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agreeing that Baltimore was "wrongly decided" but concluding that "[i]n accordance with the binding precedent of the high court, we must affirm the trial court's order denying the writ"
Summary of this case from Ex parte BowlinOpinion
NO. 14-18-00568-CR
01-30-2020
EX PARTE David WILLIAMS, Appellant
PLURALITY OPINION
Appellant David Williams is currently an inmate in the Texas prison system serving time for a felony offense. He filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, also known as a "medical writ," seeking to be released on bail because he suffers from congestive heart failure and wishes to seek a heart transplant outside the Texas prison system. Appellant receives treatment for his heart condition at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (UTMB Galveston), where he was being evaluated for a heart transplant. Appellant wishes to seek a bloodless heart transplant on religious grounds. UTMB Galveston does not offer this procedure. After a hearing, the habeas court denied the application. On appeal, appellant contends that the court erred in concluding it lacks authority to release appellant. Concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over this appeal under controlling Court of Criminal Appeals' precedent and thus correctly denied the application for writ, we affirm.
As a Jehovah's Witness, appellant is forbidden from receiving blood transfusions.
The State contends that appellant has not shown that he can receive a bloodless heart transplant elsewhere without consenting to an emergency backup transfusion if needed. Appellant testified that three hospitals in the United States offer this procedure but conceded at the hearing that whether these hospitals "requir[e] blood if needed" was "outside the scope of [his] knowledge." The State also argues that appellant is not eligible for a heart transplant because he is noncompliant in taking his prescribed medications. Appellant disputes this latter allegation and presented evidence to the contrary. Thus, the habeas court heard conflicting evidence on this issue.
Appellant sought habeas relief under article 11.25 of the Code of Criminal procedure, which provides:
When a judge or court authorized to grant writs of habeas corpus shall be satisfied, upon investigation, that a person in legal custody is afflicted with a disease which will render a removal necessary for the preservation of life, an order may be made for the removal of the prisoner to some other place where his health will not be likely to suffer; or he may be admitted to bail when it appears that any species of confinement will endanger his life.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § 11.25.
Appellant does not seek removal to another place in the Texas prison system because he contends that he cannot get a bloodless heart transplant unless he goes to one of only three hospitals in the United States that offer the procedure.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held in 1981 that the phrase "legal custody" in article 11.25 "does not contemplate a release after conviction of a felony." Ex parte Baltimore , 616 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (citing Ex parte Smith , 64 S.W. 1052 (Tex. Cr. App. 1901) and the predecessor statute to article 11.25 and holding "[w]e adhere to the Smith opinion as to the interpretation of the phrase ‘legal custody’ as it now appears in Article 11.25"). The Court further held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to release a felon under article 11.25 and thus the habeas court correctly denied the appellant's medical writ. Id. The Court affirmed the habeas court's judgment. Id. at 208.
Appellant contends that Baltimore was wrongly decided. We agree: the plain language of the statute does not contemplate an exception for felony offenders. But the language in article 11.25 is the same as when Baltimore was decided, and the Court of Criminal Appeals has never revisited the Baltimore decision. "[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis[,] once ‘the highest court of the State having jurisdiction ’ of a matter decides a ‘principle, rule or proposition of law,’ that court and all ‘other courts of lower rank ’ must accept the decision as ‘binding precedent.’ " Romero v. State , 331 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (Seymore, J., concurring) (quoting Swilley v. McCain , 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (emphasis added)). The Court of Criminal Appeals has final appellate jurisdiction over questions of law in criminal cases. Tex. Const. art. V, § 5 ; Romero , 331 S.W.3d at 86. In accordance with the binding precedent of the high court, we must affirm the trial court's order denying the writ.
( Frost, C.J., concurring, and Poissant, J., concurring).
CONCURRING OPINION
Kem Thompson Frost, Chief Justice
I concur in the court's judgment and in the plurality's conclusion that Ex parte Baltimore , a binding precedent from the Court of Criminal Appeals, mandates affirmance of the trial court's ruling. The plurality pronounces that Ex parte Baltimore was "wrongly decided." Because that determination goes beyond this court's purview, I respectfully decline to join the plurality opinion.
See 616 S.W.2d 205, 206–07 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
Ante at 329.
See Ex parte Roldan , 418 S.W.3d 143, 146 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (stating that "[i]t is clearly beyond our purview to decide that the Court of Criminal Appeals ‘wrongly decided’ a case"); accord Garcia v. State , 246 S.W.3d 121, 142 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref'd).
See Ex parte Roldan , 418 S.W.3d at 146 n.2 ; Garcia , 246 S.W.3d at 142.
Under principles of vertical stare decisis, in criminal cases, Texas intermediate courts of appeals must follow on-point decisions from the Court of Criminal Appeals even if individual members of the intermediate court disagree with the precedent. Rather than adjudge and pronounce high-court precedent "wrongly decided," a better option for those members is to use separate judicial writings to make the case for jurisprudential change. Through concurring opinions, justices can identify deficiencies in precedent, explain why another approach might better serve the interests in play, and respectfully urge the high court to revisit the issue and perhaps abrogate the precedent. This approach keeps the focus on effecting positive change, promotes collegiality within the judiciary, and holds greater promise for furthering the development of the state's jurisprudence.
See State of Texas ex rel. Vance v. Clawson , 465 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
See, e.g., Williams v. State , 960 S.W.2d 758, 760–62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. dism'd) (Taft, J., concurring) (author of majority opinion also filed a concurring opinion in which he pointed out deficiencies in a high-court precedent and respectfully urged the Court of Criminal Appeals to reconsider its decision); Shaffer v. State , 769 S.W.2d 945, 947–49 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1988) (Colley, J., concurring) (pointing out deficiencies in a high court precedent and respectfully urging the Court of Criminal to abrogate the prior precedent), rev'd , 769 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
CONCURRING OPINION
Margaret "Meg" Poissant, Justice
I concur with my colleagues on the disposition of this case, but for different reasons.
In this unfortunate set of circumstances, Appellant has been diagnosed with heart failure and non-ischemic cardiomyopathy. Appellant was receiving care for his heart condition at UTMB while in custody.
Appellant's condition worsened, although his cardiologist, Dr. Khalife, could not determine if the worsening of his condition was caused by noncompliance by Appellant or the progression of his heart disease. Appellant was dropped from further consideration by UTMB for a transplant due to his refusal to accept any transplant other than a "bloodless" transplant. In order to be considered for the transplant, Appellant was required to sign a consent form for a blood transfusion, if such a procedure became necessary, which he refused to do because of his religious beliefs.
Although Appellant testified to three possible medical institutions that perform "bloodless" transplants, in response to the court's inquiry regarding whether those three institutions required a consent for blood if necessary, Appellant testified that such information was "outside the scope of my knowledge." There is no evidence in the record that the three institutions would consider a bloodless transplant without a consent for blood if necessary.
Based on Appellant's testimony, he cannot meet the requirements of article 11.25 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, because removal to another place will not change the conditions of his health, and further there is no proof that his confinement, rather than his heart condition, is endangering his life.