Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2270
May 14, 2002
MEMORANDUM
In this § 1983 action challenging a school district's alleged policy of permitting "strip" searches and pat-downs of students, defendants move to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Jurisdiction is federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants: William Penn School District, Penn Wood West Junior High School, Dr. James O'Toole, Patricia Alford, Ronald Goldstein, Rosemary Bieg, Elijah Thompson, and Reginald Brown.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and dismissal is appropriate only if it appears that plaintiff would prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief. See Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 2001).
1. Punitive Damages. The motion to dismiss punitive damages claims against William Penn School District, Penn Wood West Junior High School, and the individual defendants in their official capacities will be granted. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) ("a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"); Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 ("[P]unitive damages cannot be recovered from [§ 1983] defendants in their official capacities"); Feingold v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 512 Pa. 567, 579-81, 517 A.2d 1270, 1276-77 (1986) (punitive damages unavailable against "the Commonwealth and its agents").
2. Qualified Immunity. Denied. Accepting the facts as pleaded and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, the complaint sets forth claims that are not overcome by the qualified immunity defense.
Under § 1983, "the question is whether a reasonable public official would know that his or her specific conduct violated clearly established rights." Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 121 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1996). The rights at issue here have been clearly established for many years. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742-43, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (holding that under the Fourth Amendment, "a search of a student by a teacher or other school official" must be reasonably justified at its inception). Determination of the reasonableness of defendants' conduct must await further development of the facts. See Grant, 121 F.3d at 122 ("crucial to the resolution of any assertion of qualified immunity is a careful examination of the record . . . to establish . . . a detailed factual description of the actions of each individual defendant").
As to the state law assault and battery claim, a public official is immune unless the intentional actions are outside the scope of the official's authority, "as well as malicious, wanton, or reckless." Dubree v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 303 A.2d 530, 534 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1973). The complaint alleges that defendants Bieg, Thompson, and Brown "intentionally" violated plaintiff's rights in conducting, in October and December, 2000, unreasonable, "egregious and offensive" searches involving partial undressing of plaintiff and a pat-down. Complaint ¶¶ 70-87. Under Rule 12(b)(6), these allegations are enough to state a claim.
3. Claims against Penn Wood West Junior High School. Granted. The Public School Code of 1949, 24 P.S. § 1-101, et seq. exclusively empowers the school districts as "bodies corporate, with all necessary powers to enable them to carry out the provisions of this act," including granting the "right to sue and be sued in [their] corporate name[s]."Id. at §§ 2-211, 2-213; cf. id. at § 2-213, Notes of Decisions 1 ("board of school directors act for and represent the school district not only in the conduct and supervision of the schools but in the assertion of every legal or equitable right relating to school property.") (citingChambersburg Borough School Dist. v. Hamilton Tp. School Dist., 77 A. 414, 228 Pa. 119 (1910)).
4. § 1983 claims: Counts I and II — Elements. Denied. By alleging searches of plaintiff's person, unjustified at their inception and conducted by state actors under color of state law, Counts I and II sufficiently make out constitutional deprivation claims under § 1983. See supra note 3.
Counts I and II allege that searches of plaintiff's person in October and December, 2000 by assistant principal Bieg and security guards Thompson and Brown deprived plaintiff of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Complaint ¶¶ 70-87.
42 U.S.C. § 1983: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . . ."
5. Municipal Liability: Count III — Policies and Customs. Denied. While defendants are correct that municipalities cannot be found vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees, liability attaches for constitutional violations produced by official policies or well-settled customs. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Those violations may be thought of as the acts of the municipality itself. Moreover, municipal officials who have final policymaking authority may be liable both in their official and individual capacities for having established a policy or custom that generates an unconstitutional practice.
Count III alleges that in October and December, 2000, "strip" searches and also in November, 2000, a "pat-down" search "reflect a custom, policy and well-settled practice" of defendants William Penn School District, Penn Wood West Junior High School, superintendant O'Toole, school official Alford, principal Goldstein, and assistant principal Bieg and that the individual defendants had "final authority to establish policies" as to searches. Complaint ¶¶ 94-95. Three other students are also alleged to have been similarly searched without justification. Complaint ¶¶ 91-92.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. at 2035 n. 55; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-81, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298-99, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986).
