Opinion
SC-2023-0234
06-02-2023
EX PARTE Carl Michael SEIBERT (In re: Carl Michael Seibert v. Lorri Ann Fields)
Douglas H. Scofield of The Revill Law Firm, Birmingham, for petitioner.
* Note from the reporter of decisions: Judge Williams, circuit judge, Cullman County, was appointed to preside over this case upon the recusal of the circuit judges in the 23rd Judicial Circuit.
Douglas H. Scofield of The Revill Law Firm, Birmingham, for petitioner. Submitted on certiorari petition only.
WISE, Justice.
Carl Michael Seibert petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion dismissing his appeal from a judgment entered by the Madison Circuit Court in a postdivorce proceeding against his former wife, Lorri Ann Fields. Seibert v. Fields, 386 So.3d 776 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition.
Facts and Procedural History
The following procedural history from the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion will be helpful to an understanding of this case:
"The parties have previously appeared before this court. See Seibert v. Fields, 290 So. 3d 420 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (‘Seibert’); Ex parte Seibert, 231 So. 3d 1111 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017); Seibert v. Seibert, 217 So. 3d 843 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (table); Ex parte Seibert, 171 So. 3d 699 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (table); and Ex parte Seibert, 171 So. 3d 700 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (table). The parties were divorced by a judgment entered by the trial court in 2014, and, on September 13, 2017, the former wife [Fields] filed a verified complaint seeking to hold the former husband [Seibert] in contempt and for a rule nisi. Seibert, 290 So. 3d at 422. The former husband filed a counterclaim, requesting, among other things, that he be awarded sole physical custody of the parties’ children and that the former wife be ordered to pay child support. Id. On March 8, 2018, the trial court entered a judgment that, among other things, awarded the former husband sole physical custody of the parties’ children and ordered the former wife to pay to the former husband child support in the amount of $300 per month. Id. In Seibert, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment ‘to the extent that it determined the former wife’s child-support obligation,’ and we remanded the cause ‘for the trial court to recalculate the former wife’s childsupport obligation in accordance with Rule 32[, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.,] and this [court’s] opinion.’ 290 So. 3d at 427.
"Following this court’s reversal, the trial court conducted a trial at which testimony was presented and various exhibits were admitted into evidence. On May 6, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment in which, among other things, it determined that the former wife was in arrears in her child-support obligation in the amount of $5,196.93; ordered the former husband to pay fees and expenses to an expert witness in the amount of $2,000; ordered each party to pay his or her own attorney’s fees and costs; and denied all remaining requested relief.
"On June 3, 2022, the former husband filed a motion, pursuant to Rules 52 and 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., requesting, among other things, that the trial court amend its findings, make additional findings, or otherwise amend its judgment. The trial court entered an order on August 29, 2022, denying that postjudgment motion. The former husband filed his notice of appeal to this court on October 12, 2022. On November 23, 2022, this court entered an order directing the parties to file letter briefs addressing whether the appeal had been timely filed. Both parties filed letter briefs in response to this court’s order; the former wife’s letter brief was accompanied by a motion to dismiss based on the former husband’s appeal having been untimely filed.
"__________
"1The former husband filed a second motion pursuant to Rule 52, Ala. R Civ.
Seibert cites this case as Ex parte State, 959 So. 2d 123 (Ala. 2006). The editor’s note at the citation provided by Seibert states: "The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama, in State v. Wilson, published in the advance sheet at this citation, 959 So. 2d 123, was withdrawn from the bound volume and will be republished in the correct chronological order with the other related opinions. See 961 So. 2d 911."
P., on September 28, 2022, and the trial court entered an order purporting to deny that motion on September 29, 2022; we note, however, that motion did not extend the time for the former husband to file his notice of appeal. See, e.g., Golden Poultry, Inc. v. Mears, 719 So. 2d 838, 838 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (noting that a ‘second "motion for amended findings" ’ did not extend the time for appeal from the final judgment in that case)."
