Opinion
1210198
09-09-2022
Ex parte State of Alabama (In re: Ex parte John Grant (In re: STATE of Alabama v. John GRANT))
Steve Marshall, att’y gen., Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., solicitor gen., A. Barrett Bowdre, deputy solicitor gen., and Cameron G. Ball, asst. att’y gen., for petitiioner. Jennifer M. Holton, Montgomery, for respondent.
Steve Marshall, att’y gen., Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., solicitor gen., A. Barrett Bowdre, deputy solicitor gen., and Cameron G. Ball, asst. att’y gen., for petitiioner.
Jennifer M. Holton, Montgomery, for respondent.
MITCHELL, Justice.
John Grant allegedly shot Earl Darl Mock from inside a vehicle. Mock was put on life support because of his injuries. Fifteen months later, Mock was taken off life support and died within 12 hours. After Grant was indicted for capital murder, he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the common-law year-and-a-day rule barred his prosecution for murder. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the motion.
Grant then filed a mandamus petition asking the Court of Criminal Appeals to direct the trial court to set aside the order denying his motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting his motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unpublished order, granted the petition and issued the writ, holding that, "[i]n light of the year-and-a-day common law provision, the State [could] prove no set of facts under which Grant [could] be convicted of capital murder." See Ex parte Grant (No. CR-20-0804, Oct. 1, 2021), — So. 3d — (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (table). In its order, the Court of Criminal Appeals said that it was bound by this Court’s decision in Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056 (Ala. 2003), which held that the year-and-a-day rule stood under Alabama law because the Legislature had not expressly abolished it. Because Mock died over a year and a day after he was shot, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, Grant could not be held responsible for his death.
This case now comes to this Court on a petition for the writ of certiorari. The State asks us to overrule Ex parte Key and to hold that the Legislature abrogated the year-and-a-day rule when it enacted the comprehensive Alabama Criminal Code, § 13A-1-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. We accept the State’s argument that the but-for causation standard in the Criminal Code leaves no room for the year-and-a-day rule. Accordingly, we overrule Ex parte Key and reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals below.
The Criminal Code became effective on January 1, 1980. See § 13A-1-11, Ala. Code 1975.
Facts and Procedural History
John Grant allegedly shot Earl Darl Mock from inside a vehicle. Mock was put on life support. Fifteen months later, he was taken off life support and died within 12 hours; according to Grant, Mock "expired [for] a multitude of reasons." Grant was then indicted for capital murder under § 13A-5-40(a)(18), Ala. Code 1975. The indictment read:
"Count I: The Grand Jury of Montgomery County charge that, before the finding of this indictment, John Grant … did intentionally cause the death of Earl Darl Mock by shooting him with a gun,
fired or otherwise used within or from a vehicle, in violation of section 13A-005-040(A)(18) of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama."
The State points out in its brief that the indictment did not include the dates of Mock's shooting or death, which is consistent with Alabama law, see § 15-8-30, Ala. Code 1975, but inconsistent with the common law.
Grant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the common-law year-and-a-day rule barred his prosecution for murder. The State argued in response that Mock was "only alive through medical intervention" between the time Grant allegedly shot him and the time he died. The State said that it "should be allowed to put on evidence from medical records and testimony [so] that a jury [could] make a fair decision of whether [Mock] could have died from his injuries without medical intervention."
The trial court denied Grant’s motion, and he filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Criminal Appeals, asking it to direct the trial court to set aside the order denying his motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting his motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals, by order, granted the petition and issued the writ, citing Ex parte Key and Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d 405 (Ala. 1993), and stating that, "[i]n light of the year-and-a-day common law provision, the State [could] prove no set of facts under which Grant can be convicted of capital murder."
The State filed an application for rehearing, which the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled without an opinion. Judge Minor concurred specially and emphasized that, "as the Alabama Supreme Court stated [in Ex parte Key], the legislature, and not the judiciary, is the appropriate branch of government to modify or abolish the year-and-a-day rule." Ex parte Grant, 378 So. 3d 569, 570 (Ala.Cr.App. 2021) (Minor, J., concurring specially).
The State petitioned this Court for certiorari review, and we granted the petition to reconsider our holding in Ex parte Key.
