 479, 863 A.2d 645 (2005).
"Representational standing depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gay Lesbian Law Students Assn. v. Board of Trustees, 236 Conn. 453, 464, 673 A.2d 484 (1996).
Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff meets the first two prongs of the associational standing test, the plaintiff fails to meet the third. The allegations of the complaint and prayer for relief plainly indicate that the primary, overriding focus of the plaintiff's claims is the recovery of monetary damages. Since the plaintiff seeks money damages for the alleged violations, proof relating to the specific injuries of the individual members is required. Because this participation of the plaintiff's members is necessary to this action, the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the criteria necessary for the assertion of associational standing. Connecticut Podiatric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., 49 Conn.Sup. 462, 467 (2006).
Although the complaint includes a claim for "declaratory relief," the complaint does not describe what specific declaration is being sought or how any such declaration is directly related to any bona fide associational interest. See generally Practice Book § 17-56(a)(2) ('The prayer for relief shall state with precision the declaratory judgment desired . . .") The primary and predominant claim is for damages to the plaintiff's members, and thus, their participation is necessary for a complete disposition of the claims being asserted and the relief being requested. Therefore, the mere fact that the complaint includes a generalized claim for declaratory relief does not affect the conclusion that this case must be dismissed. AFSCME, Council 4, AFL-CIO v. State of Connecticut, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 97 0570735 (March 25, 2002, Peck, J.) ( 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 558); see also Connecticut Podiatric Medical Assn. v. Health Net of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 49 Conn.Sup. 462.
The insufficiency of the plaintiff's interest in seeking declaratory relief is also indicated by the failure of the complaint to verify that any notice of the action was given to interested parties as required by Practice Book § 17-56(b).
In its memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff indicates that injunctive relief is also being sought. The prayer for relief, however, makes no request for injunctive relief. See generally Practice Book § 10-27. (A party seeking equitable relief shall specifically demand it as such . . .")
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. So ordered this 4th day of May 2006.