Seibert v. Fields, 386 So.3d at 777-78. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed Seibert’s appeal on the basis that it was not timely. Seibert has petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari.
Discussion
In its opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
"In her motion to dismiss, the former wife asserts that the former husband did not timely file his notice of appeal. See Golden Poultry, Inc. v. Mears, 719 So. 2d 838, 839 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (‘The timely filing of an appeal is a jurisdictional act, and an untimely appeal must be dismissed.’).
"The trial court entered a final judgment on May 6, 2022. On June 3, 2022, the former husband filed a timely postjudgment motion, pursuant to Rules 52 and 59, and, on August 29, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying that motion. In accordance with the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, the former husband had 42 days from the entry of the August 29, 2022, postjudgment order to timely file a notice of appeal. See Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. (providing that a notice of appeal ‘shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from’); Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. (providing that the filing of a postjudgment motion pursuant to Rules 52 or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure suspends the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal). The 42nd day following the entry of the August 29, 2022, postjudgment order fell on October 10, 2022, which was a legal holiday, see Rule 6(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 26(a), Ala. R. App. P.; therefore, the former husband had until October 11, 2022, to timely file a notice of appeal. See Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P.; Rule 26(a), Ala. R. App. P. (extending the last day of any period within the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure to the end of the next day when the last day of the period occurs on a legal holiday).
"In his letter brief to this court, the former husband admits that his notice of appeal was not filed in the trial court until October 12, 2022. He asserts, however, that his attorney experienced technical difficulties with the trial court’s electronic-filing system and was unable to file the notice of appeal in the trial court on October 11, 2022. The former husband further asserts that his attorney electronically filed the notice of appeal with this court on October 11, 2022, and he directs this court to the notice of appeal in this court’s case file, which bears a time stamp dated October 11, 2022, at 6:53 p.m.
"The Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure explicitly address the proper method of filing a notice of appeal to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. Rule 3(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides:
" ‘In civil cases, an appeal permitted by law as of right shall be taken to an appellate court by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4[, Ala. R. App. P.] The appellant shall cause a sufficient number of additional copies of the notice of appeal to be
marked filed with the date of filing noted thereon and certified as a true copy by the clerk of the trial court for service on the persons and parties as provided by (d)(1) or (d)(3) of this rule. Appeals by permission from interlocutory orders shall be taken in the manner prescribed by Rule 5[, Ala. R. App. P.] The notice of appeal may be filed electronically with the trial court clerk through the trial court’s electronic-filing system. If the notice of appeal is filed electronically, the appellant is not required to provide the additional copies required by this rule.’
"(Emphasis added.)
"The requirement that the notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the trial court is echoed in Rule 3(d)(1), Ala. R. App. P. (providing that, after the filing of the notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court, it is the duty of the clerk of the trial court to then serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the clerk of the appropriate appellate court); the Committee Comments to Rule 3 (‘Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court does not affect the validity of the appeal ….’); the Court Comment to Amendments to Rule 3(a), (d), and (e) Effective October 1, 2019 (‘If the notice of appeal is filed electronically, under Rule 3(d)(3), the clerk of the trial court may serve the notice of appeal electronically on the appropriate appellate court ….’); and Rule 4(a)(1) (providing that the notice of appeal ‘shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days’). Pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, in civil cases a notice of appeal must be timely filed in the trial court to invoke this court’s jurisdiction.