Standard of Review
[1] "A decision of a court of appeals on an original petition for writ of mandamus … may be reviewed de novo in the supreme court." Rule 21(e)(1), Ala. R. App. P. Thus, we review de novo whether "there is ‘(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner [for the writ of mandamus] to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ " Ex parte Sharp, 893 So. 2d 571, 573 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991)).
Analysis
Under the common law, the year-and-a-day rule provided that "a defendant [could] be prosecuted for homicide only if the victim die[d] within one year and a day of the defendant’s wrongful act." Woods v. State, 709 So. 2d 1340, 1346 n.3 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001). The Statute of Gloucester introduced the year-and-a-day rule in England in 1278, and it operated as a statute of limitations for private wrongful-death actions stemming from the Germanic custom of "weregild," an ancient legal concept that placed a monetary value on a person’s life. See Neil M. B. Rowe, The Year-and-a-Day Rule: A Common Law Vestige That has Outlived its Purpose, 8 Jones L. Rev. 1, 2 (2004) (citing 6 Edw 1 ch. 9 (1278); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411, 409 N.E. 2d 771, 773 (1980)). By the 18th century, the rule had been extended to criminal-homicide prosecutions. See United States v. Jackson, 528 A.2d 1211, 1214 (D.C. 1987). There were three primary reasons for the year-and-a-day rule: (1) 13th-century medical science was unreliable, making it difficult to determine what caused a person’s death; (2) historically, jurors in England had to rely on their own knowledge to reach a verdict, rather than on witness or expert testimony; and (3) the rule was used to limit the harsh punishment of the death penalty, which was historically imposed for all homicides. Rowe, supra, at 9-12 nn.46-56 (collecting cases); see also State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Tenn. 1999).
In the United States, state courts began recognizing the existence of the year-and-a-day rule in opinions as early as the 1820s. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 550 (1824); State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 139 (1826). The rule was applied by the United States Supreme Court in 1891, see Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 11 S.Ct. 761, 35 L.Ed. 377 (1891), and its use in the context of criminal prosecutions was again recognized by that Court in Louisville, Evansville & St-Louis R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 239, 14 S.Ct. 579, 38 L.Ed. 422 (1894).
In Alabama, the Court of Appeals recognized the rule in 1931, and our appellate courts have alluded to it a handful of times in the past century. See Howard v. State, 24 Ala. App. 512, 515, 137 So. 532, 534 (1931) ("The common-law [year-and-a-day] rule prevails in this state."); Flannagin v. State, 48 Ala. App. 559, 563, 266 So. 2d 637, 641 (Crim. App. 1971) ("There being no limitation of prosecution of murder (Code 1940, T. 15, § 219) time of the killing is not material except where the deceased may have lived beyond the common law year and a day after his wounding."); Smith v. State, 354 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (referring to the "common law rule which permits the prosecution of a homicide case regardless of the time between the wrong and the death of no more than a year and a day"); Burks v. State, 600 So. 2d 374, 382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("The common law ‘year-and-a-day rule’ prevails in Alabama."); Woods, 709 So. 2d at 1346 n.3. The year-and-a-day rule has always been considered part of Alabama’s common law; it was never codified by the Legislature as part of the murder statute. See Ala. Code 1852, §§ 3080-81; Ala. Code 1867, § 3653; Ala. Code 1876, § 4295; Ala. Code 1886, § 3725; Ala. Code 1896, § 4854; Ala. Code 1907, § 7084; Ala. Code 1923, § 4454; Ala. Code 1940, Title 14, § 314.
Our Court has used the year-and-a-day rule as the basis of a decision only once, in Ex parte Key. In that case, Ralph Lynn Key struck Brian Rollo with an automobile, and Rollo died from complications from his injuries 18 months later. 890 So. 2d at 1057. Key was indicted for murder, reckless murder, and leaving the scene of an accident at which someone was injured. Id. At trial, the State moved the trial court to allow it to proceed with the murder charge despite the year-and-a-day rule, and Key separately moved the trial court to dismiss the murder charge based on the rule. Id. at 1057-58. The trial court granted the State’s motion and denied Key’s. Id. at 1058. A jury then convicted Key of manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident. Id. at 1059. Key appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his convictions, holding -- in part -- that, although the year-and-a-day rule was part of Alabama’s common law, it was an "outdated relic" and "ha[d] completely outlived its intended purpose." Key v. State, 890 So. 2d 1043, 1050 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002). In other words, the Court of Criminal Ap- peals judicially abrogated the year-and-a-day rule.
