Opinion
23-2954
05-16-2024
ANDRE T. EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW M. MATSON and ROBERT RASMUSSEN, Defendants-Appellees.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
Submitted May 10, 2024 [*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 20-C-476 Lynn Adelman, Judge.
Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
ORDER
Andre Evans filed this lawsuit alleging that police officers Andrew Matson and Robert Rasmussen violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law when they entered his apartment without a warrant, used a Taser on him, and arrested him on charges that were later dismissed. He appeals the entry of summary judgment for the officers on his claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution. Because Evans does not contest the court's decision that the officers had qualified immunity for the warrantless entry and arrest, and because he lacked sufficient evidence for his malicious prosecution claim to withstand the summary judgment motion, we affirm.
We view the facts in the light most favorable to Evans, the nonmoving party, and draw reasonable inferences in his favor. Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2013). In April 2014, Officers Matson and Rasmussen of the Racine, Wisconsin, Police Department responded to a burglary-in-progress call. They heard a description of the suspect as an African American male, about 5'8", wearing a navy blue jacket. The officers drove down the street where the suspect was last seen and saw someone who seemed to match the description-Evans. They followed him to an apartment building and entered it together. The parties dispute what happened next.
Matson attests that he saw Evans, who looked "startled," run down the hallway, enter an apartment, and try to close the door, dropping a dark object in the process. Matson then pushed the door open and entered the apartment. According to Matson, Evans turned to face him in a "boxer's stance," and Matson ordered Evans to drop to the ground. But instead, per Matson, Evans moved toward the officer. Matson then fired his Taser at Evans and handcuffed him; Matson testifies that he used his Taser in self-defense and to obtain compliance. Rasmussen adds that he heard Matson yelling from inside the apartment and then saw that Matson had stunned Evans with the Taser.
Evans, on the other hand, swears that he did not know he was being followed until he was entering the apartment and felt someone push on the door as he tried to close it. He turned around to see Matson. According to Evans, he and Matson began "fighting for the door," and when Evans then let go of the door, Matson entered the apartment. Evans attests that he ran inside, put his hands in the air, and did nothing else before Matson deployed the Taser and arrested him. There is no dispute that Matson found a loaded gun on the floor near the doorway.
Evans was detained for one week before he posted cash bond. He was a suspect in the burglary but was never charged with it. He was, however, charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, WIS. STAT. § 941.29, and resisting or obstructing a police officer, WIS. STAT. § 946.41(1). Evans successfully moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the warrantless entry into the apartment, and in March 2016, the prosecution dismissed the state charges.
In March 2020, Evans, who was incarcerated at the time, sued Matson and Rasmussen, among other defendants. After screening the complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the district court allowed him to proceed on claims that the officers unlawfully entered his apartment and seized him, that Matson used excessive force, and that both officers maliciously prosecuted him. The court dismissed claims against all other defendants.
After discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that none of their actions was unconstitutional and that Evans's malicious prosecution claim-which they said was exclusively a matter of state law-failed because Evans lacked evidence that the officers acted maliciously or that they were responsible for initiating charges. Alternatively, they argued, they were entitled to qualified immunity on each claim.
The court partially granted the motion for summary judgment. As to the false arrest claim, the court determined that the officers had probable cause, and that, even if they did not, they were entitled to qualified immunity. On the malicious prosecution claim, the court agreed with the defendants that there was no such claim under the federal Constitution and concluded, as a matter of state law, that Evans had insufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The court denied the motion for summary judgment on the claim of excessive force, which the parties later settled. Evans appeals, and we review the summary judgment decision de novo. Abbott, 705 F.3d at 713.
Evans makes virtually no arguments in his opening brief on appeal, and although his reply brief substantially develops several arguments, that is too late to avert waiver. United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 787 n.5 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The reply brief is not the appropriate vehicle for presenting new arguments or legal theories to the court." (quoting United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 341 (7th Cir. 1996))).
Evans does assert in the opening brief that the state judge's suppression ruling is preclusive on the issue of probable cause, but this is incorrect because, to have preclusive effect under Wisconsin law-which governs here, see First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall, 738 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2013)-the earlier litigation must have been against the same party or a party whose legal interests align with those of the current defendants. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1984); Cannon v. Armstrong Containers Inc., 92 F.4th 688, 706 (7th Cir. 2024). The officers were not party to the state criminal case. Nor do their interests align with any party in that case-they do not have any substantive legal relationship to those parties, the claims are different, and no statute here allows preclusion. See Cannon, 92 F.4th at 708. Thus, the officers did not have "sufficient opportunity to be heard" in state court, and preclusion would not be "fundamentally fair." Id. at 706.
The one other argument we discern in Evans's briefs is that the district court was wrong to interpret the malicious prosecution claim as arising exclusively under state law. Evans correctly asserts that such a claim exists under the federal Constitution and can be raised via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that its "precedents recognize" what it called "a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution." Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42, 44 (2022); see Mitchell v. Doherty, 37 F.4th 1277, 1284 n.3 (7th Cir. 2022). The Court referred to the claim as "unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process." Thompson, 596 U.S. at 42 (citing, e.g., Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 363-364, 367-368 (2017)). Provided that the conduct results in the plaintiff's "seizure," the claim arises if a criminal prosecution (1) was instituted without probable cause; (2) for a "malicious" motive-a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice; and (3) "ended without a conviction." Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44, 49. Evans satisfies the seizure requirement because he spent about a week in pretrial detention, see Manuel, 580 U.S. at 365-67, and he obtained a favorable termination because the State dropped all charges.
Still, Evans's federal malicious prosecution claim would fail. First, as police officers, Matson and Rasmussen did not institute the criminal prosecution against Evans. See Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 n.5 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)); Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Illinois law). Police officers' influence generally ends where a prosecutor's begins. See Colbert, 851 F.3d at 655; Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, the Racine County District Attorney brought the charges and pursued a conviction (unsuccessfully), and Evans never alleged that he was charged without probable cause. See Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49; Manuel, 580 U.S. at 368 (explaining that probable cause did not develop between baseless arrest and initiation of prosecution). Nor did he allege, or provide evidence, that Matson and Rasmussen did anything after the arrest that made them responsible in the prosecution, such as misleading the prosecutors. See Reed, 77 F.3d at 1053-54; Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enf't Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2001); Colbert, 851 F.3d at 655. And second, as the district court also noted, Evans has not provided any evidence that the officers acted with malice; at most, he articulates why, in hindsight, the officers should not have suspected him of the robbery. Malice requires something more, such as a lack of good faith, a failure to adequately investigate, or personal animosity. See Welton v. Anderson, 770 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2014); Holland v. City of Chicago, 643 F.3d 248, 255 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying Illinois law).
As to the other constitutional claims, even if Evans had raised his arguments in the opening brief, his appeal could not succeed. In addition to ruling on the merits, the district court determined that the officers had qualified immunity for their actions surrounding the arrest. This was an independent ground for granting the summary-judgment motion with respect to those claims. And because he does not challenge this ruling on appeal, Evans forfeits any arguments he might have that the ruling was wrong. Webster v. CDI Indiana, LLC, 917 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2019); Klein v. O'Brien, 884 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2018).
AFFIRMED
[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).