Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-30011-MAP, CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-30118-MAP.
October 18, 2001
This Memorandum will address two separate cases involving substantially similar issues and arguments. Hobbs Container Company, Inc. ("Hobbs"), a California company, moves to dismiss all claims against it in both cases on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny the motions.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The following facts are supported by the respective records. In determining facts for purposes of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court takes "specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not disputed) and construe[s] them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff's jurisdictional claim. [The court] then add[s] to the mix facts put forward by the defendant, to the extent that they are uncontradicted."Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Association, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
A. Extra Fresh I
In their first complaint ("Extra Fresh I"), plaintiffs Extra Fresh, LLC ("Extra Fresh") and Reada Corporation, Inc. ("Reada") filed suit against defendants The Groupe Guillin, Guillin Emballages, Dynaplast ("Group Guillin") and Hobbs. The Amended Complaint, filed February 22, 2001, charges Group Guillin with contract violations and business torts on several theories, and Hobbs with tortious interference with contractual and business relations, and unfair and deceptive trade practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. (Docket 6).
The story giving rise to these claims begins with the business relationship between Extra Fresh and Group Guillin. The business entities which comprise Group Guillin are incorporated and located in France, and manufacture a plastic "clamshell" container. This product may be used to hold strawberries or other produce items. The complaint alleges that approximately seven years ago Extra Fresh, a Massachusetts corporation, approached Group Guillin and offered to create a market in the United States for the clamshell container. Group Guillin agreed, and in exchange Extra Fresh was designated as the exclusive sales representative and distributor for the clamshell container in the United States. (Docket 6 at 3).
Extra Fresh acted essentially as a broker by finding wholesale distributors for the clamshell product in the United States. Hobbs was one such distributor in the California market and began purchasing the clamshell container beginning in 1996. Extra Fresh alleges that Hobbs agreed to purchase the clamshell container solely from Extra Fresh as consideration for Extra Fresh's brokerage services. (Docket 6 at 4).
In a given interaction, Hobbs would order clamshell containers from Extra Fresh, usually to be delivered within 30 or 60 days. Extra Fresh would then cause the clamshells to be shipped directly from Group Guillen, or from Reada's storage warehouse in Texas. Hobbs sent purchase orders to Extra Fresh almost daily, and periodically called Extra Fresh to check on the status of those orders, but practically never physically set foot in Massachusetts. Further, the clamshell containers were never stored in, or shipped from, Massachusetts. (Docket 12). It is undisputed that Extra Fresh was purely a broker, who conducted its business almost entirely via phone, letter, and fax.
According to Extra Fresh, all parties were content with and prospering in this arrangement until Hobbs decided, in effect, to cut out the middle man. Hobbs began asking Extra Fresh suspicious and inappropriate questions about the nature of its relationship with Group Guillin, and thereafter visited Group Guillin representatives in France. Eventually, Hobbs and Group Guillen decided to breach their respective agreements with Extra Fresh, and in December, 2000, informed Extra Fresh and Reada that they were no longer needed, and would no longer be paid. (Docket 6). Plaintiffs filed suit almost immediately thereafter on the theories outlined above. As noted, Hobbs now moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
B. Extra Fresh II
In their second complaint ("Extra Fresh II"), Extra Fresh and Reada filed suit against defendants S.Z.P. Plastic Packaging Products ("S.Z.P.") and Hobbs. As in Extra Fresh I, this Complaint, filed June 26, 2001, charges S.Z.P. with contract violations and business torts on several theories, and Hobbs with tortious interference with contractual and business relations, breach of contract on various theories, conversion, and unfair and deceptive trade practices under Mass. Gen Laws ch. 93A. (Docket 1).
The story giving rise to this complaint follows the same pattern. This time, the tale involves an Israeli company, S.Z.P. However, here Extra Fresh was not just a broker. In Extra Fresh II, Extra Fresh designed a strawberry pint tray and in 1999, asked S.Z.P. to manufacture it for distribution. The two parties agreed that the pint tray would be for Extra Fresh's exclusive use in the United States. Using Extra Fresh's plans, S.Z.P. began manufacturing the Extra Fresh pint trays. (Docket 1).