In doing so, the Court of Criminal Appeals joined the appellate courts of 12 jurisdictions that had also judicially abolished the rule. See Rowe, supra, at 9 n.43.
Judge Shaw wrote specially for a majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals, "concur[ring] with most of the discussion in the main opinion" but also expressing his view "that, by enacting the Alabama Criminal Code, the Legislature intended to supersede the common-law year-and-a-day rule." 890 So. 2d at 1053 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part as to the rationale and concurring in the result). Judge Shaw wrote that he believed the Legislature had abrogated the year-and-a-day rule by adopting a but-for causation standard that "takes into consideration concurrent causes and that does not refer to any time limitations with respect to the imposition of criminal liability." Id. at 1055.
Judge Wise and Judge Cobb joined Judge Shaw’s special writing.
Key petitioned our Court for a writ of certiorari. This Court granted the petition and then unanimously reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment to the extent that it abolished the year-and-a-day rule. Our Court held that the question whether the rule should be abolished was "most appropriately decided by the Legislature, not by the Court," 890 So. 2d at 1063, and rejected the State’s argument that the Legislature had abolished the year-and-a-day rule when it enacted the Criminal Code. Id. at 1060-63. The Court stated that " ‘ "[s]tatutes in derogation or modification of the common law are strictly construed" ’ " and are " ‘ "presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared." ’ " Id. at 1060 (quoting West Dauphin Ltd. P’ship v. Callon Offshore Prod., Inc., 725 So. 2d 944, 952 (Ala. 1998)) (emphasis added). It then stated that "[b]ecause the Legislature ha[d] expressly adopted the common law as a ‘rule of decision’ in Alabama, and because the Legislature did not expressly abolish the year-and-a-day rule when it reenacted the Criminal Code, … the year-and-a-day rule remains part of the common law of this State." Id. at 1060-61 (emphasis added).
In concluding that the year-and-a-day rule had not been abrogated by the Legislature, the Court looked to § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, which provides that
"[t]he common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature."
Because the Court held that the year-and-a-day rule was part of the common law and had not been altered or repealed by the Legislature, the Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment "insofar as it abrogate[d] the year-and-a-day rule." 890 So. 2d at 1062. The Court stated that, "[a]lthough the year-and-a-day rule may appear archaic, the decision [on] how best to replace the rule is a policy question best left in the capable hands of the Legislature, which has the tools and special competency to make such prospective general rules." Id. at 1063.
[2] The State now asks us to revisit and overrule Ex parte Key. In that case, the Court reasoned that "[s]tatutes in derogation or modification of the common law are strictly construed" and are "presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared." 890 So. 2d at 1060 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But in analyzing whether the Legislature had "expressly" altered the common law, the Court focused on whether the Legislature had used particular language, not on what the relevant statutes required. Of course, the Legislature sometimes abrogates the common law by specifically stating that it is doing so -- but such a statement is not required by § 1-3-1.
See, e.g., § 35-4A-8, Ala. Code 1975 ("This chapter supersedes the rule of the common law known as the rule against perpetuities."); § 8-27-6, Ala. Code 1975 ("Those provisions of this chapter that are inconsistent with the common law of trade secrets supersede the common law ….") § 34-27-87, Ala. Code 1975 ("The duties of licensees as specified in this article … shall supersede any duties of a licensee … which are based upon common law principles of agency to the extent that those common law duties are inconsistent with the duties of licensees as specified in this article.").
[3] A more precise formulation of our common-law abrogation framework is this: "A statute which is an innovation on the common law will not be extended further than is required by the letter of the statute." Pappas v. City of Eufaula, 282 Ala. 242, 244, 210 So. 2d 802, 804 (1968). Or, put another way, "[t]he presumption is, that the language and terms of the statute import the alteration or change it was designed to effect, and their operation will not be enlarged by construction or intendment." Cook v. Meyer, 73 Ala. 580, 583 (1883); see also Lock v. Miller, 3 Stew. & P. 13, 14 (Ala. 1832) ("This statute is an innovation upon the common law, and therefore will not be extended farther than required by its letter."); Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323, 330 (1882) ("All statutes are construed in reference to the principles of the common law; and it is not to be presumed that there is an intention to modify, or to abrogate it, further than may be expressed, or than the case may absolutely require.").
