Opinion
1:23-CV-722-DII
10-02-2024
KENNETH EVANS, Plaintiff, v. DOES 1-877, Defendants.
HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MARK LANE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the court is Plaintiff's Reurged Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt 61). Doe Defendants did not respond to the Motion. After reviewing the pleadings, the relevant case law, as well as the entire case file, the undersigned recommends the Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
United States District Judge Robert Pitman referred the Motion to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation as to the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 1 of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Text order, July 1, 2024.
Doe Defendants are listed in Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's Motion. Dkt. 61-2.
I. Background
The facts alleged in the Complaint are straightforward: Plaintiff is seeking relief against Defendants for copyright infringement through their promotion, advertising, marketing, distribution, offering for sale, and sale of products using Plaintiff's copyrighted photographs (Infringing Media) via online stores (the Infringing Webstores) on various e-commerce platforms, such as Alibaba, AliExpress, Amazon, eBay, Joybuy, Shopify, Walmart, and Wish (the Marketplaces). Dkt. 61 at 2. Plaintiff alleges Defendants are selling knockoffs of his products. Dkt. 1 ¶20.
Plaintiff is engaged in the business of designing, creating, distributing, and retailing Texas Fence Fixer-branded hand tools to consumers throughout the world (Plaintiff's “Product”). Plaintiff is the owner of all right, title, and interest in and to U.S. Copyright Registration Nos. VA2340898 & Pau4173475 (the “Registrations”). Id. at 3. Plaintiff discovered that Defendants were using the Media in connection with the sale of knockoff products on the Infringing Webstores, and Plaintiff confirmed that Defendants were offering knockoff products for sale to U.S. and Texas residents. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are infringing and their activities are depriving Plaintiff of the ability to control use and licensing of his Media, and are preventing Plaintiff from enjoying the exclusive rights conferred by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Id.
Plaintiff owns valid copyrights. Id. at 7. Defendants own the Infringing Webstores, which are hosted by the online Marketplaces, and without permission displayed Media identical to Plaintiff's. Id. at 8. Plaintiff brings a single claim: direct copyright infringement under the Copyright Act. Id. at 6-7.
II. STANDARD FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) governs the entry of a default judgment by a court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). In the Fifth Circuit, three steps are required when obtaining a default judgment: (1) default by the defendant, FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a); (2) entry of default by the Clerk's Office, FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a); and (3) entry of a default judgment by the district court, FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). Additionally, in order to obtain a default judgment, the movant must establish that the defendant is neither a minor nor an incompetent person, and that the defendant is not in military service. 50 U.S.C. § 3931; Bank of New York Mellon Tr. Co., N.A. v. Hancock, 5:19-CV-270-H-BQ, 2020 WL 2989023, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 4, 2020). When a defendant has defaulted, the factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true, except regarding damages. See Jackson v. FIE Corp., 302 F.3d 515, 525 n.29 (5th Cir. 2002).
“Default judgments are a drastic remedy” and thus are “resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, “[a] party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right, even where the defendant is technically in default.” Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). Rather, “[t]here must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (default is not treated as an absolute confession by defendant of liability and of plaintiff's right to recover). A court must accept pleaded facts as true, but must also determine whether those facts state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's denial of entry of default judgment because, even if true, plaintiff's allegations would not support imposing liability against defendants).
Courts use a three-part test to determine when to enter a default judgment. The court first considers whether the entry of default judgment is procedurally warranted. United States v. Rod Riordan Inc., No. MO:17-CV-071-DC, 2018 WL 2392559, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 25, 2018); Nasufi v. King Cable Inc., No. 3:15-CV-3273-B, 2017 WL 6497762, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2017) (citing Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998)). The Fifth Circuit has set forth six factors for a court to consider in determining whether a default judgment is procedurally proper: “(1) whether material issues of fact are at issue; (2) whether there has been substantial prejudice; (3) whether grounds for default are clearly established; (4) whether default was caused by good faith mistake or excusable neglect; (5) harshness of default judgment; and (6) whether the court would feel obligated to set aside a default on the defendant's motion.” United States v. Padron, 7:17-CV-00009, 2017 WL 2060308, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 12, 2017); see Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).
Next, courts assess the substantive merits of the plaintiff's claims and determine whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mexican Rest., Inc., 126 F.Supp.3d 809, 814 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (citing Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206). In doing so, courts assume that, due to its default, the defendant admits all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff's complaint. See Rod Riordan Inc., 2018 WL 2392559, at *3.
Finally, the court determines what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive. Id. While damages are normally not to be awarded without a hearing or a demonstration by detailed affidavits establishing the necessary facts, if the amount of damages can be determined with mathematical calculation by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents, a hearing is unnecessary. Id. (citing United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979); James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993)).
III. Analysis
In considering any motion for default judgment, a court must examine jurisdiction, liability, and damages. Rabin v. McClain, 881 F.Supp.2d 758, 763 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (X. Rodriguez, J.).