Hobbs, already doing business with Extra Fresh, expressed interest in the pint tray. According to Extra Fresh, Hobbs committed to exclusively purchasing the pint trays from Extra Fresh, just as in Extra Fresh I. (Docket 1 at 3). However, the Extra Fresh/S.Z.P./Hobbs triumvirate never enjoyed a similar period of contentedness and prosperity.
In December, 2000, when Hobbs and Group Guillin let Extra Fresh know that its services were no longer needed, S.Z.P. still had not delivered its first batch of Extra Fresh pint trays. Indeed, the first trays arrived in January, 2001, and Extra Fresh refused to pay for them on the ground that they were defective. At this point, Hobbs stepped in, and entered into a separate arrangement with S.Z.P. to receive the trays directly, again cutting Extra Fresh out. (Docket 14 at 9).
Extra Fresh calls this conduct doubly bad. Not only did S.Z.P. and Hobbs breach and interfere with their respective contracts with Extra Fresh, they misappropriated the strawberry pint Extra Fresh itself designed. Plaintiffs filed suit on the theories outlined above. Again, Hobbs has moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
III. DISCUSSION
Personal jurisdiction can come in two different shapes: general or specific. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). A federal court may exercise general jurisdiction over a plaintiff who has engaged in "continuous and systematic" contacts in the forum state and thereby may be considered effectively "present" in the forum for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 417. Unlike the inquiry under specific jurisdiction, a general jurisdiction inquiry is "dispute blind"; the sole focus is on whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to be considered "present." Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 339 (5th Cir. 1999). Because plaintiffs do not claim that Hobbs is subject to general jurisdiction in Massachusetts, the court will confine its inquiry to whether Hobbs is subject to specific personal jurisdiction.
A district court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction pursues a two-part inquiry when determining whether it has the power to exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant for a given claim. See, e.g., Lyle Richards International, Ltd. v. Ashworth, Inc., 132 F.3d 111, 112 (1st Cir. 1997). First, does the Massachusetts long-arm statute authorize personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the claim? Second, is exercising jurisdiction over the defendant for the claim forbidden by the Massachusetts Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
A. Statutory Inquiry
While many states have deliberately written or construed their long-arm statutes to reach to the limits of due process, see, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33(a), the reach of the Massachusetts long-arm statute stops short of what is constitutionally permissible. See Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1996). Therefore, the statutory inquiry in the this case must be undertaken independently of the constitutional inquiry. Nevertheless, the long-arm should be construed broadly, "to effectuate the Commonwealth's legitimate desire to protect its citizens." Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 92 (1st Cir. 1998).
Although it may be helpful, under FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a) plaintiffs are not required to plead explicitly the basis for jurisdiction over the defendants. The court must therefore consider independently which provisions of the Commonwealth's long-arm statute apply to Hobbs' conduct and plaintiffs' claims. Two provisions are potentially applicable.
First, Massachusetts provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person with regard to a cause of action arising from the person's, "(a)transacting any business in this commonwealth." Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 223A § 3(a). Thus, if the cause of action arises out of Hobbs' transaction of business in Massachusetts, Hobbs falls within the grasp of the long-arm statute of Massachusetts for that claim.
Second, Massachusetts provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person with regard to a cause of action arising from the person's,
(d) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this commonwealth.
Mass. Gen. Laws. c. 223A § 3(d). Thus, if plaintiffs' cause of action arises out of Hobbs' causing tortious injury in Massachusetts, and Hobbs (1) regularly did business in Massachusetts; or (2) engaged in a persistent court of conduct in Massachusetts, or (3) derived substantial revenue from services rendered in Massachusetts, then the Commonwealth's long-arm statute is applicable.
1. Transacting Business
As the following analysis will illustrate, Hobbs did transact business in Massachusetts for purposes of the claims in Extra Fresh I, but not for purposes of the claims in Extra Fresh II. As with most personal jurisdiction questions, whether Hobbs transacted business in Massachusetts is highly fact dependent.
