Opinion
23A-PL-1984
07-12-2024
Darryl Evans, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT John F. Schrader Ball Eggleston, PC Lafayette, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1905-PL-56 The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Judge
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT John F. Schrader Ball Eggleston, PC Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jodi Kathryn Stein Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Weissmann, Judge
[¶1] While executing a search warrant at the home of Darryl Evans, police found nearly four pounds of raw marijuana, dozens of THC cartridges, and $67,507 in cash. The State seized the money and initiated a civil forfeiture action against it. In its complaint, the State alleged that Evans was dealing in marijuana and that the money was furnished for, used to facilitate, or traceable as proceeds of that crime. The trial court ruled in the State's favor, and Evans appeals.
[¶2] Evans first argues that the search of his home was unconstitutional. He then claims the State presented insufficient evidence to prove he was dealing in marijuana or that the seized money was connected to that crime. We conclude Evans is collaterally estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the search, and we find the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Evans was dealing in marijuana and that the money was used to facilitate that crime. We therefore affirm.
Facts
[¶3] Two police officers were dispatched to Evans's home in response to a reported child custody dispute. Evans was not at home when the officers arrived. But the officers were able to confirm the welfare of everyone involved in the dispute by speaking to Evans's girlfriend through the doorway of the home and by calling Evans on his cellphone. During these conversations, the officers noted a heavy odor of raw and burnt marijuana emanating from Evans's home.
[¶4] After obtaining a search warrant, the officers searched Evans's home and found the following:
• 1,739 grams (3.8 pounds) of raw marijuana, which had a street value of about $12,400.
• 124 THC vape cartridges that consisted of 91.74% marijuana and had a street value of about $3,100.
• A vacuum sealer, unused vacuum packs, vacuum packs with marijuana residue, small plastic baggies, and a digital scale.
• Multiple firearms, including a Taurus 9 mm, a Glock 27, a Glock 45, a pump-action shotgun, a rifle with a drum magazine, an AK-47, and an AR-15.
• $67,507 in United States currency.
[¶5] The THC cartridges were found inside a safe in the master bedroom, and the raw marijuana was found in large, vacuum-packed bundles in various locations around the home. One of these bundles was recovered from a dresser drawer in the master bedroom along with some of the baggies and the digital scale. Additional bundles were recovered from the master bedroom closet. And even more were found inside a backpack in a spare bedroom. The backpack also contained a plastic cup with marijuana residue in it.
[¶6] Of the money recovered during the search, $39,200 was found in a bedroom shared by Evans's children; $14,800 was found in the safe with the THC cartridges; a total of $2,234 was found in or near the dresser drawer with the marijuana bundle, baggies, and digital scale; and $5,508 was found scattered among other locations in the home. The remaining $5,765 was recovered from Evans's person when he arrived home during the search.
[¶7] The State seized all $67,507 and initiated a civil forfeiture action against it. The State also initiated criminal proceedings against Evans. Among other crimes, the State charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF), a Level 4 felony; and one count each of dealing in marijuana, possession of marijuana, and maintaining a common nuisance, all as Level 6 felonies. Additionally, the State alleged Evans was a habitual offender.
[¶8] In his criminal case, Evans moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the search of his home, arguing that the search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, Evans claimed the warrant authorizing the search was not supported by probable cause and that the police officers who conducted the search did not have a good faith belief in the warrant's validity. The trial court disagreed with Evans on both issues and denied his motion.
[¶9] The criminal case eventually proceeded to a bifurcated jury trial, during which the State offered evidence of the drugs, guns, and money obtained during the search of Evans's home. Evans repeatedly objected to the admission of this evidence, renewing the arguments made in support of his pretrial motion to suppress. His objections, however, were unsuccessful.
[¶10] In the end, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the dealing in marijuana charge, but it found Evans guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF, possession of marijuana, and maintaining a common nuisance. The jury also determined that Evans was a habitual offender, after which the trial court entered judgments of conviction. The court later sentenced Evans to a total of 15 years in the Indiana Department of Correction, with 8 years executed, 3 years in community corrections, and 4 years suspended to probation.
In the same prosecution, Evans was charged with and convicted of two counts of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. His sentences for these convictions were included in the 15-year total.
[¶11] In a prior appeal to this Court, Evans challenged his convictions for possession of a firearm by a SVF and maintaining a common nuisance as well as his 15-year sentence. Evans, however, did not argue on appeal that the search of his home was unconstitutional or that the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained during the search. Another panel of this Court ultimately affirmed Evans's convictions and sentence. Evans v. State, No. 21A-CR-1355 (Ind.Ct.App. Mar. 28, 2022) (mem.), trans. denied.
