Opinion
A148905
10-30-2017
Estate of William Doyle Campbell Deceased. JOANNE ELLIOTT et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. NADINE TAKAHASHI, Objector and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SPR-87824)
Joan Campbell had four children—Joanne Elliott, James Bloom, Rainbow Giancola (collectively, petitioners), and Nadine Takahashi. After her children were born, Joan married William Doyle Campbell (Bill). Joan died in 2014, and Bill died in 2015. Neither had a will. After Bill's death, petitioners filed a petition to determine entitlement to estate distribution. (Prob. Code, § 11700.) The probate court held a bench trial and determined Bill was petitioners' "natural parent" under Probate Code section 6453, which defines the "natural parent and child relationship" for purposes of intestate succession.
We use first names where necessary for clarity, and intend no disrespect.
Nadine appeals, contending she is Bill's "sole legal heir" and that petitioners are not entitled to share in his estate pursuant to Probate Code section 6453. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1957, Joan married James Bloom (Bloom). While married to Bloom, Joan had two children: Joanne in 1958, and James in 1960. Joan and Bloom divorced in May 1966; the Mexico divorce judgment states "there are two minor children of the marriage"—Joanne and James—who "shall remain under the custody of both parents, but [Bloom] will first have the custody." Notwithstanding the divorce decree, Joanne and James lived with Joan. The children had almost no future contact with Bloom. Bloom died in 1999.
In June 1966, Joan married Anthony Giancola. Giancola treated Joanne and James like an "inconvenience," not "children that he wanted anything to do with." Joan and Giancola began living apart in 1970 or 1971, but they remained married. While separated from Giancola, Joan began a romantic relationship with Bill. When Joan and Bill began their relationship, Joanne was approximately 12 years old and James was 10 years old.
While cohabitating with Bill, Joan had two children: Rainbow in 1972, and Nadine in 1975. Joan and Bill had multiple sexual partners in the time frame around the conception dates for Rainbow and Nadine. Rainbow's birth certificate lists "Bill Giancola" as her natural father. Bill was present when Rainbow was born and cut her umbilical cord. Giancola "not for a second" thought Rainbow was his biological daughter, and he never made such a claim. Nadine's birth certificate lists Bill as the natural father.
In 1981, Giancola petitioned for divorce from Joan. The 1981 West Virginia divorce order states there are "two children born of this marriage, namely Rainbow . . . and Nadine" but it awards Joan temporary and permanent custody only as to Rainbow, and orders Giancola to "pay $50.00 per month as child support." Giancola did not pay monthly child support, and he considered Rainbow and Nadine a part of Joan and Bill's family.
Joan married Bill in 1983. Joan and Bill were married for 31 years, until Joan's death in 2014. Bill died in 2015. Neither Joan nor Bill had a will.
Petition for Entitlement to Estate Distribution
Nadine was appointed the administrator of Bill's estate. Petitioners filed a petition for determination of entitlement to estate distribution (Prob. Code, § 11700). The operative second amended petition (petition) alleged petitioners were Bill's heirs pursuant to Probate Code section 6453, which defines the "natural parent and child relationship" for purposes of determining intestate succession. The petition alleged Bill established a parent-child relationship with Joanne and James beginning in approximately 1970, when they were minors, and that all four children lived with Joan and Bill "as a family unit." According to the petition, Bill "treated all four individuals as his own children and represented the same to family, friends, and others." For example, Bill: (1) "consistently referred to himself as 'dad' in correspondence and holiday cards"; (2) listed Joanne and Rainbow as daughters on medical records and insurance forms; (3) gave Joanne and Rainbow "away as the father of the bride" at their respective weddings; and (4) obtained a job for James, worked alongside him, and presented him "as his son."
Petitioners also alleged their right to intestate succession under Probate Code section 6454 and the doctrine of equitable adoption. Probate Code section 6454 authorizes a stepchild to inherit by intestate succession where the parent-child relationship began during the child's minority and continued throughout the child and parent's lifetimes, and the parent would have adopted the stepchild but for a legal barrier. The equitable adoption doctrine—codified in Probate Code section 6455—permits "a person who was accepted and treated as a natural or adopted child, and as to whom adoption typically was promised or contemplated but never performed, to share in inheritance of the . . . parents' [estate]." (Estate of Ford (2004) 32 Cal.4th 160, 165.) Petitioners abandoned their claim of inheritance premised on Probate Code section 6454 and the equitable adoption doctrine.
