Opinion
1:22-cv-01133-CNS-SKC
01-19-2023
ANDREW DEREK EVERETT, Plaintiff, v. MANDY RAE BOLLINGER-EVERETT, Defendant.
RECOMMENDATION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
S. KATO CREWS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court, and upon referral by the presiding judge, is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Dkt. 5] based on the parties' ongoing divorce proceedings in state court. [Dkt. 18.] Plaintiff, appearing pro se, did not file a responsive pleading to the Motion.
The Court, after reviewing the Motion, any related briefings, the case docket, and applicable law, RECOMMENDS the Motion be GRANTED for the reasons further discussed below.
Background
Plaintiff filed this action primarily alleging Defendant, his wife, made defamatory statements against him in attempts to deny his religious freedom and property rights, i.e., his children, arising from his divorce proceedings in Jefferson County state court, Case No. 21DR30874. [Dkts. 5 p. 4; 20 p. 10.]
Subsequently, Defendant filed the Motion asking the Court to dismiss this matter because of the parties' on-going divorce proceedings in state court, noting Plaintiff has refused to disclose his financial information or engage in mediation, hearings, or conferences.[Dkt. 18.]
The Court liberally construes the Motion since Defendant was unrepresented when she filed it. See Greene v. U.S. Postal Serv., 795 Fed.Appx. 581, 583 (10th Cir. 2019) (liberally construing appellants opening brief who appeared pro se). Defendant has since retained counsel.
Discussion
Defendant contends the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on their pending divorce proceedings in state court. The Court agrees.
Because the Court concludes dismissal is appropriate based on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), it declines to address any other possible bases for dismissal, including whether diversity jurisdiction applies.
The Younger abstention doctrine requires a federal court to decline jurisdiction where (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) state proceedings implicate an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional claims. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971); Morkel v. Davis, 513 Fed.Appx. 724, 727-28 (10th Cir. 2013). Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) requires a court to dismiss an action when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Jackson v. Jackson, No. 07-cv-01871-BNB, 2007 WL 2786424, at * 1 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2007) (dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's complaint challenging the validity of a divorce decree). And a complaint must plausibly allege the federal court's jurisdiction. See Robertson v. Meinig, 90 Fed.Appx. 307, 308 (10th Cir. 2004); Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (federal courts hold limited jurisdiction and therefore must have a specific legal basis to invoke it).
At the outset, Plaintiff's complaint primarily relies on “paperwork” from his divorce proceedings with Defendant to support his only claim that she made “[f]alse statements, attempts to deny religious freedom.” [Dkt. 5 p. 4.] The Court is not required to, nor will it, sort through Plaintiff's various papers and pleadings to decipher what his claims are. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Simon v. Cyrus Amax Mins. Health Care Plan, 107 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1265 (D. Colo. 2000) (a pro se plaintiff is not relieved of the burden of presenting sufficient facts to support a recognized legal claim); Marck v. Miller, No. 22-cv-00238-LTB-GPG, 2022 WL 3443803, at *2 (D. Colo. June 13, 2022) (warning pro se plaintiff that the Court will not “sort through multiple pleadings to ascertain his claims . . .”).
Although the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's complaint, his claims are vague, incoherent, and do not sufficiently demonstrate the federal court's jurisdiction over his claims or to issue the type of relief he seeks. See Marck, 2022 WL 3443803, at *2 (plaintiff's conclusory allegations failed to sufficiently allege a cognizable claim). Specifically, and among other things, Plaintiff asks the Court to dismiss two state court proceedings, recognize his revocation of marriage to Defendant, equally divide their marital property, and relieve him of his financial burden with Defendant. [Dkt. 5 p. 5.]
First, under the Younger abstention doctrine, the Court will not intervene in the state's on-going domestic relations proceedings. Morkel, 513 Fed.Appx. at 728. Moreover, Plaintiff's challenges to Defendant's custody over his children implicate important state interests to which the state court holds continuing jurisdiction over its custody orders. See Thompson v. Romeo, 728 Fed.Appx. 796, 798 (10th Cir. 2018) (affirming a district court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's case challenging a state's custody order, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Younger abstention doctrine); Ysais v. Child. Youth & Fam. Dept., 353 Fed.Appx. 159, 161 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).
Second, the Court lacks jurisdiction to “honor” Plaintiff's decision to revoke his marriage to Defendant. See Hunt v. Lamb, 427 F.3d 725, 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)) (It is well-known that under the domestic relations exception, federal courts “lack jurisdiction over the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband, and wife, and parent and child.”).
Third, this Court simply has no jurisdiction to dismiss state court proceedings, recognize “revocations” of marriage, divide marital property, adjust custody orders, or relieve a spouse from a spousal support order, i.e., all the types of relief Plaintiff appears to seek. And, Plaintiff has failed to establish his claims properly invoke the Court's jurisdiction.
In this manner, all Younger requirements are satisfied. 401 U.S. at 43; see Morkel, 513 Fed.Appx. at 727 (“[T]he application of Younger is mandatory” when all conditions are met and absent any “extraordinary circumstances.”).
Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and this case be dismissed.
ADVISEMENT
The parties have 14 days after service of this recommendation to serve and file any written objections to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).