Opinion
1170623
05-10-2019
Ex parte Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. (In re: Gregory Nix v. Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.)
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter . Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-17-903525)
On Application for Rehearing
SELLERS, Justice.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
Bolin, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.
Murdock, Special Justice, concurs specially.
Retired Associate Justice Glenn Murdock was appointed on October 23, 2018, to serve as a Special Justice in regard to this petition for a writ of mandamus. See § 12-2-14, Ala. Code 1975. --------
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., dissent.
Wise, J., recuses herself. MURDOCK, Special Justice (concurring specially).
The question of what constitutes "doing business" for purposes of a determination of venue under § 6-3-7(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975, and the question of what constitutes "minimum contacts" for purposes of in personam jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are two different questions. What constitutes "doing business" within the contemplation of the former was well explained in the analysis offered by the main opinion on original submission. I concurred in that opinion and in overruling Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 2002), and I now concur in overruling the application for rehearing, on the basis of that analysis and the authorities cited in my dissenting opinions in Ex parte Greenetrack, 25 So. 3d 449, 458 (Ala. 2009), and Ex parte Elliott, 80 So. 3d 908, 914 (Ala. 2011). See Frees v. Southern Mich. Cold Storage Co., 43 Mich. App. 756, 757, 204 N.W.2d 782, 783 (1972); Hartung v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 816, 66 Ill. Dec. 493, 443 N.E.2d 16 (1982) (distinguishing between "'doing business' within a county for purposes of venue" and "'business activity [that] must be demonstrated ... for purposes of'" in personam jurisdiction (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Mosele, 67 Ill. 2d 321, 10 Ill. Dec. 602, 368 N.E.2d 88 (1977))); Gardner v. International Harvester Co., 113 Ill. 2d 535, 541, 101 Ill. Dec. 842, 845, 499 N.E.2d 430, 433 (1986); Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Saturn Corp., 659 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1987); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cty., 17 Cal. 3d 259, 270, 551 P.2d 847, 855, 131 Cal. Rptr. 231, 239 (1976) (noting that the issues of venue and in personam jurisdiction entail "completely different policy considerations" and that "[i]t is inappropriate to apply a 'minimum contacts' test to determine whether defendants are doing business" in a given county for purposes of determining venue); and Farmers' & Ginners' Cotton Oil Co. v. Baccus, 207 Ala. 75, 92 So. 4 (1921).