Nadine opposed the petition, arguing petitioners did not share a parent-child relationship with Bill. In her trial briefs, Nadine claimed Bill was not petitioners' biological father, nor a "natural parent" within the meaning of Probate Code section 6453 because: (1) petitioners' presumed fathers were the men to whom Joan was married when petitioners were born; and (2) the 1966 divorce judgment and the 1981 divorce order (collectively, divorce decrees) demonstrated Bloom is Joanne and James's father, and that Giancola is Rainbow's father.
Bench Trial and Order Granting the Petition
During a five-day bench trial, petitioners presented evidence of Bill's deep and abiding love for petitioners. Petitioners also presented evidence that Bill welcomed them into his home, and held them out to the public as his natural children.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court granted the petition and read its judgment into the record. In an identical written judgment, the court noted the "two competing presumptions that apply to the facts of this case. The first is the presumption of paternity that applies to a child born during marriage. Family Code Section 7611(a). This presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Family Code [Section] 7612(a). The second is the presumption of a parent child relationship established through the 'natural parent' doctrine. Probate Code Section 6453. As relevant here, the court may find that a person is a natural parent if paternity is established by clear and convincing evidence the father has openly held out a child as his own. Probate Code Section 6453(b)(2)." (Fn. omitted.)
Next—under the heading "Resolution of conflicting presumptions"—the court noted the "presumption of paternity as to a child born during marriage is equally applicable to all four of Joan's children. James and Joanne were born during her marriage to . . . Bloom. Rainbow and Nadine were born during her marriage to . . . Giancola. Petitioners have rebutted this presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence that Bill welcomed each of the children into his family and public[ly] held each out as his own child." The court observed that "from the outset of his cohabitation with Joan, Bill treated Joan's children as his own. They established a nuclear family that continued to exist until Bill's death." Bill and Joan gave petitioners "all of the love and attention that would be expected of parents," and "publicly held each of them out as their child in this manner from the day they began to cohabitat[e] to the day they died."
The court rejected Nadine's argument that petitioners could not be Bill's intestate heirs because Bill was not their biological father. It noted there was "some evidence that Bill was not the biological father of Rainbow"—including the 1981 divorce order—but determined that evidence was "overcome by the clear and convincing evidence that Bill participated in Rainbow's birth, placed his first name . . . on her birth certificate . . . [and] raised her as his daughter and public[ly] acknowledged her as his daughter on a number of occasions." Finally, the court noted the law had evolved "away from the medieval concept that children should be punished for the poor life choices and sexual indiscretions of their parents" and toward the conclusion that "the basis of [a] parent child relationship is a stable and loving relationship that holds the child out to the world as a valued and loved member of the family. This principle amply supports a finding that each Petitioner, along with [Nadine], are Bill's natural children." The court concluded petitioners were Bill's legal heirs, and entitled to a share of his estate.
Nadine objected to the court's decision, arguing petitioners could not establish a natural parent-child relationship with Bill. She also reiterated her position that the divorce decrees rebutted "any competing presumption premised on 'openly holding out' a child." (Fn. omitted.) The court took no action on Nadine's objections and she timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A "personal representative, or any person claiming to be a beneficiary or otherwise entitled to distribution of a share of the estate, may file a petition for a court determination of the persons entitled to distribution of the decedent's estate. The petition shall include a statement of the basis for the petitioner's claim." (Prob. Code, § 11700.) The party seeking distribution of a disputed portion of the estate has the burden of proof against other parties having adverse claims. (O'Day v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 540, 544; 3 Gold et al., Cal. Civil Practice: Probate and Trust Proceedings (2005) § 19:37, p. 19-26.) An order determining entitlement to distribution of an estate is an appealable order. (Prob. Code, §§ 11705, 1303, subd. (f).) We independently interpret the relevant statutes and apply the substantial evidence standard to the probate court's factual findings. (Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 382 (Martinez); In re L.L. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1302, 1310.) We review for abuse of discretion the court's resolution of competing presumptions to presumed father status. (In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 606 (Jesusa V.).)
I.
General Principles
" 'Intestate succession is governed entirely by statute.' [Citations.] 'The heirs of a person are those whom the law appoints to succeed at the decedent's death to his or her estate in case of intestacy, by virtue of the statutes of succession.' [Citation.] [¶] [Probate Code] [s]ection 6400 et seq. governs intestate succession. As relevant here, if there is no surviving spouse . . . of an intestate decedent, the intestate estate passes to the decedent's 'issue' . . . . ' "Issue" of a person means all his or her lineal descendants of all generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the definitions of child and parent.' " (Estate of Britel (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 127, 135, fn. omitted (Britel).)