"On the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). The complaint alleges as much: ¶¶ 94-96.
Defendants rely on Bivens v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 1990 WL 5115, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 23, 1990) for the proposition that in Pennsylvania final policymaking authority for schools rests exclusively in school boards. However, Bivens concerned a Philadelphia school and drew exclusively on the Education Supplement to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, 351 Pa. Code § 12.12-100, et seq. Moreover, "[a]uthority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority. . . ." Pembauer, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. at 1300. More facts are needed to decide whether, and how, a delegation took place here.
6. Municipal liability: Count IV — Failure to Train. Denied. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (liability under § 1983 where "failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff's] rights. . . ." and "the deficiency in training actually caused" the violation of plaintiff's rights); supra note 8.
Count IV alleges that defendants school district, school, superintendant O'Toole, and principal Goldstein, by failing properly to train or supervise defendants Bieg, Thompson, and Brown, demonstrated a deliberate indifference to the possibility of violations of students' rights — inferentially causing the three incidents involving plaintiff (as well as the searches of three other students). Complaint ¶¶ 91-105.
7. Immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 P.S. § 8541, et seq. — Count V. Denied. The Act does not immunize state employees from liability for "willful misconduct." 42 P.S. § 8550; see Delate v. Kolle, 667 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995) ("for the purposes of [§ 8550], `willful misconduct' has the same meaning as the term `intentional tort'"). Moreover, actions for assault and battery are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, 42 P.S. § 5524(1), not the six-month period found in § 5522.
Count V alleges that the searches in October and December, 2000 constituted common law assault and battery.
The six-month period applies to an "action against any officer of any government unit for anything done in the execution of his office, except an action subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter." 42 P.S. § 5522(b)(1) (emphasis added).
8. Retaliation Claim: Count VI. Granted in part and denied in part. Count VI states retaliation claims under § 1983 against the individual defendants acting in their individual capacities; and plaintiff has standing to assert these claims. See Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997) (retaliation claim requires showing of: (1) causal connection between; (2) protected activity; and (3) retaliation); Dangler v. Yorktown Central Schools, 771 F. Supp. 625, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (student had standing to assert First Amendment retaliation claim against school district under § 1983 where school allegedly retaliated against student for his father's protected speech);supra note 8.
Count VI alleges that certain defendants retaliated against plaintiff and his guardians because minor plaintiff's aunt Rosalind Evans challenged (on his behalf) the legality of the searches. Another aunt Cornelia Evans received a letter stating that he would be "disenrolled" if proof of residency in the district were not received within five days. Complaint ¶¶ 64, 111-14. He is alleged to have resided at that time with his paternal aunt Cornelia Evans in Darby on weekdays and with his paternal aunt Rosalind Evans in Philadelphia on weekends. Complaint ¶ 112.
However, municipal liability under § 1983, including liability for the actions of individuals sued in their official capacities, is appropriate only if constitutional violations are caused by an official policy or well-settled custom of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38. Given the lack of such allegations, the First Amendment claims in count VI against William Penn School District, Penn Wood West Junior High School, and, in their official capacities, Dr. James F. O'Toole, Patricia Alford, Ronald Goldstein, and Rosemary Bieg will be dismissed.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. at 2035 n. 55; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. at 479-81, 106 S.Ct. at 1298-99.
An order accompanies this memorandum.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 14th day of May, 2002, defendants' motion to dismiss is ruled on as follows:
1. Punitive damages (all counts) — granted.
2. Qualified immunity (all counts) — denied.
3. Claims against Penn Wood West Junior High School (counts III, IV, and VI) — granted.
4. § 1983 claims: elements (counts I and II) — denied.
5. Municipal liability: policies and customs (count III) — denied.
6. Municipal liability: failure to train (count IV) — denied.
7. Immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 P.S. § 8541, et seq. (Count V) — denied.
8. Retaliation claim (count VI) — granted in part and denied in part. Count VI is dismissed as against defendants William Penn School District, Penn Wood West Junior High School and, in their official capacities, Dr. James F. O'Toole, Patricia Alford, Ronald Goldstein, and Rosemary Bieg.