Opinion
Case No. 2:01-cv-545-FtM-29DNF.
November 17, 2004
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial and Memorandum of Law (Doc. #333) filed on September 2, 2004. Defendant Cooper Tire Rubber Company filed a Response (Doc. #338) on September 15, 2004.
Plaintiff brought claims against defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford Motor) and Cooper Tire Rubber Company (Cooper Tire) for negligence and product liability arising out of a single-vehicle rollover action. After a ten-day jury trial on liability, a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor on plaintiff's claims against Ford Motor, and in Cooper Tire's favor on plaintiff's claims against Cooper Tire. Plaintiff now seeks a new trial as to Cooper Tire.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, the Court may grant a new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted[.]" Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a); George v. GTE Directories Corp., 195 F.R.D. 696, 701 (M.D. Fla. 2000). The reasons courts have granted new trials include "substantial errors in the admission or rejection of evidence[.]" Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Azevedo v. Housing Auth. of City of Sarasota, 147 F.R.D. 255, 257 (M.D. Fla. 1993). A motion for a new trial should not, however, be used merely to relitigate old issues already decided.Ramos v. Boehringer Manheim Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1213, 1214 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Plaintiff raises the following nine evidentiary issues in its motion for a new trial:
1. The Court erred in disallowing testimony from workers who worked at the Cooper Tire plant in Tupelo, Mississippi in 1992 regarding conditions, procedures or operations at the Cooper Tire plant at the time the subject tire was manufactured.
2. The Court, after permitting favorable testimony from witnesses called by Cooper Tire, erroneously disallowed the Cooper Tire employees' testimony from being used in cross examination of Cooper Tire's witnesses.
3. The Court erred by not allowing cross examination of defendant's witness, Chester Patterson, regarding plant practices at Cooper.
4. The Court erred in not allowing plaintiff to question witness Bruce Currie regarding documents that he brought to trial.
5. The Court erred in excluding internal documents from Cooper Tire as evidence during plaintiff's case in chief or in rebuttal after Cooper Tire's witnesses testified.
6. The Court erred by continuing to exclude these same documents on cross examination of witnesses, Patterson and Currie, after Cooper Tire opened the door to their admission.
7. The Court erred in excluding employee depositions or excerpts therefrom during plaintiff's rebuttal case, in direct rebuttal of the defense testimony.
8. The Court erred in disallowing testimony from Dennis Carlson regarding his knowledge of plant conditions based upon the testimony of plant workers.
9. The Court erred by allowing witnesses, Currie and Patterson, to testify over Plaintiff's Daubert objections. (Doc. #333, pp. 1-2).
The Court has carefully considered the motion, and concludes that it should be denied. With one exception discussed below, plaintiff's arguments consist of restatements of substantive arguments made before and during trial regarding the evidentiary issues listed above. "The admissibility of evidence is committed to the broad discretion of the district court, and the decision to exclude certain evidence will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion." Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Peat, Inc. v. Vanguard Research, Inc., 378 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004), citing Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000). The Court considered these issues during the course of the litigation (E.g., Doc. #267) and at trial, and the Court adheres to its prior rulings and explanations. The one exception is plaintiff's suggestion that the Court's decision to limit the scope of certain cross examinations violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. #333, p. 4). This argument is without merit as the protections of the Sixth Amendment apply by its plain terms only to criminal prosecutions. Thus, the Court concludes that plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial and its motion is due to be denied.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Plaintiff's Motion For New Trial (Doc. #333) is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 17th day of November, 2004.