"In Crawford v. Kindred, 418 So. 2d 908, 909 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), this court determined that a party did not properly appeal the judgment entered by a small-claims court by filing a notice of appeal directly with the clerk of this court, and, therefore, we dismissed the appeal. Since Crawford was decided, neither our supreme court nor our legislature has promulgated any provision authorizing a party to file a notice of appeal directly with the clerk of this court from a judgment entered in a domestic-relations case. Cf. Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24B-5 (requiring appeals in certain actions under the Teacher Accountability Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24B-1 et seq., to be filed with the clerk of this court). Furthermore, neither the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure nor any provision of the Code of Alabama allows this court to treat a notice of appeal filed directly with the clerk of this court as having been filed with the clerk of the trial court. We also have not located any provision in the law authorizing this court to transfer a notice of appeal filed with the clerk of this court to the clerk of the trial court for filing in that court. Cf. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-1-4 (authorizing transfer of appeals between appellate courts). Accordingly, we conclude that the notice of appeal filed with this court is a legal nullity that was not sufficient to invoke this court’s appellate jurisdiction.
"The former husband argues that this court should overlook the defect where the notice was filed based on Dunning v. New England Life Insurance Co, 890 So. 2d 92, 96 (Ala. 2003), which held that, ‘absent a showing that the alleged defect in a notice of appeal prejudiced the adverse party, an appeal will not be dismissed on the basis of that defect.’ However, the issue in Dunning was not whether the notice of appeal had been timely filed or whether it had been prop- erly filed in the appropriate court to invoke that court’s jurisdiction. Rather, the issue in Dunning was whether a timely filed copy of a notice of appeal that did not include an original signature was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Id. at 96. Our supreme court concluded in Dunning that, because neither the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure nor the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure required that a notice of appeal bear an original, penned signature, the timely and properly filed copy of the original notice of appeal was acceptable to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Id. at 96-97. In this case, unlike in Dunning, the defect at issue is not procedural, but is jurisdictional, and one which this court cannot overlook or excuse. See Rule 2(b), Ala. R. App. P. We find Dunning does not conflict with our decision that the filing of the former husband’s notice of appeal directly with the clerk of this court is a legal nullity.
"The former husband also argues that his appeal should be addressed on the merits because his failure to timely file his notice of appeal in the trial court resulted from his attorney’s ‘technical issues with the AlaFile system,’ which he apparently sought to mitigate by filing his notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court on the following day. We conclude, however, that even in consideration of those asserted facts, the former husband’s appeal was not timely filed.
"Electronic filing in the trial court is addressed by Rule 5(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides, in pertinent part, that ‘[a] pleading, motion, order, or other document filed by electronic means in accordance with an order or rules of the Supreme Court of Alabama constitutes filing with the court for the purpose of applying these rules.’ Rule 44, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., provides for the publication, by the Administrative Director of Courts, of ‘a policies and procedures manual pertaining to electronic filing to be placed on the Administrative Office of Courts’ Web site.’ This court takes judicial notice of the fact that, on the date this opinion was released, a folder on the home page of the Web site http://efile.alacourt.gov/administrative-procedures contains a document entitled ‘Administrative Policies and Procedures for Electronic Filing in the Civil Divisions of the Alabama Unified Judicial System’ (‘the electronic-filing policy manual’), which we recognize as an order of the Alabama Supreme Court made in accordance with Rule 44. See Cooper v. MTA, Inc., 166 So. 3d 106, 108 n.3 (Ala. 2014) (plurality opinion) (stating that, pursuant to Rule 201(b)(2), Ala. R. Evid., an appellate court ‘may take judicial notice of facts "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" ’); and Alabama Dep’t of Revenue v. Frederick, 166 So. 3d 123, 124 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (concluding that the ‘ "Administrative Policies and Procedures for Electronic Filing in the Civil Division of the Alabama Unified Judicial System" ’ governed electronic filing and amounted to ‘ "an order … of the Supreme Court," ’ pursuant to Rule 5(e), Ala. R. Civ. P.).
"The electronic-filing policy manual addresses circumstances in which a party experiences technical difficulties with the trial court’s electronic-filing system. Specifically, the electronic-filing policy manual states:
" ‘If a party misses a Court imposed filing deadline because of an inability to electronically file based upon the unavailability of the system, the party may submit the untimely filed docu
ment, accompanied by a declaration stating the reason or reasons for missing the deadline. The document and declaration must be filed no later than 12:00 noon of the first day on which the court of jurisdiction is open for business following the original filing deadline. A model form of the declaration is available at http://efile.alacourt.gov.’