Probate Code sections 6450 through 6455 define "the parent-child relationship for purposes of intestate succession." (Estate of Ford, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 165.) A parent-child relationship "exists between a person and the person's natural parents, regardless of the marital status of the natural parents." (Prob. Code, § 6450, subd. (a); Britel, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) Probate Code section 6453 describes how a "child may show whether someone is a natural parent for purposes of intestate succession." (Estate of Chambers (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 891, 895; Britel, at p. 136.) The statute "contains the rules for determining who is a 'natural parent.' " (Estate of Burden (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1021, 1026.)
II.
Petitioners Established a Natural Parent Child Relationship with Bill
Under Probate Code Section 6453 , Subdivision (a)
Under Probate Code "section 6453, subdivision (a), a natural parent and child relationship is established where the relationship is presumed under the Uniform Parentage Act [(UPA)] and not rebutted." (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 921; Borden et al., 3 Cal. Decedent Estate Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar, 2d ed. May 2017 Update) § 28.41, p. 28-34.) The intestacy statutes "incorporate the UPA to determine presumed fatherhood." (Scott v. Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1514 (Scott).) The UPA " 'provides the framework by which California courts make paternity determinations.' [Citation.] Under the UPA, as enacted in Family Code section 7611, a man is presumed the natural father of a child born during . . . his marriage to the child's mother. (§ 7611(a).) A man also attains the status of presumed father if he receives the child into his home and openly holds the child out as his natural son or daughter. (§ 7611(d).)" (Scott, at p. 1512, fn. omitted.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
A. Giancola and Bill Are Petitioners' Presumed Fathers Under Section 7611
It is undisputed Joan was married to Bloom when Joanne and James were born. It is also undisputed Joan was married to Giancola when Rainbow was born. As a result, there is substantial evidence Bloom and Giancola were presumed fathers under section 7611, subdivision (a). (See Scott, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1512 [man qualified as presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (a) where child was born during marriage to child's mother]; Dawn D. v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 932, 937-938 [same].)
As Nadine acknowledges, there is also substantial evidence Bill was petitioners' presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d). A man "with no biological connection to the child, no marital connection to the mother, and no way to satisfy the statutory presumption of paternity may nevertheless be deemed a presumed father" under section 7611, subdivision (d) if he can prove "an existing familial relationship with the child," a bond the likes of which " 'should not be lightly dissolved.' " (In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 554.) The evidence at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated Bill welcomed petitioners into his home and loved them and treated them as his own children. Bill supported petitioners financially and emotionally: he developed a parent-child relationship with them that should not " 'be lightly dissolved.' " (Ibid.; see also In re L.L., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1313-1314 [man was presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d) where he, among other things, told family members and others the girl was his daughter and named her as his child on insurance and employment forms].)
B. Nadine Failed to Rebut Bill's Presumed Father Status, and the Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Concluding This Was Not an Appropriate Action in Which to Rebut the Section 7611, Subdivision (d) Presumption
"Although more than one individual may fulfill the statutory criteria that give rise to a presumption of paternity, 'there can be only one presumed father.' [Citations.] How those competing presumptions are to be reconciled is set forth in section 7612." (Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 603.) Section 7612, subdivision (a) provides the "presumption under Section 7611 is a rebuttable presumption . . . and may be rebutted in an appropriate action . . . by clear and convincing evidence." Section 7612, subdivision (b) provides: "If two or more presumptions arise under Section . . . 7611 that conflict with each other, . . . the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls."
We turn first to section 7612, subdivision (a). Under that statute, Nadine had the burden to rebut Bill's presumed father status (§ 7611, subd. (d)) with clear and convincing evidence. (R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 774-775; Comino v. Kelley (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 678, 685.) " ' "Clear and convincing" evidence requires a finding of high probability[, or] evidence . . . " 'so clear as to leave no substantial doubt'; 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' " ' " (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594.) Section 7612, subdivision (a) is permissive—it provides the presumption " ' "may" ' " be rebutted when " 'appropriate' in the particular circumstances." (Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 604, second italics added.) "[W]hether rebuttal of the presumption would be appropriate in the circumstances of the case . . . is a matter entrusted to the juvenile court's discretion." (Id. at p. 606; Elisa B. v. Superior Court (2005) 37 Cal.4th 108, 122 (Elisa B.).)
