Opinion
No. COA18-468
05-21-2019
GEORGE R. EVANS, Plaintiff, v. DETENTION OFFICER CROFT, SHERIFF HANS MILLER, and ONSLOW COUNTY, NC, Defendants.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., by Donald R. Pocock, for plaintiff-appellee. Womble Bond Dickinson (US), LLP by Bradley O. Wood, for defendant-appellant Detention Officer Croft.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Onslow County, No. 16 CVS 4032 Appeal by defendant from order entered 8 December 2017 by Judge Dewey Jack Hooks, Jr. in Onslow County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 October 2018. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., by Donald R. Pocock, for plaintiff-appellee. Womble Bond Dickinson (US), LLP by Bradley O. Wood, for defendant-appellant Detention Officer Croft. BERGER, Judge.
On December 8, 2017, the trial court entered summary judgment dismissing claims brought by George R. Evans ("Plaintiff") against Detention Officer Todd Michael Croft ("Officer Croft"), Sheriff Hans Miller ("Sheriff Miller"), and Onslow County, North Carolina (collectively, "Defendants"). The trial court allowed Plaintiff's assault and battery claim against Officer Croft, in his individual capacity, to proceed to trial. Officer Croft appeals from the summary judgment order arguing the trial court erred by concluding that he was not entitled to public official immunity and by partially denying summary judgment as to Plaintiff's assault and battery claim. We reverse and remand.
Factual and Procedural Background
On October 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed suit in Onslow County Superior Court against Defendants alleging Officer Croft used pepper spray against him Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee in the Onslow County Detention Center. Plaintiff sued Officer Croft for assault and battery and violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also sued Sheriff Miller and Onslow County under a theory of respondeat superior.
Defendants filed their answers on November 28, 2016, in which each defendant denied the material allegations in Plaintiff's complaint and asserted the defenses of public official immunity, qualified immunity, and governmental immunity. On October 20, 2017, Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. In support thereof, affidavits and a copy of a surveillance video of the incident were included.
In his affidavit, Officer Croft stated, in relevant part:
2. As of December 31, 2014, I was a duly appointed and sworn Onslow County Sheriff's Detention Officer serving in the Onslow County Detention Center. I was and am fully trained, sworn and certified by the North Carolina Sheriffs' Education and Training Standards Commission to
serve as a Detention Officer. I continue to serve as an Onslow County Sheriff's Detention Officer.
3. At approximately 8:28 a.m. on Wednesday morning, December 31, 2014, I was performing my duties as an Onslow County Sheriff's Detention Officer in Cell Block B of the Onslow County Detention Center. While conducting a "Block Check" (inspecting the Cell Block) with Sergeant Potter, we encountered a prisoner George Evans in the common area of the Cell Block. At that time, Mr. Evans was a pre-trail detainee, pending trial on a number of criminal charges, including first-degree attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill or inflict serious injury, and assault by pointing a gun. Mr. Evans made numerous demands upon us regarding some correspondence that he was preparing. He demanded that we provide him with an ink pen, as he claimed that the pen or pencil that he was using was not good enough. He also demanded that we weigh the items that he wanted to mail so that he would know how many stamps to place on the envelope. He further demanded that we provide him with some tape so that he could write the recipient's address on a separate sheet of paper and then tape it to the envelope.
4. Sergeant Potter suggested to Mr. Evans that he simply write the recipient's address on the side of the envelope itself and that that should be sufficient for his needs. We further advised Mr. Evans that we could not accommodate his requests, as we could not do the same for every other prisoner (weigh their mail and provide them with ink pens and tape) in the Onslow County Detention Center. While it may seem like a small issue to someone who does not work in a jail or prison facility, providing services or materials to one prisoner when they cannot be provided to all (because it is either physically or fiscally impossible or cannot be done without disrupting our ability to perform our primary duties) creates a situation in which other prisoners may feel that they are being treated unfairly or that another prisoner is receiving preferential treatment. This sentiment can foster resentment and anger, which in
turn can quickly lead to issues affecting the good order, discipline and safety of the facility. Sergeant Potter conferred with our chain of command and confirmed that we were correct in our determination that we could not accommodate Mr. Evans' demands. We again told Mr. Evans that we could not do what he wanted us to do. Mr. Evans refused to accept our answer and Sergeant Potter's suggestion regarding his writing the address directly on the envelope. He became increasingly angry, abusive and argumentative, repeatedly telling us that our answer was "not good enough," or words to that effect.