"In the present case, the former husband argues that his attorney had technical difficulties with the trial court’s electronic-filing system that prevented him from filing the notice of appeal on October 11, 2022. In that event, the electronic-filing policy manual permitted the late filing of the notice of appeal by filing the same by ‘12:00 noon’ on October 12, 2022, accompanied by a ‘declaration stating the reason or reasons for missing the deadline.’ The State Judicial Information System indicates that the former husband’s notice of appeal was filed in the trial court on October 12, 2022, at 12:07 p.m. Thus, the former husband missed the filing deadline outlined in the electronic-filing policy manual. Additionally, the former husband failed to submit to the trial court, at any time, a declaration stating the reason for having missed the October 11, 2022, deadline. We conclude, therefore, that the former husband failed to file his notice of appeal in the trial court in accordance with the orders of our supreme court, as required by Rule 5(e).
"The timely filing of a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court is a jurisdictional act, and an untimely appeal must be dismissed. See Rule 3, Ala. R. App. P.; and Golden Poultry, 719 So. 2d at 839. The former husband failed to timely file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. We therefore dismiss the appeal. See Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. (stating that an appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of appeal is not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court).
"__________
"2The former husband attached to his letter brief the affidavit of his attorney in support of his assertions surrounding the difficulties his attorney had while attempting to electronically file the notice of appeal in the trial court on October 11, 2022. The affidavit is dated December 1, 2022. We decline to address whether this court may consider that affidavit on appeal because such a determination is unnecessary in light of our resolution of the former wife’s motion to dismiss."
Seibert, 386 So.3d at 778–81.
I.
Seibert argues that the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in this case conflicts with this Court’s prior decisions in Ex parte Taylor, 157 So. 3d 122 (Ala. 2008), Dunning v. New England Life Insurance Co., 890 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 2003), State v. Wilson, 961 So. 2d 911(Ala. 2006),1 and Edmondson v. Blakey, 341 So. 2d 481 (Ala. 1976). Seibert’s allegation of conflict appears to be based on his assertion that "[i]t has long been held that under Rule 4[, Ala.] R. [App.] P., only the time of filing is jurisdictional. See, Dunning v. New England Life Insurance Co. …" Petition at p. 12. Thus, he appears to argue that the requirement that the notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the trial court is not jurisdictional. However, none of the cited cases involved the situation in which a notice of appeal had been filed within the time required by Rule 4, Ala. R. App. P., but had not been filed in the trial court, as required by Rule 3(a), Ala. R. App. P. Additionally, none of those cases included any suggestion that the filing of a notice of appeal in an incorrect court is effective as a timely filed notice of appeal.
Dunning and Taylor both involved a notice of appeal that had been timely filed in the appropriate court. However, the notice of appeal in Dunning had not been signed by counsel, and the notice of appeal in Taylor had been "signed by a foreign attorney who purportedly had not been admitted to practice law in Alabama under the rules of the Alabama State Bar governing admission of foreign attorneys pro hac vice." 157 So. 3d at 122. Thus, those cases address defects within the notice of appeal. State v. Wilson involved the State’s filing of a premature notice of appeal in the trial court. Finally, Edmondson addressed the issue whether a notice of appeal was effective as to one of the defendants below when that notice did not include that defendant as a named appellee; did not "indicate by description or date" that the appeal was from the order granting that defendant’s motion for a summary judgment; and did not indicate by designation that order was being challenged on appeal. 341 So. 2d at 484.
For these reasons, Seibert has not established that there is a probability of merit to his argument that the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s prior decisions in those cases.
II.