The following facts are not in dispute: (1) the clamshell containers were never sent from Massachusetts; (2) invoices were always sent from Reada in Texas; (3) Hobbs always made payments to Reada in Texas; (4) Hobbes knew Extra Fresh was a Massachusetts corporation; (5) Hobbes always sent its purchase orders to Massachusetts, and hundreds of purchase orders were in fact sent; and (6) Hobbes made hundreds of calls to Extra Fresh in Massachusetts on business matters. (Docket 12 at 2; Docket 27).
In addition, the court accepts as true for purposes of personal jurisdiction, as it must under Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, 142 F.3d at 34, the following facts set forth in the affidavit of Frank Lenge, a principal of Extra Fresh: (7) Hobbs approached Extra Fresh at a trade show about selling the clamshell product in the United States; (8) Hobbs requested and received a promise from Extra Fresh not to sell the clamshell product to other distributors in California; and (9) Hobbs made repeated offers to buy Extra Fresh. (Docket No. 27, at 3-6).
These facts are more than sufficient to establish that Hobbs transacted business in Massachusetts. Hobbs relies on the First Circuit's decision in Lyle Richards, 132 F.3d 111, to support its claim that it did not transact business in Massachusetts. Although Lyle Richards is similar to this case because the plaintiff there acted as a an intermediary for the defendant in his capacity as its purchasing agent, id. at 112, it is distinguishable in other significant respects.
The plaintiff in Lyle Richards was a former employee of the defendant, hired to act as the defendant's agent for an operation set up by the defendant. Id. That former employee merely happened to live and sometimes work in Massachusetts. Id. at 113. In contrast, Hobbs sought out Extra Fresh, knowing it to be an established Massachusetts corporation, in order to act as the exclusive California distributor for an operation that was set up and orchestrated by Extra Fresh. In furtherance of this relationship, Hobbs called Extra Fresh hundreds of times in Massachusetts and initiated hundreds of sub-contracts with Extra Fresh in Massachusetts regarding its purchase orders. The fact that Hobbs did not spend time in Massachusetts physically is simply not determinative; transacting business in Massachusetts does not require a physical presence in Massachusetts. See, e.g., United Elec., Radio Mach. Workers of America v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1087 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that "defendant need not have a physical presence in Massachusetts."). In the context of the facts asserted in Extra Fresh I, Hobbs clearly transacted business in Massachusetts.
The next question is whether the causes of action arise out of Hobbs' transaction of business in Massachusetts. See Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 144 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1995). As to each claim against Hobbs in Extra Fresh I, they certainly did. Each claim in that complaint is related to Extra Fresh's agreements with Hobbs and Guillin Group establishing Extra Fresh as the sole link through which the clamshell container would be sold in the United States. Thus, the court finds that subdivision (a) of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3, authorizes it to exercise personal jurisdiction over Hobbs as to each claim stated in Extra Fresh I.
However, the causes of action in Extra Fresh II obviously do not arise out of Hobbs' transaction of business in Massachusetts. Nearly all the facts noted in Extra Fresh I relate to Hobbs' business relationship with Extra Fresh over the distribution of the clamshell container. In contrast, Extra Fresh II charges Hobbs under various theories with foul play in relation to S.Z.P. and the Extra Fresh strawberry pint tray. The facts giving rise to these claims, while perhaps targeted at Massachusetts, took place entirely outside its borders. Thus, the court finds that subdivision (a) of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3, does not authorize it to exercise personal jurisdiction over Hobbs as to the claims stated in Extra Fresh II.
2. Tortious Injury in Commonwealth
Next, the court must consider whether Hobbs committed a tort outside of Massachusetts that caused injury in Massachusetts in a manner that satisfies subdivision (d). In Extra Fresh I and Extra Fresh II, Hobbs is charged with tortious inference with contractual relations, and tortious interference with business relations. It is undisputed that these torts took place outside Massachusetts.