[¶12] Following Evans's criminal appeal, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing in the civil forfeiture action. Evans represented himself during the proceeding, having asked his counsel to withdraw ten days earlier. On the State's motion, the court took judicial notice of certain portions of the evidentiary record in Evans's criminal appeal. These generally consisted of photographs of and police testimony about the drugs, money, and other items found during the search of Evans's home. The State also presented new testimony by a police officer qualified as "an expert in the field of drug interdiction and drug enforcement." Tr. Vol. II, p. 17. The expert opined that Evans was dealing in marijuana based on "[t]he quantities of drugs, the packaging materials[,] and the large amount of cash" police found in Evans's home. Id. at 25.
[¶13] The trial court ultimately found that Evans was dealing in marijuana and that the money was furnished for, used to facilitate, or traceable as proceeds of that crime. The court therefore entered a forfeiture order in favor of the State.
Discussion and Decision
[¶14] In this civil appeal, Evans argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove the money seized from his home was subject to forfeiture. But first, he claims much of that evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained through an unconstitutional search of his home. The State contends that Evans is collaterally estopped from challenging the constitutionality of the search because the issue was fully litigated during his criminal trial. We agree that collateral estoppel applies and ultimately find sufficient evidence to support the trial court's forfeiture order.
I. Evans Is Collaterally Estopped from Challenging the Constitutionality of the Search
[¶15] Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, "operates to bar a subsequent re-litigation of the same fact or issue where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit and the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit." Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (Ind. 1993). Under such circumstances, "the first adjudication will be held conclusive even if the second is on a different claim." Id.
[¶16] For collateral estoppel to apply: (1) there must be "a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction"; (2) the "issue that was necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceeding [must be] the same issue presented in the subsequent lawsuit"; and (3) "the party to be estopped [must have been] a party or the privity of a party in the prior action." Nat'l Wine &Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst &Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012). Courts must also consider "whether the party against whom the judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel." Id. (quoting Small v. Centocor, Inc., 731 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000)).
[¶17] Evans does not dispute that his criminal case satisfies collateral estoppel's three primary requirements for barring his claim in the forfeiture case that the search of his home was unconstitutional. He also does not assert that he lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the criminal case. He argues only that it would be unfair to allow collateral estoppel to bar his constitutional claim under the circumstances of the forfeiture case. According to Evans, those circumstances are his criminal trial jury's inability to reach a verdict on the dealing in marijuana charge and the fact that he was not represented by counsel at the forfeiture hearing.
[¶18] Evans's hung jury argument is not compelling. Forfeiture actions are "civil in nature," and the State's burden of proof is lower than in a criminal case. Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ind. 1995); see Ind. Code § 34-24-1-4(a) (requiring the State to prove preponderance of the evidence that seized property is subject to forfeiture). Thus, "property can be seized and forfeited 'regardless of whether the property owner is proven guilty of a crime-or even charged with a crime.'" Smith v. State, 232 N.E.3d 109, 113 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Serrano v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1139, 1140 (Ind. 2011)).
[¶19] As for Evans's lack of counsel at the forfeiture hearing, it was Evans who instructed his counsel to withdraw ten days before the forfeiture hearing. And though Evans asked for a continuance to obtain new counsel at the outset of the hearing, he does not argue on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying that request. We also observe that Evans was represented by counsel in his criminal case when the constitutionality of the home's search was adjudicated. Thus, we fail to see how Evans proceeding pro se at the forfeiture hearing makes the application of collateral estoppel unfair.
[¶20] Evans is collaterally estopped from challenging the constitutionality of his home's search.
II. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Forfeiture Order
[¶21] "Civil forfeiture is a legal fiction that authorizes 'action against inanimate objects for participation in alleged criminal activity.'" Smith v. State, 232 N.E.3d 109, 113 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. 2022)). "In the context of illegal drug activity, forfeiture actions 'are designed to be a relatively efficient means to remove, from its owner, property used to further illegal trafficking in drugs.'" Id. (quoting Katner v. State, 655 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ind. 1995)). "Yet, despite that laudable design, civil forfeitures 'are not favored' due to their 'significant criminal and punitive characteristics.'" Id. (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1005 (Ind. 2014)). We are therefore charged to "apply the law as written and enforce civil forfeitures 'only when within the bounds of both the letter and spirit of the law.'" Id. at 114 (quoting Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1005).