Here, the homicide statutes -- specifically the but-for causation standard contained in those statutes -- require us to hold that the Legislature abrogated the common-law year-and-a-day rule. The comprehensive Criminal Code is just that -- comprehensive. It defines and occupies the whole field of substantive criminal law. The Criminal Code abolished common-law crimes, see § 13A-1-4, Ala. Code 1975; enumerated defenses, see § 13A-3-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975; and provided express definitions of criminal offenses, working on the premise "that persons accused of crime -- and also the prosecuting officials, the courts and all others concerned with the administration of justice -- are entitled to know in plain explicit language what constitutes the offense charged." Commentary to § 13A-1-4 (emphasis added). The Criminal Code directs that "[a]ll provisions of [the Criminal Code] shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, including the purposes stated in Section 13A-1-3," see § 13A-1-6, Ala. Code 1975, which include "proscrib[ing] conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm," "defin[ing] the act or omission and the accompanying mental state that constitute each offense," and "insur[ing] the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses," see § 13A-1-3, Ala. Code 1975.
[4] The Criminal Code’s definitions of homicide offenses not only make no mention of the year-and-a-day rule, but those definitions also incorporate a standard of causation that is incompatible with that rule. Criminal homicide is defined as when "[a] person … intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the death of another person," and includes "[m]urder, manslaughter, [and] criminally negligent homicide." § 13A-6-1(a)(1) and (2), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The statutes for murder, § 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975, manslaughter, § 13A-6-3, Ala. Code 1975, and criminally negligent homicide, § 13A-6-4, Ala. Code 1975, all use the phrase "causes the death of another person" in defining the respective crimes. Murder -- the offense with which Grant was charged -- is defined as when a person "does any of the following":
"(1) With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of that person or of another person.
"(2) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he or she recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person other than himself or herself, and thereby causes the death of another person.
"(3) He or she commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, burglary in the first or second degree, escape in the first degree, kidnapping in the first degree, rape in the first degree, robbery in any degree, sodomy in the first degree, aggravated child abuse under Section 26-15-3.1, [Ala. Code 1975,] or any other felony clearly dangerous to human life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant if there be any, causes the death of any person.
"(4) He or she commits the crime of arson and a qualified governmental or volunteer firefighter or other public safety officer dies while performing his or her duty resulting from the arson." § 13A-6-2(a) (emphasis added).
The homicide statutes do not place any time limitation on causing another’s death or cabin the meaning of "cause" in any other manner. Instead, they depend on the but-for causation standard set out in § 13A-2-5(a), Ala. Code 1975, which says: "A person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient." Importantly, the but-for causation standard accounts for concurrent causes and contains no time limitation. In adopting such a precise causation standard, the Legislature clearly abrogated the yearand-a-day rule.
In contrast, "[t]he traditional common law definition of murder was stated by Coke in the seventeenth century as: ‘When a man of sound memory and of the age of discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, and under the King's peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied by the law, the death taking place within a year and a day.' " Commentary to § 13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975.
The commentary to the Model Penal Code’s murder provision -- from which Alabama’s murder statute was derived in part -- explains that the but-for causation standard "renders unnecessary the ancient requirement that death of another take place within a year and a day of the actor’s conduct" and that "[m]ost modern states are in accord with the Model Code in eliminating the express time limitation as a special causal requirement." Model Penal Code § 210.1, cmt. 4(a) (Am. L. Inst. 1980).
[5] Applying the definition of murder -- which relies on the but-for causation standard -- to the facts of this case, Mock allegedly would not have died if Grant had not allegedly shot him; the only thing that kept Mock from dying sooner rather than later was medical intervention. Thus, Grant allegedly committed murder. The only way around this conclusion is to judi- cially amend the text of the but-for causation standard to provide an exception that is not there, i.e., to say that in homicide cases "[a] person is criminally liable if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient" or unless the victim does not die within a year and a day. This we cannot do because we are "not at liberty to rewrite statutes or to substitute [our] judgment for that of the Legislature." Ex parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. 2003). Accordingly, we overrule Ex parte Key and hold that the Legislature abrogated the common-law year-and-a-day rule when it enacted the Criminal Code.