5. Mr. Evans' anger, abusiveness and disrespect escalated to a point at which I concluded that he should be confined to his cell. I advised Sergeant Potter of my conclusion and intent. Sergeant Potter concurred and walked away to handle other matters. I told Mr. Evans that our response concerning his mail situation was the best we could do and directed him to proceed to his cell. . . . Mr. Evans continued to refuse to obey my orders to return to his cell and continued to rant, jabbing his finger at my face and telling me that he was going to see to it that [I] would lose my job. At this point, we were both standing at the end of a table, approximately four feet apart with nothing between us. When Mr. Evans extended his arm to point at my face, his index finger stopped no more than 18 inches from my eyes. While I ignored his verbal threat about my job, Mr. Evans' physical act of jabbing his finger at my face caused me to have concern that [he] was preparing to engage in a physical confrontation with me. He had long finger nails and pointed directly at my eyes, rather than toward my chest or some other direction. I commanded Mr. Evans to not point his finger into my face, telling him that it was an act of aggression. As I did so, I pulled my can of OC pepper spray from my belt and held it at my side to both protect myself and to warn Mr. Evans that his behavior would not be tolerated. I again instructed Mr. Evans to go immediately to his cell. He refused and instead pointed his finger in my face again. I raised my can of pepper spray and pointed it at his face and told him once more to go to
his cell. He began to point his finger at my face a third time. At that moment, I discharged a short burst of OC spray toward Mr. Evans' face. As I did so, he turned his head away from the pepper spray and stepped away from me. I told him once again to go to his cell. Mr. Evans wiped his face with his sleeve and gathered his papers that were lying on the table. He placed his papers under his arm and finally began to walk toward his cell. I continued to brandish my can of OC pepper spray to ensure that Mr. Evans followed my commands and to protect myself in case he turned to physically confront me. Mr. Evans did not appear to be heavily effected (sic) by the pepper spray, as he was able to walk to his cell without any apparent difficulty. I followed behind him to ensure that he went to his cell as directed. Mr. Evans proceeded to his cell without further incident. He entered his cell, where there was a sink and running water for him to use to rinse his face and eyes and to otherwise decontaminate himself from the pepper spray. I closed the door to his cell behind him. I brought a cool wet towel to him at 8:45 a.m. in case he needed it to further decontaminate himself. I continued to observe Mr. Evans over the next several hours. He did not display any respiratory problems or complain of any nausea or discomfort.
6. A copy of my Jail Incident Report that I completed following this incident is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A. A CD containing a copy of the video surveillance footage of the incident is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B. There is no audio on this footage, as the surveillance camera system does not record sound.
7. During the incident with Mr. Evans, I was dealing with a prisoner pending trial for serious violent crimes, who was refusing to follow my instructions, and who was becoming increasingly abusive and belligerent. His belligerence and insubordination escalated into a physical dimension when he began pointing his finger into my face. I warned Mr. Evans not to point his finger in my face again and drew my can of OC pepper spray, providing him with clear warning
that he would be sprayed if he did not calm down and go to his cell as I had repeatedly instructed him to do. Rather than doing so, he continued to angrily point his finger in my face and refused to obey my instructions. I made the decision to deploy pepper spray against Mr. Evans, believing it was necessary to protect myself and to maintain good order and discipline within the Detention Center. Mr. Evans had repeatedly refused to follow my verbal commands and had engaged in behavior that was physically threatening to me. He showed no sign of calming down or following my commands, continuing to angrily point at me and to defy my commands even after I had drawn my pepper spray. I concluded that deploying my pepper spray in the brief manner that I did constituted the least amount of force that was necessary under the circumstances in order to gain control over the situation. I did not see any other available options. Mr. Evans had refused to follow my commands. Placing my open hands on his arm or elsewhere on his body ("soft hands") to try to guide him to his cell would have placed me within arms reach of Mr. Evans, who was unsecured and who seemed to me to be ready to fight me at any instant, and in my perception would have created an extremely likely potential for a physical confrontation, which could have resulted in serious injury to both of us and to anyone else who got involved. Any other level of force would have been greater than the use of pepper spray. In sum, I made the best decision that I could under the tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving circumstances presented to me: Being confronted, one on one, with an angry, insubordinate and belligerent prisoner who was physically bigger than I am, and whose behavior was escalating toward a physical confrontation.