Thus, two inquiries will determine whether subdivision (d) is satisfied: First, is the economic injury alleged by Extra Fresh sufficient to satisfy the requirement that Hobbs "caus[ed] tortious injury in the commonwealth?" Second, did Hobbs meet the second requirement of subdivision (d) by (1) regularly doing business in Massachusetts; or (2) engaging in a persistent court of conduct in Massachusetts, or (3) deriving substantial revenue from services rendered in Massachusetts?
a. Injury in Commonwealth
On the first inquiry, plaintiffs claim that Hobbs caused injury to Extra Fresh in Massachusetts. Indeed, at oral argument, Extra Fresh noted that it is in danger of going out of business because Hobbs cut it out of the contracts with Group Guillin and S.Z.P. Despite this, the issue is not straight-forward.
Subdivision (d) "does not apply merely because the plaintiff feels the effect of a tortious injury [in the forum]." United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 1999). Yet, an economic injury can be sufficient under subdivision (d). See Keds Corp. v. Renee Intern. Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215,218 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Economic injury in the form of lost sales in the forum state is sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement for jurisdiction.").
Close examination of the alleged damages to the plaintiff in Extra Fresh I and Extra Fresh II make it clear that they constitute "injuries in the commonwealth" for purposes of subdivision (d). Extra Fresh's ability to conduct business in Massachusetts is severely limited as a result of Hobbs' alleged tortious activity. Hobbs knew that Extra Fresh did business from Massachusetts and derived its income there. It knew that interfering with Extra Fresh's contracts and business arrangements would injure Extra Fresh. Extra Fresh has been deprived of a significant percentage of its business by being cut off from Group Guillin and S.Z.P. Therefore, construed broadly, see Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 92 (1st Cir. 1998), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3(d) applies to the claims for tortious inference with contracts and business relations in Extra Fresh I and Extra Fresh II. See Kleinerman v. Morse, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 824 (1989) (§ 3(d) satisfied by contractual interference claim); Better Boating Association, Inc. v. BMG Chart Prods., Inc., 1998 WL 408976, *5 (Mass.Dist.Ct. 1998) (same). See also Catrone v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 850 (D.Mass. 1986) (plaintiff's allegation that it was unable to pursue its occupation sufficient to satisfy § 3(d)).
b. Persistent Conduct or Substantial Revenue
As noted above, plaintiffs can satisfy the second requirement under subdivision (d) by showing that Hobbs (1) regularly did business in Massachusetts; or (2) engaged in a persistent court of conduct in Massachusetts, or (3) derived substantial revenue from services rendered in Massachusetts. There can be no doubt that this prong is met.
The exhibits attached to Frank Lenge's affidavit are ample evidence of "a persistent course of conduct in Massachusetts." See Docket 27. As noted, Hobbs sent hundreds of purchase orders to Massachusetts, and called Massachusetts hundreds of times. In addition, the revenue generated from the sales of the clamshell container is more than sufficient to constitute "substantial revenue" derived from "services rendered" in Massachusetts.
These facts are sufficient to support this prong for purposes of the claims in Extra Fresh I and Extra Fresh II. Although the aforementioned conduct does not relate to the claims in Extra Fresh II,
there is no requirement under subsection (d) that plaintiff's cause of action arise from defendant's persistent course of conduct in the commonwealth. The 'arising from' language refers to the 'causing tortious injury' in Massachusetts, not the 'persistent course of conduct.'"Durette v. International Cancer Screening Labs., Inc., 1995 WL 809562, *2 n. 5 (Mass.Dist.Ct. 1995). Therefore, because both prongs are met, the reach of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A § 3(d) extends to the claims for tortious inference with contracts and business relations Extra Fresh I and Extra Fresh II.
c. Pendent Personal Jurisdiction
This conclusion does not address all the claims in Extra Fresh I II.See Phillips Exeter Academy v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Questions of specific jurisdiction are always tied to the particular claims asserted."). Some of the remaining claims are not captured by either subdivision (a) or (d). They must instead be brought within the court's jurisdictional power by the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction, which has generally been upheld by district courts in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction, over state law claims arising out of a common nucleus of operative fact as jurisdictionally sufficient state law claims. See, e.g., Salpoglou v. Shlomo Widder, M.D., P.A., 899 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D.Mass. 1995). The power of pendent personal jurisdiction must flow from Congress, and the district courts upholding it generally rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Val Leasing, Inc. v. Hutson, 674 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D.Mass. 1987) (referring to supplemental jurisdiction statute).
