Opinion
A17-1705
11-19-2018
Jason Maurice Fagin, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016). Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-12-1131 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2012, Jason Maurice Fagin pleaded guilty to first-degree test refusal based on his admission that he was arrested for driving while impaired and refused to submit to a blood test or a urine test. In 2017, Fagin petitioned for postconviction relief based on State v. Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. 2016), and State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016), which collectively held that the state cannot prosecute a person for refusing to submit to a blood test or a urine test without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. The postconviction court denied Fagin's petition on multiple grounds, reasoning in part that, if Trahan and Thompson apply retroactively to a conviction that has reached final judgment, Fagin did not satisfy his burden of proving that there were no exigent circumstances that would have justified a warrantless search of his blood or urine. We conclude that the postconviction court erred by placing the burden of proof with respect to exigent circumstances on Fagin instead of on the state. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On March 22, 2012, at 2:14 a.m., two Washington County deputy sheriffs responded to a report of a vehicle that was stopped in the middle of a rural highway in Denmark Township. When they arrived, the deputies saw a vehicle stopped diagonally across both lanes of traffic. The deputies saw two persons inside the vehicle, one in the driver's seat and one in the front passenger's seat, both of whom appeared to be unconscious. The deputies noticed that the driver, later identified as Fagin, had a sock "halfway off his foot," which caused the deputies to suspect that he had injected a narcotic into his foot before passing out. The deputies attempted to wake Fagin and the passenger. When Fagin awoke, the deputies displayed their badges. Fagin drove away hastily. The deputies chased him in a squad car and stopped him shortly thereafter. The deputies arrested Fagin and read him the implied-consent advisory. A deputy sheriff asked Fagin to submit to a blood test or a urine test. Fagin refused.
The state charged Fagin with first-degree refusal to submit to chemical testing, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2010), and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(b)(1) (2010). In July 2012, Fagin pleaded guilty to the test-refusal charge, and the state dismissed the possession charge. The district court imposed a sentence of 65 months of imprisonment. Fagin did not pursue a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. In July 2014, Fagin petitioned for postconviction relief based on Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). In September 2014, the postconviction court denied the petition. Fagin filed a notice of appeal but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal.
In May 2017, Fagin again petitioned for postconviction relief, this time based on the supreme court's opinions in Trahan and Thompson. In August 2017, the postconviction court denied the petition on multiple grounds. The postconviction court first reasoned that Fagin waived his constitutional challenge to the test-refusal statute by pleading guilty. In the alternative, the postconviction court considered whether Trahan and Thompson apply retroactively to a conviction that has reached final judgment. The postconviction court declined to answer that question. Rather, the postconviction court reasoned that, even if Trahan and Thompson apply retroactively, Fagin "has not carried his burden of showing that exigent circumstances could not or would not have been found in 2012." Fagin appeals.
DECISION
Fagin argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition. In his initial brief, he made three arguments: (1) the postconviction court erred by ruling that Fagin waived his postconviction claim by pleading guilty; (2) the postconviction court erred to the extent that it reasoned that Trahan and Thompson do not apply retroactively to a conviction that has reached final judgment; and (3) the postconviction court erred by reasoning that, if Trahan and Thompson apply retroactively, he did not satisfy his burden of proof with respect to exigent circumstances. In a supplemental brief, the state conceded that Fagin's first and second arguments are meritorious in light of the supreme court's recent opinion in State v. Johnson, 916 N.W.2d 674 (Minn. 2018), in which the supreme court held that a guilty plea does not waive a Trahan-Thompson challenge to the constitutionality of the test-refusal statute and held that Trahan and Thompson apply retroactively. See id. at 680-81, 683-84.
Accordingly, there is only one remaining issue: the issue raised by Fagin's third argument. In his initial brief, Fagin argued that the postconviction court erred by placing the burden on him to demonstrate that no exigent circumstances existed. In his supplemental brief, he noted his right to a remand in light of Johnson, reiterated his argument that the state bears the burden of demonstrating exigent circumstances, and asked this court to reverse and "remand the case to the district court to allow the state the opportunity to meet its burden and prove that exigent circumstances justified law enforcement's demand for a warrantless blood or urine search."
The state argues in its supplemental brief that the postconviction court did not err by placing the burden of proof on Fagin. The state acknowledges that, in a pre-trial motion, the state has the burden of showing an exception to the warrant requirement. But the state contends that, in a postconviction action, the petitioner bears the burden on all factual issues necessarily raised by the petition. In support of its contention, the state cites both the postconviction statute and caselaw. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(3) (2016); State v. Ranier, 502 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn. 1993); Black v. State, 184 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. 1971). The state further contends that, because Fagin did not introduce any evidence on the issue, the postconviction court properly ruled that he did not satisfy his burden of proof.
The supreme court has provided a clear answer to the question that is disputed by the parties in this case. In Johnson, the supreme court held that, even though Birchfield, Trahan, and Thompson apply retroactively, reversal of a postconviction petitioner's conviction "is not automatic." 916 N.W.2d at 684. Rather, "district courts will need to apply the Birchfield rule and determine if the test-refusal statute was unconstitutional as applied." Id. In Trahan, the supreme court made such a determination in a procedural posture that was the same as the procedural posture in this case: a constitutional challenge to the test-refusal statute in a postconviction action. 886 N.W.2d at 221-23. The supreme court considered the state's argument that the statute was not unconstitutional as applied because a warrantless blood draw would have been justified by exigent circumstances. Id. In the course of its reasoning, the supreme court stated, "The government has the burden to show that exigent circumstances existed." Id. at 222 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2098 (1984)). The supreme court concluded its discussion by stating, "we hold that the State cannot meet its burden to prove exigent circumstances." Id. at 223.
Thus, the postconviction court erred by placing on Fagin the burden of proving the absence of exigent circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings with respect to the issue of exigent circumstances. On remand, the state shall bear the burden of proving that exigent circumstances existed when law-enforcement officers read Fagin the implied-consent advisory and asked him to submit to a blood test or a urine test. The postconviction court shall allow both parties to introduce additional evidence on the issue of exigent circumstances. We express no opinion as to whether McNeely applies to that exigent-circumstances determination. See Johnson, 916 N.W.2d at 684 n.8.
Reversed and remanded.