8. At all times during the performance of my duties as a Onslow County Detention [Officer], including the incident with George Evans on December 31, 2014, I acted in good faith and without malice or corruption. I followed all applicable laws, rules, policies and regulations and performed my duties to the best of my abilities. I used the
minimum level of force necessary to protect myself from Mr. Evans and to help gain control over him and to preserve order and discipline within the Onslow County Detention Center, and nothing more.
Sherriff Miller's affidavit stated, in relevant part:
2. I have served as a law enforcement officer for more than forty years. I am currently the duly elected and sworn Sheriff of Onslow County, North Carolina. I have served as the Sheriff of Onslow County since December 1, 2014.
. . . .
5. As the Sheriff of Onslow County, I have the responsibility to operate the Onslow County Detention Center. . . . It is my policy that the Onslow County Detention Center is and shall be a facility that is safe for both the prisoners housed within it as well as for the detention staff who operate it. Detention officers may only use the amount of force necessary to maintain order, restore discipline or to obtain compliance with a lawful order. Examples of the type of behavior that may justify the use of force include, but are not limited to, a (sic) inmate who is assaulting, or appears likely to assault, another inmate or an officer; an inmate who is destroying, or appears likely to destroy property; or if it appears that an inmate is or may be preparing to escape.
6. Subsequent to its occurrence, I reviewed the video surveillance camera footage of the December 31, 2014 incident involving Plaintiff George R. Evans and Detention Officer Croft. I also spoke with my Jail Administrator and others involved in the incident, as well as reviewing the Incident Report completed by Officer Croft. In reviewing the video footage (there is no audio), I observed Mr. Evans apparently refusing to obey the instructions of Officer Croft and becoming agitated: pointing his finger in Officer Croft's face while in close proximity to him; continuing to point his finger in Officer Croft's face after Officer Croft had drawn his pepper spray from his belt; and continuing to do so even
after Officer Croft raised the pepper spray to eye level. I further observed Mr. Evans turn his head away from what appears to be a very brief deployment of pepper spray by Officer Croft and then gather some papers from a table and walk to his cell, with Officer Croft following behind him. Based on my observation, it appeared to me that Officer Croft or any reasonable officer in his position could have perceived that he was being confronted by a non-compliant prisoner who was refusing to follow lawful commands; who was physically larger than he was; and who was actively presenting a physical threat to the officer and to the good order and discipline of the Onslow County Detention Center, such that a limited deployment of pepper spray under those circumstances was a reasonable amount and means of force for a detention officer to utilize in order to defend himself/herself and to maintain good order and discipline within the Onslow County Detention Center.The contents of the surveillance video are consistent with the affidavits of Officer Croft and Sheriff Miller. Plaintiff did not file a written response or affidavit in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
7. Detention Officer Todd Croft was and is fully trained, sworn and certified by the North Carolina Sheriffs' Education and Training Standards Commission to serve as a Detention Officer. I am not aware of any evidence or information that would demonstrate that he has used, or has any tendency to use, unlawful or excessive force.
During the summary judgment hearing, the trial court heard arguments from Defendants' counsel and Plaintiff. The trial court also reviewed the surveillance video, which Plaintiff stated "adequately and accurately" reflected the events. The trial court entered a summary judgment order which dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants, except the assault and battery claim against Officer Croft in his individual capacity. The trial court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim because Officer Croft was "not entitled to public [official]." Officer Croft appeals from this interlocutory order, arguing the trial court erred by concluding that he was not entitled to immunity from the assault and battery claim.
Jurisdiction
"The threshold question is whether this case is properly before us." Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 808 S.E.2d 488, 496 (2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "In general, a party has no right to immediate appellate review of an interlocutory order." Thompson v. Town of Dallas, 142 N.C. App. 651, 653, 543 S.E.2d 901, 903 (2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "An appeal is interlocutory when noticed from an order entered during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the entire case and where the trial court must take further action in order to finally determine the rights of all parties involved in the controversy." Beroth Oil Co., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 808 S.E.2d at 496 (citations and quotation marks omitted). "[T]his Court must dismiss an interlocutory appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, unless the appellant is able to carry its burden of demonstrating that the order from which he or she seeks to appeal is appealable despite its interlocutory nature." C. Terry Hunt Indus., Inc. v. Klausner Lumber Two, LLC, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 803 S.E.2d 679, 682 (2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Generally, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is a nonappealable interlocutory order. This Court will only address the merits of such an appeal if a substantial right of one of the parties would be lost if the appeal were not heard prior to the final judgment.Fullwood v. Barnes, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 792 S.E.2d 545, 549 (2016) (purgandum).