This court follows that trend. Specifically, it adopts the reasoning and analysis in Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1980), and 4 Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069.2. (2000 Supp.). It finds that the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, provides this court with the power to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over claims that arise from a common nucleus of operative fact as a claim properly before it. Thus, because all the claims in Extra Fresh I II arise from a common nucleus of operative fact as claims properly captured by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, §§ 3(a) or 3(d), this court will exercise its personal jurisdiction power over Hobbs for all claims, provided that doing so is consistent with constitutional requirements.
B. Constitutional Inquiry
The next step is to determine whether exercising jurisdiction over Hobbs for the specified claims comports with constitutional limitations.See International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). No argument has been offered suggesting any state constitutional impediment to jurisdiction; the focus is therefore on the United States Constitution.
This inquiry generally breaks down into three parts: first, whether the claims undergirding the litigation directly relate to or arise out of the defendant's contacts with Massachusetts; second, whether those contacts were purposefully directed towards Massachusetts or show a purposeful availment of the benefits and protections afforded by Massachusetts law; third, whether it is consistent with fair play and substantial justice to subject the defendant to jurisdiction. See Phillips Exeter Academy v. Howard Phillips Fund, 196 F.3d 284, 288 (1st Cir. 1999) (outlining tripartite analysis).
1. "Arose From" Contacts
As the analysis above has already shown, the claims in Extra Fresh I and Extra Fresh II arise from Hobbs' contacts with Extra Fresh in Massachusetts. In Extra Fresh I, Hobbs is charged with various contract and business torts claims related to the distribution of the clamshell container. The purchase orders attached to Frank Lenge's Affidavit alone are ample evidence of Hobbs' contacts with Massachusetts that relate to the distribution of the clamshell container. See Docket 27.
Further, Extra Fresh II charges Hobbs with tortious interference with Extra Fresh's contractual and business relationships while knowing that Extra Fresh was located in Massachusetts and that Extra Fresh would be injured in Massachusetts. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715 ("When a foreign corporation directly targets residents in an ongoing effort to further a business relationship, and achieves its purpose, it may not necessarily be unreasonable to subject that corporation to forum jurisdiction when the efforts lead to a tortious result."). In fact, Hobbs was able to cut out Extra Fresh only after obtaining information from Extra Fresh about the Israeli corporation, S.Z.P., in Massachusetts. (Docket 14 at 9). Given these facts, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will not be offended on the ground that the causes of action in Extra Fresh I or II are not sufficiently related to Hobbs' contacts with Massachusetts.
2. Purposeful Availment
Next, has Hobbs purposefully availed itself of Massachusetts law in its contacts with Massachusetts underlying the claims in Extra Fresh I II? "The function of the purposeful availment requirement is to assure that personal jurisdiction is not premised solely upon a defendant's 'random, isolated, or fortuitous' contacts with the forum state." Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391 (1st Cir. 1995). The cornerstones of the "purposeful availment" analysis are foreseeability and voluntariness. See Ticketmaster-New York v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 207 (1st Cir. 1994).
With regard to the Extra Fresh I claims, Hobbs' contacts were voluntary, and it was foreseeable that its actions might subject it to suit in Massachusetts. For years, Hobbs ordered clamshell containers from Extra Fresh several times a week. In doing so, as noted, it sent hundreds of letters and faxes to Massachusetts, and called Massachusetts hundreds of times. Moreover, the court has found that Hobbs initiated the business relationship with Extra Fresh over the clamshell container. See Phillips Exeter Academy, 196 F.3d at 292 (noting purposeful availment, if defendant solicits and willingly enters relationship).