A. Jurisdiction
When a party seeks entry of a default judgment under Rule 55, “the district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties.” Sys. Pipe & Supply v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Because this case involves a claim under the Copyright Act, it invokes the court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction and its jurisdiction over copyright actions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338.
A federal court may assert personal jurisdiction if (1) the state's long-arm statute applies, and (2) due process is satisfied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). In Texas, the long-arm statute authorizes exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident to the full extent compatible with federal due process. Id. Personal jurisdiction is proper if two requirements are met:
First, the nonresident defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing minimum contacts with that forum state. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA de CV, 92 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).
To establish “minimum contacts,” the defendant must have contacts giving rise to either specific or general jurisdiction. Id. at 324. To determine “fairness,” courts consider:
(1) the burden on the nonresident defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in securing relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution to controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990). Specific jurisdiction exists when (1) a nonresident defendant has purposefully directed its activities at the forum state, and (2) the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. Diece-Lisa Indus. v. Disney Enters., 943 F.3d 239, 250 (5th Cir. 2019).
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff alleged facts and submitted evidence sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants, without authorization or license from Plaintiff, knowingly and willfully advertised, offered for sale, and sold, and continue to willfully advertise, offer for sale, and sell knockoff products, through, inter alia, the Internet, using the Infringing Images,” Dkt. 1 ¶ 21; and Defendants “offer[] shipping within, or importation into, the United States, including Texas, and . . . each Defendant has used the Infringing Images to sell or offer for sale the knockoff products within the United States, including to consumers in Texas. Id. ¶23. Plaintiff submits hundreds-nearly 4,000 pages-of screen captures of Defendants' online stores displaying the Media. Dkts. 1-4-1-15.
Accepting these well-pleaded facts as true, the undersigned finds that this case arises out of Defendants' contacts with Texas, and that Defendants purposefully directed their activities to and availed themselves of this forum. E.g., Norrell v. Doe, No. 1:23-cv-00238-RP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158169, at *7 (W.D. Tex. 2023) (citing case law), R. & R. adopted, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187807, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2023). The undersigned also finds that exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants would not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Felch, 92 F.3d at 323. The Court therefore has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
B. Liability
The Court next considers whether a default judgment is procedurally warranted and whether the Complaint sufficiently sets forth facts showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief. United States v. 1998 Freightliner Vin #:1FUYCZYB3WP886986 , 548 F.Supp.2d 381, 384 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
1. Procedural Requirements
Defendants have through one or more websites pursued sales from Texas residents by offering shipping to Texas residents. Dkt. 61 at 4. Defendants are online merchants, and thus they are not minors, incompetent persons, or in military service. The Clerk of Court has entered default against Defendant. Dkt. 26.
Default judgment is procedurally warranted. First, Defendants failed to file a proper answer or responsive pleading. Second, Defendants' failure to respond or appear threatens to cause substantial prejudice because it threatens to bring the adversarial process to a halt, effectively prejudicing Plaintiff's interests. Third, the grounds for default judgment are clearly established because Defendants have failed to answer or defend. Fourth, nothing suggests that default was caused by a good-faith mistake or excusable neglect. Defendants have simply chosen not to participate in this litigation. Fifth, default judgment would not be harsh in this situation because the judgment would be for no more than what Defendants owe under the law. Sixth, given the circumstances, this court has no reason to set aside any default judgment it may enter. In sum, default judgment is procedurally proper.
2. Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff's claims are meritorious, and there is sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment. To state a claim for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), Plaintiff must establish: (1) the subject work is original and that Plaintiff is the owner or author of the work; (2) that she complied with all formalities required to secure a copyright under Title 17; (3) that she is the proprietor of the copyright of the photo involved; (4) that the work was displayed publicly; and (5) that Defendant had not received permission from Plaintiff to use the photo. Fermata Int'l Melodies v Champions Golf Club, 712 F.Supp. 1257, 1259 (S.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1567 (5th Cir. 1990).
As described in the Complaint (Dkt. 1) Defendants-without permission or authorization-displayed photos on their websites for which Plaintiff owns the rights and licenses for various uses, including online publication. Dkt. 1 ¶4. Plaintiff attached a copy of his copyright, Dkt. 1-16, supporting the first, second, and third elements of a § 501(a) claim. Defendants displayed the photos publicly on their websites. Dkt. 61 at 9-10; see Dkts. 1-4-1-15. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendants were not authorized to use the Media. Dkt. 1 ¶21. Accordingly, the merits of the claim provide a basis for entry of default judgment.