[1] Seibert also asserts as a ground for relief that the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in this case conflicts with its prior decision in Crawford v. Kindred, 418 So. 2d 908 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). However, in the argument section of his petition, Seibert asserts:
"Finally, the lower court’s reliance on its own decision in Crawford v. Kindred … is in conflict with the above quoted decisions of this Court because in Crawford, the court to which the appeal was taken, did not have jurisdiction to hear appeals taken from the small claims court. Here the Court of Civil Appeals did."
Petition at p. 13. At best, it appears that Seibert actually argues that the Court of Civil Appeals’ reliance on Crawford was misplaced. However, appellate-court error is not a specific ground for certiorari review pursuant to Rule 39(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. Additionally, in Crawford, the defendant appealed an adverse judgement of a small-claims court directly to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal, stating:
"Rule M of the Alabama Small Claims Rules provides that a judgment rendered by the small claims court ‘may be appealed to the circuit court by the filing of a notice of appeal in the office of the clerk of the small claims court within 14 days from the date of the judgment… Inasmuch as that rule was adopted subsequent to § 12-12-72 of the Code of Alabama (1975), a direct appeal to this court from a small claims judgment is not presently authorized. An appeal taken without authority of law must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction: Hallman v. City of Northport, 386 So. 2d 756 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); 2 Ala. Digest, Appeal and Error, Key No. 1.
"It is clear that the defendant has attempted to base his appeal upon subdivision (2) of § 12-12-72 which provides for a direct appeal from the district court to the appropriate appellate court if the parties stipulate that only questions of law are involved and if the district court certifies the questions. Here, the district court belatedly certified a question of law to this court; however, the plaintiffs have never stipulated with the defendant that only a question of law is involved. Hence, both prongs of that subsection are not properly satisfied in this appeal. There has been no substantial compliance with the statute. Therefore, the same end result would be here required even if Rule M did not exist and if that code section had sole application, for appeals which are not taken in the manner prescribed by statute or supreme court rule must be dismissed. LeFlore v. State ex rel Moore, 288 Ala. 310, 260 So. 2d 581 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007, 93 S. Ct. 436, 34 L.Ed. 2d 299 (1972)."
Crawford, 418 So. 2d at 908-09 (emphasis added).
In its opinion in this case, the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
"Pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, in civil cases a notice of appeal must be timely filed in the trial court to invoke this court’s jurisdiction.
"In Crawford v. Kindred, 418 So. 2d 908, 909 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), this court determined that a party did not properly appeal the judgment entered by a small-claims court by filing a notice of appeal directly with the clerk of this court, and, therefore, we dismissed the appeal. Since Crawford was decided, neither our supreme court nor our legislature has promulgated any provision authorizing a party to file a notice of appeal directly with the clerk of this court from a judgment entered in a domestic-relations case. Cf. Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24B-5 (requiring appeals in certain actions under the Teacher Accountability Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24B-1 et seq., to be filed with the clerk of this court). Furthermore, neither the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure nor any provision of the Code of Alabama allows this court to treat a notice of appeal filed directly with the clerk of this court as having been filed with the clerk of the trial court. We also have not located any provision in the law authorizing this court to transfer a notice of appeal filed with the clerk of this court to the clerk of the trial court for filing in that court. Cf. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-1-4 (authorizing transfer of appeals between appellate courts). Accordingly, we conclude that the notice of appeal filed with this court is a legal nullity that was not sufficient to invoke this court’s appellate jurisdiction."
Seibert, 386 So.3d at 779. Nothing in the Court of Civil Appeals’ holding in the present case conflicts with its previous holding in Crawford. Accordingly, Seibert is not entitled to certiorari review as to this claim.
III.
