Opinion
WR-47,417-04 WR-47,417-05
09-19-2018
ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 1073163-B IN THE 230TH DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY Per curiam. ORDER
These are subsequent applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.071, § 5.
Applicant was originally convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in March 1997 for the 1994 shooting death of Farah Fratta. Applicant unsuccessfully challenged his 1997 conviction and sentence in this Court on direct appeal and in an initial 11.071 writ application. See Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte Guidry, No. WR-47,417-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2000). However, applicant subsequently obtained federal habeas relief. See Guidry v. Dretke, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26199 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2003); Guidry v. Dretke, 397 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2005).
The State retried applicant in February and March 2007, and the new jury also convicted him of capital murder. The evidence supporting the jury's verdict generally showed that, at the time of her death, Farah Fratta ("Farah") and her husband, Robert Fratta ("Fratta") were involved in a bitter divorce and child-custody proceeding. Fratta recruited an acquaintance, Joseph Prystash, to kill or find someone to kill Farah for remuneration. Prystash, in turn, enlisted applicant, who was a neighbor of Prystash's then-girlfriend, Mary Gipp. On the evening of November 9, 1994, applicant hid outside of Farah's residence until she returned home. As Farah was getting out her car in the garage, applicant entered the garage and killed her with two close-range and contact gunshots to the head.
According to the new jury's answers to the special issues, the trial court again sentenced applicant to death. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(2). This Court affirmed applicant's 2007 conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Guidry v. State, No. AP-75,633 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2009) (not designated for publication). We also denied relief on his initial post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus challenging that 2007 conviction and sentence, and we dismissed his first subsequent writ application challenging the same. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 11.071; Ex parte Guidry, Nos. WR-73,329-02 & WR-73,329-03 (Tex. Crim. App. June 27, 2012).
In his instant applications, filed in the trial court on October 31, 2016, and February 15, 2017, respectively, applicant again challenges his 2007 capital murder conviction and death sentence. This Court received the instant applications on April 16, 2018.
Applicant styled his February 15, 2017 filing as an "amended" version of the subsequent writ application he filed in the trial court on October 31, 2016. However, Applicant raises an additional claim in his February 2017 filing—specifically, an allegation that "The State Used False Evidence to Obtain [Applicant's] Conviction in Violation of the Due Process Clause." Therefore, Applicant's February 2017 filing is properly designated pursuant to Article 11.071 as another subsequent writ application, and we have assigned it a separate writ number.
Applicant does not number the claims he presents in either of these applications. However, in his application filed in the trial court on October 31, 2016, applicant appears to raise four general categories of allegations: (1) allegations that the State violated its duties of disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) claims asserting that he received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and previous habeas counsel; (3) record-based claims; and (4) "other" claims. This last category of claims includes: an allegation that applicant was unconstitutionally denied the counsel of his choosing in prior post-conviction proceedings; a claim pursuant to Justice Stevens's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995); and a claim that evolving standards of decency prohibit the death penalty as a punishment for murder.
In his application filed in the trial court on February 15, 2017, applicant raises all of the same claims he raised in the application he filed in the trial court on October 31, 2016. However, applicant also raises an additional claim that the State used false evidence to secure his 2007 capital murder conviction.
See supra note 1. --------
We have reviewed both applications and find that applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071, § 5(a). Accordingly, we dismiss both applications as an abuse of the writ without considering the merits of the claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2018. Do Not Publish