Opinion
C.A. No. 00C-02-24 RRC.
Submitted: May 19, 2000.
Decided: May 26, 2000.
Robert F. Phillips, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 820 North French Street, 6th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware 19801.
William John Evans, S.B.I. No. 00249460, Delaware Correctional Center, P.O. Box 500 Smyrna, Delaware 19977.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. GRANTED.
Dear Mr. Phillips and Mr. Evans:
William John Evans (Plaintiff) filed a pro se complaint on February 2, 2000 against Nancy J. Perillo, Esquire (Defendant) alleging legal malpractice. On April 26, 2000, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
I. Summary of Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiff is a sentenced inmate incarcerated with the Delaware Department of Correction after pleading guilty on April 1, 1998 to the felonies of Arson in the First Degree, Reckless Endangering in the First Degree and Insurance Fraud. As part of the plea bargain agreed to by Plaintiff the State of Delaware entered a nolle prosequi on a charge of Arson Second Degree and an another charge of Insurance Fraud. Although the plea agreement was reached after the trial court had ruled against Plaintiff on pre-trial motions and the commencement of trial, the Court specifically asked Plaintiff if he understood what his plea of guilty meant and after receiving affirmative responses, the trial Court found that the guilty pleas were entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Plaintiff had been represented by Defendant, an Assistant Public Defender employed by the State of Delaware.
Plaintiff has filed a complaint alleging that Defendant committed legal malpractice violating his constitutional rights by not obtaining and providing to Plaintiff requested discovery materials and acting with "deliberate indifference towards ministerial duties." Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that certain American Bar Association standards for defense attorneys were violated. Plaintiffs claims are listed in toto below.
Plaintiff's Complaint at ¶¶ 11-15.
A.) 4-1.3 Delays punctuality; And workload counsel did not act with diligence, misrepresented the facts of the case and endangered clients interest.
B.) 4-3.8 Duty to keep client informed counsel did not promptly reply with reasonable request for information. In fact [Defendant] refused to obtain material [Plaintiff] requested and State offered to make available. I.E. Still photo's and video of scene.
C.) 4-4.1 Duty to investigate; Counsel did not conduct prompt investigation of circumstances, explore all avenues leading to facts relevant, Investigation should include efforts to secure information which [Defendant] did not do.
D.) Compliance with discovery procedure. [Defendant] refused to obtain all discovery. [Defendant] failed to review facts in discovery.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Plaintiff claims that these acts violated his constitutional rights and are legal malpractice. In his complaint, Plaintiff asks this Court to award him $4,000,000 for "extreme emotional distress" and "psychological abuse," and $2,000,000 against Defendant for "conspiring with the State to convict [Plaintiff]."
Id. at ¶¶ 24-26.
II. Contentions of The Parties
Defendant has filed this Motion to Dismiss the Complaint alleging that although Plaintiff has made "several vague, no-specific allegations that [Defendant] committed legal malpractice . . . Plaintiff conveniently ignores the fact that he pled guilty to the three felonies for which he was sentenced." Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's pleas of guilty constituted a waiver of all errors or defects occurring before the pleas and that he may not raise claims of constitutional violations. Defendant argues that "every claim relating to an alleged violation of Plaintiff's rights which occurred prior to his guilty pleas is entirely without merit and should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted." Defendant further claims that she is protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity and that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts supporting a theory of conspiracy. Defendant asks this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.Plaintiff contends that this is a civil case in "GROSS NEGLIGENCE" and that Defendant is arguing the merits of Plaintiffs Super. Ct. Civ. R. 61 motion for postconviction relief. With respect to Defendant's claim of immunity, Plaintiff states that "[i]t may be true that defendant works for the State and is paid out of State funds but her duties and office's primary interest is that of the client . . . [t]o act independently of the Government and to oppose it in adversary litigation was an indispensable element of defendant's responsibility." Plaintiff contends that just cause has been to show not to dismiss his complaint.
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 6.
Also pending as of this date is Plaintiff's Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 Motion For Postconviction Relief filed on September 23, 1999.
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 8.
III. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, made pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), will not be granted if the plaintiff may recover under any conceivable set of circumstances susceptible to proof under the complaint. No 12(b)(6) motion can be granted unless it appears to a certainty that, under no set of facts which could be proved to support a claim, the plaintiff would be entitled to relief, although vagueness and lack of detail in the claim itself are not sufficient grounds to dismiss.
Finkbiner v. Mullins, Del. Super., 532 A.2d 609, 617 (1987).
Towe v. Justis Bros., Inc., Del. Super., 290 A.2d 657 (1972).
IV. Discussion
This Court finds that Plaintiff cannot recover under any conceivable set of circumstances alleged in the complaint. First, Plaintiff is not specific in alleging the materials and discovery that he was not provided, and Plaintiff has done nothing more than allege violations of the American Bar Association standards with no legal support. Second, Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges for which he is now incarcerated. "Under well-settled Delaware law . . . a properly entered plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all errors or defects occurring before the plea[.]" Moreover, "a guilty plea breaks the chain of events in the criminal proceedings and constitutes a waiver of possible defenses." Plaintiff has waived any claim to a violation of his constitutional rights. Third, Defendant's actions are protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Defendant's conduct did not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the evidence shows her conduct was in good faith, without gross or wanton negligence, and with the belief that public interest would best be served by her actions. Fourth, Plaintiff has failed to allege any specific facts supporting a conspiracy claim and this Court finds this contention wholly without merit.V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint is GRANTED. The hearing that had been scheduled for June 6, 2000 on the State's Motion to Dismiss is canceled.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
RICHARD R. COOCH, JUDGE.