[¶22] In a contested forfeiture action, the State must establish a "nexus" between the property sought to be forfeited and the subject criminal activity. Katner, 655 N.E.2d at 349. This requirement is a "means to guarantee" that the State is forfeiting "actual instruments" of a criminal enterprise contemplated by Indiana's forfeiture statutes. Id. But the exact nexus to be shown depends on the type of property for which forfeiture is sought. See Ind. Code § 34-24-1-1.
[¶23] The State proceeded under Indiana Code § 34-24-1-1(a)(2), which in pertinent part, permits the forfeiture of money upon a showing that it was:
(A) furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for an act that is in violation of a criminal statute;
(B) used to facilitate any violation of a criminal statute; or
(C) traceable as proceeds of the violation of a criminal statute.
In its complaint, the State generally alleged that the money was furnished for, used to facilitate, or traceable as proceeds to Evans's dealing in marijuana. Evans challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he violated Indiana's dealing in marijuana statute. He also complains that the State failed to show the requisite nexus between the money and that crime.
A. Standard of Review
[¶24] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a civil forfeiture order, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Brown v. Eaton, 164 N.E.3d 153, 161 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses, and we will reverse only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. When there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling, it will not be disturbed. Gonzalez v. State, 74 N.E.3d 1228, 1230 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017).
B. Dealing in Marijuana
[¶25] To prove Evans was dealing in marijuana, the State had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he had "intent to deliver" the marijuana found in his home. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10(a)(2)(C) (cleaned up). Evans claims the State failed to meet this burden. We disagree.
[¶26] Because intent is a mental state, "the trier of fact generally must resort to the reasonable inferences arising from the surrounding circumstances" to determine whether a possessor of drugs had intent to deliver them. Ladd v. State, 710 N.E.2d 188, 191 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). Those circumstances may include the person's "possession of a large quantity of drugs, large amounts of currency, scales, plastic bags, and other paraphernalia," among other things. Id.
[¶27] Here, the evidence showed that Evans possessed nearly four pounds of raw marijuana, dozens of THC cartridges, $67,507 in cash, a vacuum sealer, vacuum packs, plastic baggies, and a digital scale. The State also presented the testimony of a drug trafficking expert, who reviewed this physical evidence and concluded that Evans was dealing in marijuana.
[¶28] The State showed by a preponderance of the evidence that Evans had "intent to deliver" the marijuana found in his home. Thus, it sufficiently proved that he was dealing in the drug under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-10(a)(2)(C).
C. Requisite Nexus
[¶29] To prove the requisite nexus between Evans's dealing and the money seized from his home, the State had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was furnished for, used to facilitate, or traceable as proceeds of the crime. Ind. Code § 34-24-1-1(a)(2). Evans claims the State presented insufficient evidence to prove the money was "traceable as proceeds" of his dealing. Ind. Code § 34-24-1-1(a)(2)(C). But he makes no argument concerning the State's other allegations-most notably, that the money was "used to facilitate" the crime. Ind. Code § 34-24-1-1(a)(2)(B).
[¶30] Our Supreme Court has indicated that money received in exchange for drugs, "whatever its provenance," is an "instrumentality of a criminal drug deal" and thus "used to facilitate" crime. State v. $2,435 in U.S. Currency, 220 N.E.3d 542, 557 (Ind. 2023). Here, the evidence gives rise to a reasonable inference that Evans received the seized money in exchange for drugs.
[¶31] The State's drug trafficking expert testified that, when analyzing whether a person is dealing the drugs they possess, one of the things he looks for is "large amounts of money from the sales, the profit from the sales." Tr. Vol. II, p. 22. In the expert's experience, drug dealers do not keep their money in a bank because "they don't want to pay [income] taxes on it," which might "draw attention" to themselves. Id. at 23. But "[t]hey do conceal it in the child's room, in a child's car seat, and things like that because . . . they think police are less likely to search those areas and find that." Id. at 22. The expert also noted that "people don't generally . . . hide legitimate money throughout their house." Id. Thus, the expert agreed that "the large quantities of money" found in Evans's home, "regardless of where it was stored," was "consistent with dealing." Id. at 23.
[¶32] The State showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the seized money was received in exchange for drugs. Therefore, it sufficiently proved the money was used to facilitate Evans's dealing under Indiana Code § 34-24-1-1(a)(2)(B).
[¶33] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.