Seibert further argues that the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s prior decision in Ex parte G.L.C., 281 So. 3d 401 (Ala. 2018). Specifically, he alleges:
"(a) [In this case,] the Court of Civil Appeals stated:
" ‘In the present case, the former husband argues that his attorney had technical difficulties with the trial court’s electronic-filing system that prevented him from filing the notice of appeal on October 11, 2022. In that event, the electronic-filing policy man
ual permitted the late filing of the notice of appeal by filing the same by ‘12:00 noon’ on October 12, 2022, accompanied by a ‘declaration stating the reason or reasons for missing the deadline.’ The State Judicial Information System indicates that the former husband’s notice of appeal was filed in the trial court on October 12, 2022, at 12:07 p.m. Thus, the former husband missed the filing deadline outlined in the electronic-filing policy manual.’
"(b) In Ex parte G.L.C., 281 So. 3d 401, 408 (Ala. 2018), this Court stated:
" ‘This Court has held that ‘[t]he only jurisdictional prerequisite for an appeal is the timely filing of a notice of appeal.’ Dunning v. New England Life Ins. Co., 890 So. 2d 92, 96 (Ala. 2003) (citing Edmondson v. Blakey, 341 So. 2d 481, 484 (Ala. 1976), and Committee Comments to Rule 3, Ala. R. App. P. (‘Timely filing of the notice of appeal is a jurisdictional act. It is the only step in the appellate process which is jurisdictional.’)). This Court does not wish to muddy the waters of this clear directive. However, when considering the particular circumstances of this case -- that the mother did everything she was supposed to do but was prevented from timely filing her notice of appeal based on erroneous information given to her by someone in the circuit clerk’s office -- together with the fact that the mother was appealing the termination of her parental rights, we must conclude that equity requires that we deem the mother’s notice of appeal timely filed.’ "
Petition at pp. 7-8 (emphasis omitted).
In Ex parte G.L.C., a juvenile court entered a final judgment terminating a mother’s parental rights on August 16, 2017. Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1)(E), Ala. R. App. P., and Rule 28(c), Ala. R. Juv. P., the mother had 14 days, or until August 30, 2017, to file her notice of appeal.
"The notice of appeal and docketing statement that appear in the record were stamped filed on August 31, 2017, but that date had been changed by hand to August 30, 2017. The notice of appeal and the docketing statement are signed by the mother, not the court-appointed attorney who represented her during the termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. The date next to the mother’s signature on the notice of appeal is August 31, 2017, but it had been changed to August 30, 2017; the date next to the mother’s signature on the docketing statement is August 31, 2017.
"On September 6, 2017, the Court of Civil Appeals docketed the mother’s appeal. The same day, the father’s attorney sent an e-mail to Tina Hadley, a docket specialist in the Baldwin County circuit clerk’s office (‘the circuit clerk’s office’), inquiring about the altered dates on the mother’s notice of appeal. Hadley responded immediately and stated:
" ‘[The mother] attempted to file Aug[ust] 30[th] which was her 14th day. The girls in juvenile sent her upstairs to me and security had locked the door as it was then 4:30 and the door is actually on an automatic lock. I verified with Juvenile that she had been here and been turned away. I corrected the dates so that she met her time frame since it was not her fault.’
"On September 15, 2017, the father filed in the juvenile court a motion to dismiss the mother’s appeal as untimely filed. After the mother filed a response, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 31, 2017. The mother testified that she came to the Baldwin County courthouse on August 30, 2017, and a security officer ‘sent [her] upstairs … to file the appeal.’ The mother said that she went upstairs to the circuit clerk’s office and waited for someone to help her. The mother stated that ‘it was about time for them to go’ but she eventually told someone that she was there ‘to file [a] juvenile appeal.’ The individual whom she spoke to sent her ‘downstairs’ -- apparently to the juvenile division of the circuit clerk’s office -- but by the time she got there the doors were locked. The mother stated that she asked if she could leave the notice of appeal in an envelope but that ‘they said … [she] would have to come the next day.’
"The mother testified that she returned to the ‘downstairs’ clerk’s office the following day -- August 31 -- to file her notice of appeal because that was where she had been told to go the previous day. But, when she appeared at the clerk’s office downstairs, ‘they’ sent her back to the circuit clerk’s office upstairs to file her notice of appeal. When the mother returned to the circuit clerk’s office upstairs, someone finally accepted her notice of appeal, and it was stamped filed on August 31.