Plaintiff also shows that infringement is willful, which the Fifth Circuit has held encompasses knowing and reckless violations. Graper v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 756 F.3d 388, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2014). A court may infer willfulness from evidence that notice of a valid copyright was provided to the defendant before the infringement. WB Music Corp. v. Big Daddy's Entm't, No. EP-05-CA-267-PRM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32216, 2005 WL 2662553, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2005). Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants have been using the Infringing Photographs on the Infringing Webstores without Plaintiff's authorization, which demonstrates that the Defaulting Defendants had knowledge that their activities infringed on Plaintiff's rights, or at least shows that the Defaulting Defendants were willfully blind, or acted with reckless disregard to Plaintiff's rights.” Dkt. 61 at 13. Because Defendants have not appeared, they have not contested any facts. By their default, Defendants have admitted to willfully infringing. Taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, he has pleaded sufficient facts to show that Defendants are liable for willful infringement of his copyrights.
C. Relief
Plaintiff seeks relief for direct copyright infringement. Id. at 8. Plaintiff seeks relief under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) in the form of statutory damages; injunctive relief; attorneys fees and costs; and an order that “those in privity with Defendants and those with notice of the injunction . . . shall” take certain measures. Id. at 8-9. Generally, in the default-judgment context, unliquidated damages are not awarded without an evidentiary hearing. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2)(B); James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993). That said, the Rules do not require an evidentiary hearing, and the court has broad discretion to forgo an evidentiary hearing where there is sufficient evidence to render a decision without one. See James, 6 F.3d at 310; United Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (holding that in the default judgment context, damages may “be entered without a hearing” if “the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation”).
1. Injunctive relief
The District Court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Dkts. 10 & 17. The preliminary injunction is effective for the pendency of this case and enjoins Defendants from, inter alia, infringing Plaintiff's copyright registrations, moving funds from their online accounts, removing or destroying evidence related to their online accounts, and transferring or disposing of any assets. Dkt. 17. The preliminary injunction also provides that “Third Party Providers,” including financial institutions and service providers, must identify all accounts and funds connected to Defendants and block any transfers from those accounts if served with the Order. Id.
Plaintiff requests entry of a permanent injunction with similar terms. Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining Defendants from infringing his copyrights, moving funds from their online accounts, removing or destroying evidence related to their online accounts, and transferring or disposing of any assets. Dkt. 61-1 (Proposed Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction) at 3. Plaintiff further asks that Defendants be ordered to delete or destroy any Media within their control and file a report under oath detailing their manner of compliance. Id. Plaintiff also requests that third-party hosting platforms and payment processors in possession of Defendants' funds restrain Defendants' funds and release them to Plaintiff if served with an order from the District Court granting a permanent injunction. Id. at 5.
Under the Copyright Act, a court may “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction generally must satisfy a four-factor test: (1) the plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate compensation; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) a permanent injunction would not disserve the public interest. eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
Plaintiff argues that because “Defendants' unauthorized and infringing acts have already caused immeasurable damage to Plaintiff, and the nature of the Defaulting Defendants' infringement-copying Plaintiff's Media and selling products using aliases and foreign accounts-suggests that, absent an injunction, they will remain free to continue doing so under further aliases.” Dkt. 61 at 17.
The requirements of irreparable injury and no adequate remedy at law often are indistinguishable. Lewis v. S. S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1124 (5th Cir. 1976). The undersigned finds that the first two factors are satisfied. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Dhandapani, No. 3:19-CV-01300-M, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194794, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2020) (finding both factors met where unlawful use continued, and future infringement would be difficult to trace to defendant); Stygian Songs v. Johnson, 776 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (“[A] damages recovery, though it will help compensate past infringements, will not prove effective at guarding against future infringements.”).
As to the balance of hardships, it is not a burden on Defendants to follow the law and cease unauthorized use of the Media. But the undersigned finds that Plaintiff would suffer hardship without a permanent injunction because it is likely that Plaintiff would have to litigate future infringement by Defendants. Finally, an injunction would serve the public interest by promoting compliance with copyright laws. Norrell, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158169, at *13. Thus, the undersigned finds that the relevant factors all weigh in favoring of granting a permanent injunction.
2. Damages
Rule 54(c) provides that: “A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” Plaintiff alleges that each Defendants subject to this default judgment infringed the Media. Plaintiff asks the Court to award statutory damages of not more than $30,000 for each and every infringement of the Media pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), which should be enhanced to a sum of not more than $150,000 by 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) because of Defendants' willful copyright infringement. Dkt. 61 at 11. Plaintiff does not seek actual damages or request a hearing.
As authorized by 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), the court has the power to award statutory damages of “not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just” for each infringed work. Mason v. Montgomery Data, 967 F.2d 135, 143 (5th Cir. 1992). “[T]he statute has been interpreted to vest in the trial court broad discretion to determine whether it is more just to allow a recovery based on calculation of actual damages and profits, as found from evidence, or one based on a necessarily somewhat arbitrary estimate within the limits permitted by the Act.” F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemp. Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 231-32(1952). Courts “are guided by the principle that complying with the copyright laws should be less costly than violating them-meaning that statutory damages should be sufficient to deter future copyright infringement.” Neutral Gray Music v. Tri-City Funding & Mgmt., No. 4:19-CV-04230, 2021 WL 1521592, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2021) (citing cases).
“Among the numerous factors considered by the courts in setting statutory damage amounts are the expenses saved and profits reaped by the infringer; the deterrent effect of the award on a defendant and on third parties; and the infringer's state of mind in committing the infringement.” Motionware Enters v. Indiv., Bus. Entities & Unincorp. Ass'ns Identified on Exhibit 1, No. 1:22-CV-1225-RP, 2023 WL 6977940, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2023), R. & R. adopted, No. 1:22-CV-1225-RP, 2023 WL 6979603 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2023) (quoting Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld, 991 F.Supp. 543, 560 (N.D. Tex. 1997)). Furthermore, “while there ‘need not be a direct correlation between statutory damages and actual damages,' it has generally been held that “the statutory award should bear some relation to actual damages suffered.” Aberle v. GP Clubs, No. A-19-CV-1066-RP, 2020 WL 4035074, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2020), R. & R. adopted No. A-19-CV-1066-RP (Dkt. 16) (W.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020) (quoting Philpot v. Music Times, 2017 WL 9538900, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017)). “[C]ourts in this Circuit frequently award statutory damages in amounts that are between two and three times the license fee refused by the defendant.” Id. (citing EMI Apr. Music v. Jet Rumeurs, 632 F.Supp.2d 619, 625 (N.D. Tex. 2008)).
Plaintiff elects to pursue statutory damages and requests the court award the maximum amount of $30,000. Dkt. 61 at 11. Plaintiff admits “[v]ery little discovery occurred with regard to the Defaulting Defendants' overall sales to date and the Defaulting Defendants' profit margins directly related to the sale of products using the Infringing Photographs, as none of the Defaulting Defendants have provided this information, and the Marketplaces have not been able to provide Plaintiff with all of the information requested throughout this case.” Id. at 14. Thus, Plaintiff submitted no evidence about licensing fees or similar actual damages.
The undersigned found this court's recent cases useful in resolving this motion. Last year in the Austin Division of the Western District of Texas, Magistrate Judge Susan Hightower concluded that $10,000 per Defendants was an appropriate measure of statutory damages. Norell, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158169, at *15-16. As is the case here, she concluded that the plaintiff did not show a maximum award of $150,000 per infringement was just. Id. at *15. But as is also the case here, she noted that deterrence was an important consideration, where defendants willfully infringed to sell an unknown quantity of a product. Id. Thus, just like in Norell, “[b]ecause the [Media] were not just reproduced but infringed by use of a highly commercial nature, the Court considers it just to grant a higher award than in cases in which photographs were infringed merely by display on a website.” Id. (comparing the $2,500 award for a single infringing photo in Aberle v. GP Clubs, No. A-19-CV-1066-RP, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126126, 2020 WL 4035074, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2020)). Thus, for the foregoing reasons, particularly the similarity to a recent case, the undersigned recommends that the District Court award Evans $10,000 from each Defendant for its infringement.
3. Attorney's Fees
Plaintiff also seeks reasonable expenses under the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 505. “[I]n copyright cases the award of attorney's fees is ‘the rule rather than the exception and should be awarded routinely.'” La. Contractors Licensing Serv. v. Am. Contractors Exam Servs., 594 Fed.Appx. 243, 244 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Micromanipulator Co. v. Bough, 779 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1985)). “The factors considered when deciding to award attorney's fees include the ‘frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.'” Motionware, 2023 WL 6977940, at *6 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 535 (1994)).
If the District Court adopts this Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff will prevail on his claims. The undersigned finds that this case is neither frivolous nor unreasonable, and that it may serve to compensate Plaintiff and deter other infringers. Furthermore, the willful nature of Defendants' infringement and failure to defend or otherwise participate in this action, leading to unjustified delays and increased costs and fees, an award of reasonable costs and attorney's fees is appropriate. Considering all relevant factors, the undersigned recommends that the District Court award Plaintiff his full costs and reasonable attorney's fees, subject to submission of an accounting detailing fees and costs and a supporting affidavit.
IV. Recommendation
For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction (Dkt. 61). The undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Plaintiff Kenneth Evans's request for a default judgment and ENTER JUDGMENT for Plaintiff and AWARD Plaintiff $10,000 in statutory damages per Defendant against Doe Defendants listed in Exhibit 1 to the Motion for copyright infringement, plus post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
The undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Plaintiff's requests for entry of a permanent injunction, costs, and attorney's fees.
Finally, the Clerk SHALL END the REFERRAL to the undersigned.
V. Objections
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battles v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within 14 days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).