Well-settled precedents hold orders denying dispositive motions based on the defenses of governmental and public official's immunity affect a substantial right and are immediately appealable. This Court allows interlocutory appeals of orders denying motions based on these defenses because the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.
Here, Officer Croft appeals from an interlocutory summary judgment order. Officer Croft argues the trial court erred by concluding that he was not entitled to public official immunity, a claim that affects a substantial right. Therefore, his appeal is properly before this Court.
Analysis
Officer Croft argues that the trial court erred by concluding that he was not entitled to public official immunity because Plaintiff cannot show that Officer Croft acted with the requisite malice. We agree.
"We review a trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment de novo." Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Salem Logistics Traffic Services, LLC, 365 N.C. 520, 523, 723 S.E.2d 744, 747 (2012) (citation omitted). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2017). "A genuine issue of material fact has been defined as one in which the facts alleged are such as to constitute a legal defense or are of such nature as to affect the result of the action . . . ." Smith v. Smith, 65 N.C. App. 139, 142, 308 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1983) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "When considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. All inferences of fact must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the nonmovant." Strickland v. Hedrick, 194 N.C. App. 1, 9, 669 S.E.2d 61, 67 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
"Evidence properly considered on a motion for summary judgment includes . . . material which would be admissible in evidence or of which judicial notice may properly be taken." Murray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 123 N.C. App. 1, 8, 472 S.E.2d 358, 362 (1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, when ruling on a summary judgment motion, the trial court is generally "confined to the sworn or verified testimony in the record as may be evidenced through pleadings, affidavits, or depositions." Draughon v. Harnett Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 N.C. App. 208, 213, 580 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2003).
Oral testimony at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment may [also] be offered; however, the trial court is only to rely on such testimony in a supplementary capacity, to provide a small link of required evidence, but not as the main evidentiary body of the hearing. The trial court may also consider arguments of counsel as long as the arguments are not considered as facts or evidence.Strickland v. Doe, 156 N.C. App. 292, 296-97, 577 S.E.2d 124, 129 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
A party may also support or oppose a motion for summary judgment by proffering "a properly verified pleading which meets all the requirements for affidavits." Schoolfield v. Collins, 281 N.C. 604, 612, 189 S.E.2d 208, 212 (1972).
In any case in which verification of a pleading shall be required by these rules or by statute, it shall state in substance that the contents of the pleading verified are true to the knowledge of the person making the verification, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters he believes them to be true. Such verification shall be by affidavit of the party . . . [or] by the agent or attorney of a party . . . .N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 11(b) (2017) (emphasis added). "Thus, according to Rule 11(b) . . ., a party or attorney may verify a pleading only by affidavit of the party or attorney, and signatures alone are not sufficient." Gaskill v. State, 109 N.C. App. 656, 659-60, 428 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1993) (emphasis added).
An affidavit is defined as
an oath or affirmation reduced to writing, sworn or affirmed to before some officer who has authority to administer it. . . . The essential requisites are . . . that there shall be an oath administered by an officer authorized by law to administer it, and that what the affiant states under such oath shall be reduced to writing before such officer. . . . It must be certified by the officer before whom the oath was taken before it can be used for legal purposes; indeed, it is not complete or operative until this is done. The certificate, usually called the jurat, is essential, not as part of the affidavit, but as official evidence that the oath was taken before a proper officer. The object of such an instrument is to obtain the sworn statement of facts in writing of the affiant in such official and authoritative shape, as that it may be used for any lawful purpose, either in or out of courts of justice.Alford v. McCormac, 90 N.C. 151, 152-53 (1884) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2017).
Therefore, if a party supports its motion for summary judgment with sworn affidavits and the nonmoving party fails to properly dispute or contradict the assertions made in those sworn affidavits, then summary judgment against the nonmoving party would be proper "for the simple reason that [the nonmoving party] failed to carry the burden placed upon them by Rule 56(e)." Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 264, 278 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1981).
Moreover, this Court has held that "summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party is unable to overcome an affirmative defense offered by the moving party." Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth., 191 N.C. App. 581, 583, 664 S.E.2d 8, 10 (2008) (purgandum). "On an affirmative defense, the burden of proof lies with the defendant." Redding v. Shelton's Harley Davidson, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 816, 822, 534 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
"[A]s a complete bar to liability, governmental immunity constitutes an affirmative defense." Clayton v. Branson, 170 N.C. App. 438, 449, 613 S.E.2d 259, 268 (2005). "The defense of public official immunity is a derivative form of governmental immunity." Fullwood, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 792 S.E.2d at 550 (citation omitted). "[J]ailers are public officials entitled to immunity because they exercise the power of the State and carry out a statutor[ily delegated] duty." Baker v. Smith, 224 N.C. App. 423, 434, 737 S.E.2d 144, 151 (2012).
