No. 05-03-00215-CR.
Opinion Issued April 4, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. X02-00232-8. Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, FITZGERALD, and LANG.
Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD
David Eugene Edwards appeals the district court's judgment denying his application for writ of habeas corpus to avoid extradition to California where he is charged with twenty-five felony counts of securities fraud, mainly against the elderly. In two issues, appellant questions whether he was denied due process because he was not presented before a court of record within the forty-eight-hour mandate of article 15.17(a) of the code of criminal procedure, and he questions whether the documents supporting the California Governor's Warrant were insufficient, whether he was denied gubernatorial discretion, and whether the State established his identity or presence in the demanding state. We affirm.
California's application for requisition states that appellant stands accused of illegally receiving $365,000 from victims residing in Santa Clara County, California and $98.7 million from over 1,300 victims nationwide.
Facts
Between 1998 and 2002, appellant allegedly committed twenty-five felony offenses in California. On November 13, 2002, the Governor of California issued a request upon the Governor of Texas to arrest and extradite appellant because he committed illegal acts outside the State of California resulting in crimes inside that state. On November 20, the Governor of Texas issued a warrant for appellant's extradition to California. On December 4, Dallas County sheriff deputies located appellant at a federal detention center, arrested him, and transported him to the Dallas County jail, where he was issued the two Governors' warrants. On December 12, appellant was taken before Magistrate Dorothy Shead, at which time appellant objected that he had not been before a "court of record" within forty-eight hours pursuant to code of criminal procedure article 15.17 and article 51.13, section 10. Eight days later, appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus, to which he attached the Governors' warrants and appellant's supporting affidavit. In his affidavit, appellant stated his due process rights had been violated because he was not taken before a magistrate within forty-eight hours of arrest and he was not the person identified in the Governors' warrants. He later filed a supplement to his petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting the trial court had no jurisdiction to extradite him because: (1) he was denied due process because he was not brought before a "court of record" within forty-eight hours of his arrest; (2) the supporting extradition documents, the complaint and application for requisition, were invalid on their face because they were not verified; (3) the California Governor's Warrant seeks a person of the opposite gender, which shows the State's lack of proof of identity; and (4) the California Governor's warrant bases the request for extradition on code of criminal procedure article 51.13 section 6, yet alleges crimes that could only be committed under article 51.13 section 3, thereby showing the State's lack of proof of appellant's presence and status as a "fugitive" amenable to extradition. At the district court's request, the magistrate court held a hearing on January 3, 2003. That court considered appellant's habeas corpus complaints and entered proposed findings and recommendations that the Governor's Warrant was valid on its face, appellant had been charged with a crime in the demanding state, appellant was the person named in the request for extradition, and appellant was a fugitive. In its order, the district court adopted the magistrate's findings and recommendations and denied appellant's application for writ of habeas corpus. This appeal followed. Applicable Law
A governor's grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978). Once the governor of the asylum state has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus is limited to a determination of whether the extradition documents are facially in order, whether the applicant has been charged with a crime in the demanding state, whether the applicant is the person named in the request for extradition, and whether the applicant is a fugitive. See id.; State ex rel. Holmes v. Klevenhagen, 819 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). The court is without authority to consider equitable issues during the habeas corpus hearing. See Holmes, 819 S.W.2d at 543. Timeliness of Appearance in Asylum State
In his first issue, appellant questions whether he was timely brought before a magistrate or judge of a court of record. Specifically, he asserts he first appeared before a magistrate eight days after his arrest, and he first appeared before a "court of record" thirty days after his arrest, neither of which were within the forty-eight-hour requirement under article 15.17(a). Conversely, the State argues article 15.17(a), which governs arrests generally and requires that an arrested person be brought before a magistrate within forty-eight hours of arrest, does not apply to an extradition proceeding. Instead, the State asserts the more specific statute, article 51.13, section 10, which governs extradition proceedings, controls over the more general statute, article 15.17(a). Article 51.13, section 10 requires that a person arrested in an extradition proceeding be taken "forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this State." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 10 (Vernon 1979) (footnote added). Article 51.13, section 10 does not demand an exact time restriction. As such, the State argues article 15.17(a) is inapplicable, and appellant was arguably brought before the judge of a court of record "forthwith." The State adds that even if appellant had not been timely presented "forthwith," appellant has made no claim or demonstration of harm for the eight-day delay. Cf. Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (court in habeas review of extradition could consider whether appellant lacked sufficient mental competency to assist his counsel's preparation of a writ of habeas corpus challenging the extradition proceeding). We conclude that whether appellant was timely presented before a judge of a court of record does not fall within the limits of our review. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 289 (stating rule that reviewing court is limited to deciding whether extradition documents are facially valid, whether petitioner has been charged with crime in demanding state, whether petitioner is person named in request for extradition, and whether petitioner is fugitive); Ex parte Potter, 21 S.W.3d at 297 (Texas courts reviewing habeas corpus order in extradition case are limited to the four grounds set out in Doran and to consideration of the applicant's mental competency). However, even if we could consider it, we conclude the record does not show appellant was harmed by any delay in bringing him before the court pursuant to either articles 15.17(a) or 51.13, section ten. Appellant asserts the violation of the statutes also violated his constitutional right to due process. Assuming for purposes of this opinion that (1) article 51.13, section 10 was violated, and (2) that any such violation would violate his constitutional right to due process, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any violation any due process right did not contribute to the denial appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a). Accordingly, we resolve the first issue against appellant. In his second issue, appellant questions whether the trial court erred in denying his application for writ of habeas corpus because the documents supporting the Governor's Warrant were invalid on their face, he was denied gubernatorial discretion, the State did not prove he was the person stated in the Governor's Warrant, and the State did not prove he was present in the demanding State. We review these arguments in order. Documents Supporting the Governor's Warrant
Appellant argues the documents supporting the Governor's Warrant did not meet the requirements of article 51.13, section 3 because (1) the demanding state's complaint upon which the warrant was issued did not constitute a proper affidavit, as it was not based on personal knowledge, and (2) that arrest warrant was not issued on the complaint. Code of criminal procedure article 51.13, section 3 provides that a demand for extradition must be accompanied by one of the specified types of charging instruments to support issuance of a Governor's Warrant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 3 (Vernon 1979). The charging instrument must be a copy of one of the following: (1) an indictment; (2) an information; (3) an affidavit before a magistrate and a warrant issued thereupon; or (4) a judgment of conviction or a sentence imposed in execution of the conviction. Id. The issuance and introduction into evidence of a Governor's Warrant, regular on its face, creates a prima facie case that the requirements for extradition have been met. See Ex parte Martinez, 530 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex.Crim. App. 1975). However, the accused may complain about the supporting papers and challenge their sufficiency in order to show that the Governor's Warrant was illegally issued. See Ex parte Cain, 592 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (op. on reh'g). The supporting papers introduced with the Governor's Warrant may be used to "buttress or defeat" the prima facie case made out by the introduction of the warrant. See id. Here, the California Governor's Warrant is supported by an amended complaint and affidavit made before a magistrate with a copy of an arrest warrant issued upon it. Appellant first argues the affidavit in support of the amended complaint was insufficient because Deputy Sondra Serenka did not state she had personal knowledge of the facts stated in the complaint. There is no requirement that an affidavit in support of a complaint recite the affiant has personal knowledge of the matters stated in the complaint. Ex parte Harris, 389 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex.Crim.App. 1965); Ex parte McDonald, 631 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref'd). Appellant relies upon this Court's decisions in Ex parte Bahmer, 763 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.), and Ex parte Zepeda, No. 05-97-01435-CR (Tex.App.-Dallas Feb. 9, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Those cases, however, are distinguishable from the present case. In Bahmer, there was no affidavit contained in the supporting papers. See Bahmer, 763 S.W.2d at 433. Notwithstanding that the unpublished Zepeda opinion has no precedential value, the affidavit in that case was not signed by the affiant; instead, it was signed by someone else on behalf of the affiant. See Zepeda, No. 05-97-01435-CR at *2; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.7 ("Opinions not designated for publication by the court of appeals under these or prior rules have no precedential value. . . ."). Without deciding the sufficiency of the affidavit as a criminal pleading, we conclude the amended complaint in the present case meets the affidavit requirement of the extradition statute. An affidavit is defined as "a statement in writing of a fact or facts signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 312.011(1) (Vernon 1998). The amended complaint was in writing; it listed the twenty-five counts of felony offenses against appellant; it was signed by Deputy Sondra Serenka, the party making the statement; it stated that Serenka was duly sworn and deposed; she swore to the amended complaint before Superior Court Judge Gilbert T. Brown, an officer authorized to administer oaths; and Judge Brown certified the amended complaint under his seal of office. Appellant's argument lacks merit. In a related argument, appellant asserts that, based on an inconsistency in the proffered arrest warrant, no arrest warrant was issued on the amended complaint. Specifically, he relies on the arrest warrant's recitation that Judge Brown, who authorized the issuance of the warrant, received the amended complaint under oath from "35 Nolen" of the District Attorney's office, not Deputy Sondra Serenka, who signed the amended complaint. Article 51.13, section 3 requires a copy of an affidavit before a magistrate in the demanding state, "together with a copy of any warrant which issued thereupon." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 3. We have already determined the amended complaint constituted a valid affidavit. What we must decide is whether the arrest warrant was issued on the amended complaint, and we conclude that it did. Notwithstanding the complained-of error, the two documents correspond in sufficient, significant respects. Both documents were issued on the same day by the same judge, they recite the same defendant with the same birth date, they list the same offenses committed, and they each bear the same "PFN" number "DSD229." That the fill-in-the-blank arrest warrant form states a different name from the deputy's name is not sufficient to overcome the prima facie case made by the introduction of the Governor's Warrant that the arrest warrant was issued on the amended complaint. As such, the arrest warrant and the amended complaint together comply with article 51.13, section 3. The supporting documents were valid on their face. We resolve this argument against appellant. Gubernatorial Discretion
