Opinion
Case No. 1:19-cv-1083
01-22-2020
ALRELIO EVANS, Plaintiff, v. KEVIN BREGE et al., Defendants.
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the Court is permitted to drop parties sua sponte when the parties have been misjoined. Pursuant to that rule, the Court will drop as misjoined Defendants Brege, Melton, Boland, Swanowicz, Tehhove, Sheggrud, and Otten and dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them without prejudice.
With regard to the claim that remains, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Reviewing Plaintiff's remaining claim against that standard, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claim against the only remaining Defendant, Unknown Librarian.
Discussion
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Chippewa County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred during July and August of 2019, while he was incarcerated at the E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF), in Muskegon County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues personnel from LRF: Residential Unit Manager, Kevin Brege; Assistant Residential Unit Supervisor, Dominick Melton; Unknown Librarian, Unknown Party; Psychologist, Unknown Boland; and Corrections Officers: Unknown Swanowicz, Unknown Tehhove, Unknown Sheggrud, and Unknown Otten.
A. Unknown Librarian
Plaintiff alleges that Unknown Librarian denied Plaintiff access to the courts by not permitting Plaintiff four hours of law library time per week during the week beginning August 5, 2019. Plaintiff claims he was, because of the denial, unable to timely submit some of his claims to this Court.
B. Defendants Brege, Swanowicz, and Tehhove
On July 25, 2019, and July 31, 2019, these defendants denied Plaintiff a shower during yard. On July 31, Swanowicz and Tehhove laughed at Plaintiff to degrade and belittle him. Prisoners on other wings were allowed showers after exercising.
C. Defendant Sheggrud and Otten
On August 2, 2019, Plaintiff's snack bag was tampered with—his peanut butter was smeared all over the bag and his milk carton. Plaintiff believes Sheggrud and Otten tampered with his snack bag in retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of grievances.
D. Defendant Boland
Defendant Boland placed Plaintiff on suicide watch on August 13, 2019, apparently because Plaintiff had gone on a hunger strike and would not speak with Boland about it.
E. Defendant Melton
Defendant Melton failed to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the hearing report on a Class III misconduct written because Plaintiff had a laundry bag in the dayroom.
F. Plaintiff's claims
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Librarian denied him access to the courts by not permitting him the four hours of law library time called for by MDOC policy. Plaintiff claims that by denying him two showers, Defendants Brege, Swanowicz, and Tehhove violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Sheggrud and Otten violated Plaintiff's First Amendment rights to petition for redress of grievances when they tampered with his snack bag in retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of administrative grievances. Plaintiff claims further that, by tampering with his snack bag, Sheggrud and Otten violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Boland violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights because his night on suicide watch was cruel and unusual punishment and it was ordered in retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of grievances. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Melton violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he failed to provide Plaintiff a copy of the Class III misconduct hearing report.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages.
II. Misjoinder
The joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is "strongly encouraged" when appropriate to further judicial economy and fairness. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). This does not mean, however, that parties should be given free rein to join multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants into a single lawsuit when the claims are unrelated. See, e.g., Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App'x 436, 437 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997); Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (adopting magistrate judge's report).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) limits the joinder of parties in single lawsuit, whereas Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) limits the joinder of claims. Rule 20(a)(2) governs when multiple defendants may be joined in one action: "[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." Rule 18(a) states: "A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party."
Courts have recognized that, where multiple parties are named, as in this case, the analysis under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18:
Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there is more than one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with joinder of claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18. . . .7 Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure Civil § 1655 (3d ed. 2001), quoted in Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 778, and Garcia v. Munoz, No. 08-1648, 2007 WL 2064476, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14, 2008); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (joinder of defendants is not permitted by Rule 20 unless both commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied).
Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of them that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact common to all.
Therefore, "a civil plaintiff may not name more than one defendant in his original or amended complaint unless one claim against each additional defendant is transactionally related to the claim against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact." Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 778. When determining if civil rights claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence, a court may consider a variety of factors, including, "the time period during which the alleged acts occurred; whether the acts . . . are related; whether more than one act . . . is alleged; whether the same supervisors were involved, and whether the defendants were at different geographical locations." Id. (quoting Nali v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., No. 07-10831 2007 WL 4465247, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2007)).
Permitting improper joinder in a prisoner civil rights action also undermines the purpose of the PLRA, which was to reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits that were being filed in the federal courts. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004). Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not commence an action without prepayment of the filing fee in some form. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). These "new fee provisions of the PLRA were designed to deter frivolous prisoner litigation by making all prisoner litigants feel the deterrent effect created by liability for filing fees." Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1997). The PLRA also contains a "three-strikes" provision requiring the collection of the entire filing fee after the dismissal for frivolousness, etc., of three actions or appeals brought by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, unless the statutory exception is satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The "three strikes" provision was also an attempt by Congress to curb frivolous prisoner litigation. See Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Seventh Circuit has explained that a prisoner like Plaintiff may not join in one complaint all of the defendants against whom he may have a claim, unless the prisoner satisfies the dual requirements of Rule 20(a)(2):
Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass that [a multi]-claim, [multi]-defendant suit produce[s] but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees--for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) . . . .George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Brown v. Blaine, 185 F. App'x 166, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2006) (allowing an inmate to assert unrelated claims against new defendants based on actions taken after the filing of his original complaint would have defeated the purpose of the three strikes provision of PLRA); Patton v. Jefferson Corr. Ctr., 136 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 1998); Shephard v. Edwards, 2001 WL 1681145, *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2001) (declining to consolidate prisoner's unrelated various actions so as to allow him to pay one filing fee, because it "would improperly circumvent the express language and clear intent of the 'three strikes' provision"); Scott v. Kelly, 107 F. Supp. 2d 706, 711 (E.D. Va. 2000) (denying prisoner's request to add new, unrelated claims to an ongoing civil rights action as an improper attempt to circumvent the PLRA's filing fee requirements and an attempt to escape the possibility of obtaining a "strike" under the "three strikes" rule). To allow Plaintiff to proceed with improperly joined claims and defendants in a single action would permit him to circumvent the PLRA's filing fee provisions and allow him to avoid having to incur a "strike" for purposes of § 1915(g), should his claims turn out to be frivolous.
A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person -- say, a suit complaining that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions -- should be rejected if filed by a prisoner.
Plaintiff's first claim is the First Amendment "access to the courts" claim against Unknown Librarian. Plaintiff's various claims against Defendants Brege, Swanowicz, and Tehhove (the "shower Defendants") are entirely unrelated to his claim against Defendant Librarian. Similarly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Sheggrud and Otten (the "peanut butter Defendants") are entirely unrelated to his claims against Defendant Librarian and also unrelated to his claims against the shower Defendants. Plaintiff's claims against Boland are unrelated to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Librarian, the shower Defendants, and the peanut butter Defendants. Plaintiff's claim against Melton is unrelated to Plaintiff's claims against any of the other Defendants.
Plaintiff has essentially filed five complaints in one. His shower, peanut butter, suicide watch, and misconduct report claims have no connection to his law library claim. They are raised against different Defendants, based on different conduct, and subjected Plaintiff to different harms. The claims are entirely discrete, there is no transactional relationship between them. Therefore, the claims and parties other than the "access to the courts" claim against Defendant Librarian are misjoined.
Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action." Instead, Rule 21 provides two remedial options: (1) misjoined parties may be dropped on such terms as are just; or (2) any claims against misjoined parties may be severed and proceeded with separately. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Gr., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572-73 (2004) ("By now, 'it is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time . . . .'"); DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006); Carney v. Treadeau, No. 07-cv-83, 2008 WL 485204, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2008); Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924, 940 (E.D. Mich. 2008); see also Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[D]ismissal of claims against misjoined parties is appropriate."). "Because a district court's decision to remedy misjoinder by dropping and dismissing a party, rather than severing the relevant claim, may have important and potentially adverse statute-of-limitations consequences, the discretion delegated to the trial judge to dismiss under Rule 21 is restricted to what is 'just.'" DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845.
At least three judicial circuits have interpreted "on such terms as are just" to mean without "gratuitous harm to the parties." Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845. Such gratuitous harm exists if the dismissed parties lose the ability to prosecute an otherwise timely claim, such as where the applicable statute of limitations has lapsed, or the dismissal is with prejudice. Strandlund, 532 F.3d at 746; DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 846-47; Michaels Bldg. Co., 848 F.2d at 682.
In this case, Plaintiff brings his causes of action against the improperly joined Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Furthermore, "Michigan law provides for tolling of the limitations period while an earlier action was pending which was later dismissed without prejudice." Kalasho v. City of Eastpointe, 66 F. App'x 610, 611 (6th Cir. 2003).
All of the actions about which Plaintiff complains occurred in 2019, well within the three-year period of limitations. Those claims are not at risk of being time-barred. Plaintiff therefore will not suffer gratuitous harm if the improperly joined Defendants are dropped and the claims against them dismissed. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion under Rule 21 and drop Defendants Brege, Melton, Boland, Swanowicz, Tehhove, Sheggrud, and Otten from the action, and dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by Plaintiff. See Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350 ("In such a case, the court can generally dismiss all but the first named plaintiff without prejudice to the institution of new, separate lawsuits by the dropped plaintiffs."); Carney, 2008 WL 485204, at *3 (same).
Plaintiff is cautioned, again, that he must limit all future actions to claims and Defendants that are transactionally related to one another.
III. Failure to state a claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails "'to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff contends Defendant Librarian violated his First Amendment right to access the courts when he or she denied Plaintiff access to the law library during the week of August 5, 2019. It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The principal issue in Bounds was whether the states must protect the right of access to the courts by providing law libraries or alternative sources of legal information for prisoners. Id. at 817. The Court further noted that in addition to law libraries or alternative sources of legal knowledge, the states must provide indigent inmates with "paper and pen to draft legal documents, notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them." Id. at 824-25. The right of access to the courts also prohibits prison officials from erecting barriers that may impede the inmate's access to the courts. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992).
An indigent prisoner's constitutional right to legal resources and materials is not, however, without limit. In order to state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show "actual injury." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000. In other words, a plaintiff must plead and demonstrate that the shortcomings in the prison legal assistance program or lack of legal materials have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there may be an actual injury:
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. "Thus, a prisoner's right to access the courts extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only." Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Moreover, the underlying action must have asserted a non-frivolous claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353; accord Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (Lewis changed actual injury to include requirement that action be non-frivolous).
In addition, the Supreme Court squarely has held that "the underlying cause of action . . . is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). "Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant." Id. at 416.
Plaintiff's conclusory statement that he "was unable to timely submit some of [his] claims to this Court, " (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.10), does not satisfy the requirements of identifying a non-frivolous underlying cause of action that was impaired by Defendant Librarian's actions. The Court has reviewed the various actions Plaintiff has filed in this Court and no harm is apparent. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Librarian for violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review authorized by the joinder rules, the Court elects to drop as misjoined parties Defendants Brege, Melton, Boland, Swanowicz, Tehhove, Sheggrud, and Otten. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them without prejudice.
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's claims against the remaining Defendant—Unknown Librarian—will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reason the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
An order and a judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered. Dated: January 22, 2020
/s/ Janet T. Neff
Janet T. Neff
United States District Judge