Public official immunity precludes suits against public officials in their individual capacities and protects them from liability as long as a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption.Fullwood, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 792 S.E.2d at 550 (purgandum). Therefore, "[a] public official is immune from suit unless the challenged action was (1) outside the scope of official authority, (2) done with malice, or (3) corrupt." Chastain v. Arndt, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 800 S.E.2d 68, 76 (2017) (purgandum).
"To survive a motion for summary judgment based on public official immunity, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant-official's tortious conduct falls within one of the immunity exceptions." Dempsey v. Halford, 183 N.C. App. 637, 640-41, 645 S.E.2d 201, 205 (2007) (purgandum). Here, Plaintiff acknowledged that Officer Croft's actions were neither outside the scope of his official duties nor corrupt. "Summary judgment, therefore, turns on whether [P]laintiff presented a sufficient forecast of evidence of malice to overcome [Officer Croft's] immunity." Id. at 641, 645 S.E.2d at 205.
In this context,
[a] defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another. Thus, elementally, a malicious act is an act (1) done wantonly, (2) contrary to the actor's duty, and (3) intended to be injurious to another.Chastain, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 800 S.E.2d at 76-77 (purgandum).
It is well settled that absent evidence to the contrary, it will always be presumed that public officials will discharge their duties in good faith and exercise their powers in accord with the spirit and purpose of the law. This presumption places a heavy burden on the party challenging the validity of public officials' actions to overcome this presumption by competent and substantial evidence. Moreover, evidence offered to meet or rebut the presumption of good faith must be sufficient by virtue of its
reasonableness, not by mere supposition. It must be factual, not hypothetical; supported by fact, not by surmise.Hedrick, 194 N.C. App. at 10-11, 669 S.E.2d at 68 (purgandum).
In the matter sub judice, Defendants bore the initial burden of supporting their motion for summary judgment with evidence that tended to show that Officer Croft was entitled to the affirmative defense of public official immunity. Defendants supported their motions by filing the affidavits of Officer Croft and Sheriff Miller and a copy of the surveillance video that tended to show that Officer Croft acted without malice when he deployed pepper spray. The policy of the Onslow County Detention Center authorizes its detention officers to "use the amount of force necessary to maintain order, restore discipline or to obtain compliance with a lawful order."
Plaintiff was non-compliant with Officer Croft's order to return to his cell and appeared likely to assault Officer Croft. By supporting their motion for summary judgment with this proffered evidence, Defendants satisfied their initial burden of producing evidence that tends to show that Officer Croft is in fact entitled to the affirmative defense of public official immunity.
In response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff relied exclusively on his unverified complaint and his own arguments made during the summary judgment hearing. "[T]he trial court may not consider an unverified pleading when ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Allen R. Tew, P.A. v. Brown, 135 N.C. App. 763, 767, 522 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1999) (citation omitted).
Although Plaintiff signed his complaint certifying that his allegations were true and based on his personal knowledge, the complaint was not properly verified because "signatures alone are not sufficient." Gaskill, 109 N.C. App. at 660, 428 S.E.2d at 476. Because Plaintiff's complaint was not notarized to attest that it was made under oath and certified by an official authorized to administer such an oath, it was not admissible as evidence in opposition to Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Additionally, the statements Plaintiff made during the summary judgment hearing were not made under oath, and are no different than arguments of counsel. Arguments are not evidence. Therefore, the trial court could consider Plaintiff's remarks "as long as the arguments [were] not considered as facts or evidence." Strickland, 156 N.C. App. at 297, 577 S.E.2d at 129. Thus, Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence or facts to overcome the "heavy burden on the party challenging the validity of public officials' actions." Hedrick, 194 N.C. App. at 10-11, 669 S.E.2d at 68 (purgandum).
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it concluded that "defendant Detention Officer Croft is not entitled to public [official] immunity as to Plaintiff's state law tort claim for assault and battery against him in his individual capacity."
Conclusion
Because Officer Croft was entitled to public official immunity which precludes suit against him for Plaintiff's assault and battery claim, we reverse and remand to the trial court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judges STROUD and DILLON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).