Next, appellant argues the Texas Governor mistakenly believed that, based on the nature of the crimes alleged and conflicts in the supporting documents, he had no discretion to refuse California's demand for appellant's extradition. As such, appellant was deprived of any possible benefit of gubernatorial discretion allowed under article 51.13, section 6. Article 51.13, section 3 mandates extradition in cases where the accused was present in the demanding state during the commission of the offense and thereafter fled to the asylum state. Unlike section 3, section 6 is stated in permissive language, allowing the Texas Governor the discretion to surrender any person to the demanding state whose actions in Texas, or in a third state, intentionally result in a crime in the demanding state. Compare Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 3 with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 6. The amended complaint and application for requisition allege offenses committed in California, including first degree burglary. That count in the amended complaint states that appellant "did enter an inhabited dwelling house located at [the victim's] home with the intent to commit theft and [a] felony[ies], Securities Fraud." The application for requisition states that because the victims were contacted and deceived in their homes, the suspects' joint actions constituted first degree burglary. It also explains that appellant, whose business was located in Washington State, conspired with sales agents in California to convince California residents to invest money in fraudulent bank notes. The California Governor's Warrant states that appellant stands charged with the offenses listed in the amended complaint and application for requisition "by intentionally committing an act or acts while outside the State of California resulting in said crimes in this State, and it has been represented and is satisfactorily shown . . . that [appellant] is now to be found in the State of Texas." Arguably, California can pursue appellant's conviction under the law of parties. As such, the offenses listed in the amended complaint and the application for requisition are not inconsistent with the language of the California Governor's Warrant that tracks section six. Nothing in the California Governor's Warrant or its supporting documents suggest appellant did not receive the gubernatorial discretion to which he was entitled. We resolve this argument against appellant. Identity
Appellant next argues the State failed to prove he was the accused named in any of the demanding or asylum state's documents. Specifically, he contends the State's proof, an enlarged photo copy of a Washington State driver's license and supporting certification that the license was a true and correct copy, did not identify appellant as the same person named in the Governor's Warrant. The Texas Governor's Warrant, which appears regular on its face, made out a prima facie case authorizing remand of appellant to custody for extradition. See Ex parte Larson, 494 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973). By introducing the Texas Governor's Warrant into evidence at the habeas corpus hearing, the State shifted the burden to appellant to prove that he was not the person charged with the crimes in California. Appellant placed identity into issue at the hearing by denying he was the person named for extradition. As such, the burden then shifted to the State to show that appellant was the identical person named in the Texas Governor's Warrant. See id. The amended complaint and the arrest warrant contain information identifying the person sought for extradition. Both documents refer to "David Eugene Edwards," whose birth date is October 8, 1957. The arrest warrant describes the accused as a six-foot-tall male weighing 205, living at 75th Avenue Ct. W., University Place, Washington, 98467. The driver's license states the same address, birth date, height, and weight for "David Eugene Edwards." To prove identity, the prosecutor introduced into evidence the driver's license and a supporting affidavit stating the license was a true and correct copy. On cross-examination, appellant identified himself by the same name, address, birth date, height, and weight as reflected in the supporting documents. Based on this record, the State showed appellant was the identical person named in the Texas Governor's Warrant. We resolve this argument against appellant. Presence in Demanding State. Finally, appellant argues the State failed to prove he was present in the demanding state. Article 51.13, section 3 provides that no demand for the extradition of a person shall be recognized by the Texas Governor unless, "except in cases arising under Section 6," it is in writing "that the accused was present in the demanding State at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that thereafter he fled from the State. . . ." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.13, § 3. The California Governor's Warrant expressly tracked the language of article 51.13, section 6. See Rentz v. State, 833 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.) (holding in part that where appellant was charged with sending package containing cocaine to co-defendant in state of Florida, it was not necessary for State to prove appellant was in demanding state at time of offense). As such, the State was not required to prove presence in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the offenses. We resolve this argument against appellant. Having resolved all arguments in appellant's second issue against him, we overrule appellant's second issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment.