Opinion
Civ. A. No. 1:99cv303-D-D.
Filed Date: January 26, 2000.
OPINION
Before the court is the Defendant's motion for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration of the motion, the court finds that it should be granted.
Factual and Procedural Background
This action was commenced on September 17, 1999, in the Chancery Court of Lee County, Mississippi, against Susan Robbins (Robbins). On October 5, 1999, the Defendant filed her petition for removal of the action alleging that this court has original jurisdiction over the action in that it is a civil case governed by federal law, specifically section 205 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1055. Robbins subsequently filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
In its Complaint, the Plaintiff contends that the deceased, James Robbins, participated in a retirement plan serviced originally by the Hartford Company and later changed to Principal Financial Group. Under the service of the Hartford Company, the deceased purportedly designated his four children as beneficiaries of the retirement plan, and upon transfer to Principal Financial Group, a new beneficiary statement was not executed. After James Robbins' death, disbursement of the retirement benefits was made solely to the deceased's widow, Susan Robbins.
Plaintiff submits that it was the clear intent of the deceased to have his retirement benefits shared among his four children and that he made this known to both his children and his wife immediately prior to his death. Both injunctive and replevin relief are requested in the Plaintiff's Complaint, premised on the contention that neither Mississippi Code Annotated § 25-11-103, nor ERISA should be applied to defeat the clear intent of the deceased to have his children receive the benefits of the retirement plan.
Discussion
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mtg. Co., 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5 th Cir. 1995). "Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle it to the relief it seeks," dismissal is proper. Id. It must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5 th Cir. 1995).
Conversely, dismissal is never warranted because the court believes the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on the merits. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Even if it appears an almost certainty that the facts alleged cannot be proved to support the claim, the complaint cannot be dismissed so long as the complaint states a claim. Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5 th Cir. 1986). If, however, a required element, a prerequisite to obtaining the requested relief, is lacking in the complaint, dismissal is proper. Id.
Under Rule 7.2(D) of the Uniform Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Northern District of Mississippi and the Southern District of Mississippi, the Plaintiff's opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was due within ten days after service of the movant's motion. Despite the court's communication with counsel for the Plaintiff and a substantial extension of time within which to file their response, the Plaintiff has yet to file any opposition to the motion. Local Rule 7.2(D) also provides that "[i]f a party fails to respond to any motion other than a motion for summary judgment within the time allotted, the court may take the motion as confessed." Therefore, the Defendant's motion may properly be granted as unopposed.
In the interest of judicial economy, however, the court will address the merits of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Robbins alleges that the subject retirement plan is governed by ERISA, specifically 29 U.S.C. § 1055. In light of the Plaintiff's reference to ERISA in its Complaint, the court finds the Defendant's contention accurate. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-46, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1551-52, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987).
In 1984, Congress amended ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code to provide additional protection to the dependent spouses of employees covered by pension plans, primarily widows and divorcees. Davis v. College Suppliers Co., 813 F. Supp. 1234, 1236 (S.D.Miss. 1993). The amendment, known as the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REACT), requires that a qualified joint and survivor annuity be provided to the surviving spouse of a participant of an employee pension benefit plan, unless the plan provides that the participant's nonforfeitable accrued benefits are payable in full, on the death of the participant, to the participant's surviving spouse, or unless the surviving spouse has waived her rights to benefit plan proceeds. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(2)(C)(i).
The rationale behind the surviving-spouse annuity, and other provisions of § 1055, is "to ensure a stream of income to surviving spouses." Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 849, 117 S.Ct. 1754, 1764, 138 L.Ed.2d 45 (1997). This stream of income is "automatic and mandatory, absent a waiver." Davis, 813 F. Supp. at 1238 (citing Tulley v. Ethyl Corp., 861 F.2d 120, 124 (5 th Cir. 1988); Donohue v. Shell Provident Fund, 656 F. Supp. 905, 908 (S.D.Tex. 1987)). See also Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 756 (6 th Cir. 1995) (holding surviving spouse of participant is to receive benefits under ERISA plan following death of participant, unless such benefits are specifically waived by spouse). As to the manner in which the spouse may effectuate a waiver, ERISA provides that the spouse must consent in writing to the designation of another beneficiary, and such designation cannot be changed without further spousal consent, witnessed by a plan representative or notary public. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A)(i).
Thus, under the provisions of ERISA, the only way the Defendant could have waived her right to the plan proceeds would have been to execute a written waiver containing the provisions required by the statute. The Plaintiff's Complaint, however, contains no such allegation. The Complaint fails to include any allegation that the Defendant waived her right to the survivor benefits or consented to having the deceased's children designated as the beneficiaries. The only allegation concerning the benefits is that it was the deceased's intention to have his children receive the plan proceeds instead of his spouse and that ERISA should not be applied to defeat that purpose.
While the Defendant contends that she never executed a waiver allowing the benefits to be paid to anyone other than herself, the court specifically makes no such finding. As to the Plaintiff's Complaint, the court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. Notwithstanding the Plaintiff's desire to have the court set aside the applicable law due to the consequences of its application, ERISA is, in fact, controlling, and its provisions plainly instruct that the surviving-spouse annuity be automatic and mandatory, absent a waiver. Plaintiff's contention that the deceased's intent should override the express provisions of ERISA is without merit, and such action would undermine Congress' clear purpose for establishing the waiver requirement.
Accordingly, the court finds that the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and shall be dismissed with prejudice. A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that:
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket # 4) is GRANTED; Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; all other pending motions are DENIED as moot; and this case is CLOSED.
All memoranda and other materials considered by the court in ruling on this motion are hereby incorporated into and made a part of the record in this cause.
SO ORDERED, this the ______ day of January 2000.
GLEN H. DAVIDSON United States District Judge