"Hadley testified that the mother came to the circuit clerk’s office on August 31, 2017, with her notice of appeal already filled out and filed her notice of appeal from the judgment terminating her parental rights. Hadley agreed that all the date stamps on the mother’s notice of appeal had been changed from August 31 to August 30 even though the mother had not actually filed her notice of appeal on August 30. Hadley indicated that she changed all the dates on the mother’s notice of appeal from August 31 to August 30 because the mother had been to the circuit clerk’s office on August 30 to file her notice of appeal but had been unable to do so.
"At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court stated:
" ‘I think that I have to find that it was not timely filed. Do I think the clerk’s office needs a better … standard operating procedure for dealing with folks that walk up to this courthouse at 4:28 and 52 seconds? Yes. Yes, I do. But I don’t -- I don’t know what their procedure is for that. There probably is some procedure and somebody probably did not follow it. But I don’t know what it is. Because I know that things can be filed when the physical building is locked. So I know you can do it, that it’s possible. But I’m not sure what that procedure is, and I do think the clerk’s office could have handled it better. But it wasn’t filed in time, ultimately, and the remedy for that is not to change the date on the paperwork. So I’ll have to grant the motion to dismiss.’
"On October 31, 2017, the juvenile court entered an order dismissing the mother’s appeal. On April 4, 2018, the Court of Civil Appeals, citing Ex parte Madison County Department of Human Resources, 261 So. 3d 381 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017), and D.V.P. v. T.W.P., 905 So. 2d 853, 856 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), issued an order stating that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to enter an order dismissing the mother’s appeal and that, therefore, that order was void. However, the Court of Civil Appeals reinvested the juvenile court with jurisdiction for 14 days ‘for the limited purpose of making a factual determination as to the date the notice of appeal was filed.’ On April 12, 2018, the juvenile court entered an order stating that, ‘[a]fter reviewing the facts, pleadings, and transcripts available, it is hereby determined that [the mother] filed her notice of appeal on August 31, 2017. This was 15 days after this Court’s final order.’
"The Court of Civil Appeals subsequently issued an opinion dismissing the mother’s appeal as untimely filed. See G.L.C.[ v. C.E.C., 281 So. 3d 392 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018)]. The mother filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court seeking review of the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision."
Ex parte G.L.C., 281 So. 3d at 402-04 (footnote omitted).
In her petition for a writ of certiorari, the mother presented the following issue of first impression:
"[W]hether a notice of appeal may be deemed timely filed when the filer ‘physically appears at the clerk’s office and presents a notice of appeal to the clerk before the expiration of the filing deadline, with [the] intention that it be received and filed, only to have the clerk’s office decline to receive and file that notice at the time of presentment.’ "
Ex parte G.L.C., 281 So. 3d at 404. This Court ultimately stated:
"This Court has held that ‘[t]he only jurisdictional prerequisite for an appeal is the timely filing of a notice of appeal.’ Dunning v. New England Life Ins. Co., 890 So. 2d 92, 96 (Ala. 2003) (citing Edmondson v. Blakey, 341 So. 2d 481, 484 (Ala. 1976), and Committee Comments to Rule 3, Ala. R. App. P. (‘Timely filing of the notice of appeal is a jurisdictional act. It is the only step in the appellate process which is jurisdictional.’)). This Court does not wish to muddy the waters of this clear directive. However, when considering the particular circumstances of this case -- that the mother did everything she was supposed to do but was prevented from timely filing her notice of appeal based on erroneous information given to her by someone in the circuit clerk’s office – together with the fact that the mother was appealing the termination of her parental rights, we must conclude that equity requires that we deem the mother’s notice of appeal timely filed.