Admittedly, the purposeful availment inquiry for the Extra Fresh II claims is more complicated. It is less obvious that Hobbs availed itself of the privileges and protections of Massachusetts law during the conduct that gave rise to these claims. In fact, the conduct giving rise to the Extra Fresh II claims did not begin until some time in 2000, (Docket 14), and the extensive and lengthy interaction present in Extra Fresh I is absent in Extra Fresh II.
Nevertheless, the conduct giving rise to Extra Fresh II shows sufficiently purposeful activity directed towards Massachusetts to pass constitutional muster. There is no question that Hobbs' activity was voluntary. See Nowak, 94 F.3d at 716. The real question, then, is whether Hobbs should have foreseen that its activity might subject it to suit in Massachusetts. Id.
Extra Fresh has submitted sufficient facts to support this conclusion for constitutional purposes. First, Hobbs was excited about the Extra Fresh pint, and learned about it and S.Z.P. from Extra Fresh in Massachusetts. (Docket 14, at 8). Second, Hobbs knew that Extra Fresh designed the strawberry tray. (Docket 1, at 11). Third, Hobbs sought and obtained confidential, proprietary information from Extra Fresh in Massachusetts about its relationship with S.Z.P. (Docket 14, at 9). Last, Hobbs made repeated offers to buy Extra Fresh. (Docket 27, at 6).
Given these facts, and the ongoing relationship with Extra Fresh that was tied up in the events leading to the Extra Fresh II litigation, Hobbs should have reasonably foreseen that it might be subject to suit in Massachusetts. The facts show a pattern of conduct targeting Extra Fresh and its business relationships in Massachusetts.
3. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
The last constitutional inquiry calls for the application of what are often called the "Gestalt factors." The First Circuit considers five such factors:
(1) the defendant's burden of appearing, (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantial social policies.Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 63-64 (1st Cir. 1994). Consideration of these factors does not suggest that it would violate the federal constitution to exercise jurisdiction over Hobbs.
It will, of course, burden Hobbs to defend this case in Massachusetts. However, "staging a defense in a foreign jurisdiction is almost always inconvenient and/or costly." Id. at 62. In this case, travel from California to Massachusetts will not be especially onerous for a company like Hobbs, which has shown its willingness to travel internationally, to France and Israel, to further its business. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D.Mass. 1997).
Massachusetts has an undeniable interest in adjudicating the dispute, especially given the economic impact locally and potential loss of jobs in Massachusetts resulting from injury to the plaintiff. Extra Fresh has indicated its interest in adjudicating these disputes here, and "a plaintiff's choice of forum must be accorded a degree of deference with respect to the issue of its own convenience." Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1395.
Next, it is true that because this litigation will potentially involve parties from California, France, and Israel, the judicial system has an interest in resolving these controversies in a single forum. However, that forum need not be Massachusetts. Witnesses and interested parties are likely to reside in Massachusetts, California, Texas, France, Israel, and perhaps other places. This consideration therefore is neutral.
The last factor — social policy — weighs in favor of Massachusetts. The primary policy at stake in this litigation is the enforceability of exclusive brokerage contracts. The court will be required to interpret Massachusetts law, and the outcome will accordingly affect all Massachusetts brokers in some way.
In sum, the gestalt factors, taken as a whole, favor the exercise of jurisdiction in Massachusetts. Exercising jurisdiction over Hobbs for the claims in Extra Fresh I II will not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. Given this, the fact that the causes of action asserted against Hobbs are captured by the Massachusetts long-arm statute or under this court's pendent personal jurisdiction, and the fact that exercising jurisdiction will not otherwise offend due process, Hobbs' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in each case will be denied.
Separate orders will issue.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, Hobbs Container Company's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Docket No. 5) is hereby DENIED. The clerk will set a date for a status conference to set a schedule for future proceedings.
It is So Ordered.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, Hobbs Container Company's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Docket No. 10) is hereby DENIED. The clerk will set a date for a status conference to set a schedule for future proceedings.
It is So Ordered.