Opinion
WR-94,232-01
11-09-2022
EX PARTE CLINTON RAY IVY, Applicant
Do not publish
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. F43633-A IN THE 413TH DISTRICT COURT FROM JOHNSON COUNTY
ORDER
PER CURIAM
Applicant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Ivy v. State, No. 14-10-00028-CR (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] March 17, 2011) (not designated for publication). Applicant filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request a jury instruction on the voluntariness of Applicant's statement pursuant to Article 38.22, §6 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and failed to object that the jury charge given misstated the burden of proof for determining the voluntariness of Applicant's statement. Applicant also alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these jury charge issues on direct appeal. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order trial counsel and appellate counsel to respond to Applicant's claims. In developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel's name.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether trial counsel's performance was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court shall also make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether appellate counsel's performance was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant's claims.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court's findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from hearings and depositions. See Tex. R. App. P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested by the trial court and obtained from this Court.
Yeary, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Applicant was convicted in 2009 of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in 2011. Ivy v. State, No. 14-10-00028-CR, 2011 WL 915016 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] March 17, 2011) (not designated for publication). In October of 2022, Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07. In his application, he alleges that he received ineffective assistance from both trial and appellate counsel.
Today, the Court remands this application to the trial court to further develop the record. I join the Court's remand order But I write separately to address my thoughts concerning the doctrine of laches and its possible application to this case See Ex parte Smith, 444 S.W.3d 661 (Tex Crim App 2014) (holding a trial court has the authority to sua sponte consider the doctrine of laches); Ex parte Bazille, S.W.3d, No WR-89,851-02, 2022 WL 108348 (Tex Crim App Jan 12, 2022) (Yeary, J, concurring).
The doctrine of laches ought to be considered in a case like this one. Applicant's appeal was finalized in 2011, but this writ application was not filed until eleven years later. The record is also silent regarding circumstances that may excuse Applicant's delay, and at least some explanation for the long delay in filing should be provided. Consistent with this Court's precedent, the trial court "may sua sponte consider and determine whether laches should bar relief." Smith, 444 S.W.3d at 667. If the trial court does so, it must give Applicant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the delay and give the State's prosecutors and/or former counsel for Applicant an opportunity to state whether Applicant's delay has caused any prejudice to their ability to defend against Applicant's claims. Id. at 670. And ultimately, the trial court may include findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the doctrine of laches in its response to this Court's remand order.
"Our revised approach will permit courts to more broadly consider the diminished memories of trial participants and the diminished availability of the State's evidence, both of which may often be said to occur beyond five years after a conviction becomes final." Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434, 437-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting)).
With these additional thoughts, I join the Court's order.