"__________
"4We note that, once parental rights have been terminated, Alabama law provides no method for regaining those rights. See V.M. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 710 So. 2d 915, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (‘[T]he termination of parental rights is a drastic measure, and we know of no means by which those rights, once. terminated, can be reinstated.’). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (‘[A] … decision terminating parental rights is final and irrevocable. … Few forms of state action are both so severe and so irreversible.’)."
In this case, Seibert asserted that he was prevented from timely filing his notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court based on technical difficulties with the trial court’s electronic-filing system. As the Court of Civil Appeals discussed in its opinion, the "Administrative Policies and Procedures for Electronic Filing in the Civil Divisions of the Alabama Unified Judicial System" sets forth the procedure that must be followed when a party misses a filing deadline as the result of the inability to electronically file a document based upon the inability to access the trial court’s electronic-filing system. Specifically, it provides that the document to be filed and "a declaration stating the reason or reasons for missing the deadline" "must be filed no later than 12:00 noon of the first day on which the court of jurisdiction is open for business following the original filing deadline." However, Seibert did not comply with that procedure. The deadline for filing Seibert’s notice of appeal was October 11, 2022. Thus, Seibert was required to file the notice of appeal and the declaration by 12:00 noon on October 12, 2022. However, Seibert did not file the notice of appeal until 12:07 p.m. on October 12, 2022, and he did not file a declaration stating his reasons for missing the deadline in the trial court. Accordingly, unlike the situation in Ex parte G.L.C., this was not a situation in which Seibert "did everything [he] was supposed to do." 281 So. 3d at 408. Additionally, unlike the situation in G.L.C., this case does not involve the termination of parental rights. For these reasons, Seibert has not established that there is a probability of merit to his argument that the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in this case conflicts with this Court’s prior decision in Ex parte G.L.C.
IV.
In the statement of his grounds for relief, Seibert includes the following:
"3. The question of whether the timely filing of a notice of appeal in the appellate court that had jurisdiction over the appeal and to which the appeal is directly taken is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of that court is a material question requiring decision and one of first impression in this Court.
"4. Pursuant to [Ala. R. App. P.] 4, the question of whether when filing a notice of appeal, the place of filing is jurisdictional, as the Court of Civil Appeals apparently held, is a material question requiring decision and one of first impression in this Court.
"5. The question of whether under the facts and circumstances of this case, the place of filing was a waivable defect is a material question requiring decision and one of first impression in this Court.
"6. The question of whether the provision of the electronic filing policy manual creating the terms and conditions for late filings resulting from electronic filing system errors bars the filing of a notice of appeal, where as here, the notice was filed at the first available time (seven minutes) following the 12:00 pm deadline imposed by the policy is a material question requiring decision and one of first impression in this Court.
"7. The question regarding the effect of electronic filing rules upon the timely filing of a notice of appeal where a party misses an imposed deadline due to technical difficulties … is a material question requiring decision and one of first impression in this Court."
Petition at pp. 8-10 (emphasis omitted). However, in the argument section of his petition, Seibert does not actually argue these issues as issues of first impression. Rather, he focuses on his arguments that the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in this case conflicts with prior Alabama caselaw. Therefore, Seibert does not appear to adequately articulate and argue any issues of first impression for this Court.
[2, 3] Moreover, the Court of Civil Appeals thoroughly explained why the filing of the notice of appeal in the Court of Civil Appeals did not properly invoke that court’s jurisdiction, even though that notice was filed before the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired. The Court of Civil Appeals further pointed out that the electronic-filing rules included provisions to address the situation in which a party misses a filing deadline due to an inability to access the trial court’s electronic filing system and explained why Seibert had not complied with those rules. Although Seibert obviously disagrees with the Court of Civil Appeals’ decision in this case, he has not presented any compelling argument that this case warrants further review by this Court. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.
WRIT DENIED.
Parker, C.J., and Sellers, Stewart, and Cook, JJ., concur.