[6] In overturning Ex parte Key, we are mindful of the doctrine of stare decisis, which promotes respect for precedent but is " ‘not an inexorable command.’ " Ex parte Capstone Bldg. Corp., 96 So. 3d 77, 89 n.8 (Ala. 2012) (quoting 20 Am. Jur. Courts § 131 (2005)). "Although [our] Court strongly believes in the doctrine of stare decisis and makes every reasonable attempt to maintain the stability of the law, this Court has had to recognize on occasion that it is necessary and prudent to admit prior mistakes …." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d 409, 421 (Ala. 1997). Here, it is "necessary and prudent" to acknowledge that the Court’s decision in Ex parte Key was flawed.
The factors we review when overruling precedent construing a statute -- " ‘[(1)] the plausibility of the existing interpretation of a statute, [(2)] the extent to which that interpretation has been fixed in the fabric of the law, and [(3)] the strength of arguments for changing the interpretation’ " – weigh in favor of overruling Ex parte Key. See Ex parte Capstone Bldg. Corp., 96 So. 3d at 89 n.8 (quoting 20 Am. Jur. Courts § 131). First, the Court’s interpretation of the homicide statutes and the but-for causation standard in Ex parte Key was not plausible, because the Court focused on whether the Legislature had specifically stated that it was abrogating the year-and-a-day rule instead of considering what the homicide statutes and the but-for causation standard required. Second, although Ex parte Key was decided nearly two decades ago, it has not become fixed in the fabric of Alabama law, because the year-and-a-day rule is seldom invoked. Indeed, criminal perpetrators cannot rely on it with any confidence -- whether a victim will take longer than a year and a day to die is not something a perpetrator can easily control, so the rule does not help a perpetrator decide whether to commit a homicide offense. Lastly, as discussed above, the State has put forth strong textual arguments for ruling in its favor.
In this case, for example, it was through a fortuitous set of medical interventions that Mock was able to stay alive as long as he did, and those interventions took place at the hands of third parties over whom Grant had no control.
Conclusion
The Legislature abrogated the common-law year-and-a-day rule when it enacted the comprehensive Criminal Code. It did so by adopting express definitions of homicide offenses that incorporate a but-for causation standard that (1) contains no time limitation and (2) accounts for concurrent causes. Accordingly, we overrule our decision in Ex parte Key, reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment granting Grant’s petition and issuing a writ of mandamus, and instruct the Court of Criminal Appeals to quash that writ.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Parker, C.J., and Sellers, J., concur specially, with opinions.
PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the main opinion. I write to explain more fully why I believe that the common-law year-and-a-day rule was abrogated in 1980 by the Criminal Code’s causation standard. In a nutshell, the rule was a limitation attached to the causation element of murder, and that element was comprehensively defined by the Criminal Code.
The basis for the year-and-a-day rule was "[t]he difficulty in proving that the blow cause[d] the death." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.4(i) (2d ed. 2003) (emphasis added). As Sir Edward Coke explained in the 17th century, "if [the victim] die[s] after [a year and a day], it cannot be discerned, as the law presumes, whether he died of the [defendant’s] stroke or po[i]son, etc.[,] or of a natural death." Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 53 (E. & R. Brooke eds. 1797). Thus, the rule functioned as a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption that the prosecution could not prove causation. See 9 H.S.G. Halsbury, Laws of England § 1157, at 571 (1909); 16 Fla. Jur. 2d Criminal Law -- Substantive Principles/Offenses § 443 (2017).
Essentially, then, the year-and-a-day rule was a limitation attached to the causation element of murder. Because that limitation was inconsistent with the Criminal Code’s comprehensive but-for causation standard, that standard necessarily abrogated the year-and-a-day rule.
SELLERS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the decision of the Court to overrule Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056 (Ala. 2003), based on the Legislature’s abrogation of the year-and-a-day rule when it enacted the Alabama Criminal Code, § 13A-1-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. I write specially to point out that I do not read the Court’s opinion today as settling the issue whether the overruling of Key should be applied retroactively, to this defendant or otherwise. It does not appear that that important issue has been fully and sufficiently briefed before the trial court, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, or this Court.