Nadine contends she rebutted Bill's presumed father status with the divorce decrees, which she claims are "judgment[s] establishing parentage of the child by another person." In certain situations, a presumption under section 7611 "is rebutted by a judgment establishing parentage of the child by another person" (§ 7612, subd. (d)) but Nadine has not established the divorce decrees are "judgment[s] establishing parentage."
The court did not—as Nadine claims—"ignore" the divorce decrees. In her trial brief, Nadine argued the divorce decrees rebutted Bill's presumed father status; she repeated this contention in closing argument. The court admitted the divorce decrees into evidence, and the judgment discusses the 1981 divorce order and concludes it does not defeat Bill's presumed father status.
The authority upon which Nadine relies does not establish the divorce decrees are "judgment[s] establishing parentage . . . by another person" within the meaning of section 7612, subdivision (d). In her opening brief, Nadine cites only one case: Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 373. There, a separate paternity action and a genetic test established father was the child's biological father and the parties agreed "there [wa]s a preexisting judgment establishing father's paternity of [the] child." (Martinez, at pp. 379, 389, fn. 9.) Here, there was no prior paternity action or genetic testing, and petitioners do not agree the divorce decrees are judgments establishing parentage within the meaning of section 7612, subdivision (d). Martinez is distinguishable.
In her reply brief, Nadine cites additional cases. We normally disregard new case law presented for the first time in a reply brief, and we do so here. (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 482, fn. 10.) In any event, the cases in Nadine's reply brief are distinguishable. In Weir v. Ferreira (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1509, the court interpreted Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (b)(1), which is not at issue here. (Weir, at pp. 1519-1520.) County of San Diego v. Hotz (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 605 held "[a] divorce judgment between the parties adjudicating as between themselves their parental relationship to a child results in an issue adjudication binding them under the doctrine of collateral estoppel." (Id. at p. 608.) Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467 considered whether extrinsic fraud was a proper ground for setting aside an alimony award and a property settlement in a divorce decree. The Kulchar court stated "[i]nterlocutory divorce decrees are res judicata as to all questions determined therein." (Id. at p. 470.) Here, neither Bill nor petitioners were parties to the divorce decrees and, as a result, these cases have no application here.
Nadine's argument is not persuasive even if we assume for the sake of argument the divorce decrees are judgments establishing Bloom and Giancola's parentage under section 7612, subdivision (d). As stated above, section 7612, subdivision (a) provides the presumption in section 7611, subdivision (d) "may" be rebutted when " 'appropriate' in the particular circumstances." (Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 604, second italics added; In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 70.) Here, the court implicitly concluded it was not "an appropriate action" in which to rebut Bill's presumed father status, and this conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. (Jesusa V., at pp. 606-607 [no abuse of discretion in determining "this was not an appropriate action" in which to rebut presumed fatherhood claim]; Elisa B., supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 122 [case was "not 'an appropriate action' in which to rebut the presumption," and "it would be an abuse of discretion to conclude that the presumption may be rebutted in the present case"].)
Nadine seems to suggest the lack of a "blood relationship" between petitioners and Bill negates their right to inherit as his intestate heirs. We disagree. The presumptions in section 7611, subdivision (d) " 'are driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state's interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family.' " (Elisa B., supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 121-122.) Even if Bill had no "biological" or "genetic" connection to Rainbow, Nadine's argument would fail. (See In re Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 58-59 [section 7611, subdivision (d) presumption not necessarily rebutted where man, who received a child into his home and openly held the child out as his natural child, admitted he was not the child's biological father].)
C. Weightier Considerations of Policy and Logic Favor Bill's Status as a Presumed Father
Next we turn to section 7612, subdivision (b), which provides that where "presumptions arise under Section . . . 7611 that conflict with each other" the court must identify "the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls." (§ 7612, subd. (b); Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 607.) In other words, where there are conflicting presumptions under section 7611, the "court must make factual findings as to each claim and then determine which claim is entitled to greater weight under section 7612, subdivision (b)." (In re L.L., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 1318; In re P.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 974, 981.)
Here, the court considered the competing presumptions and concluded Bill's presumed father status was entitled to greater weight because he raised petitioners, gave them "all of the love and attention that would be expected of" a parent, and publicly acknowledged petitioners as his children. The court also determined policy considerations favored resolving the competing presumptions in Bill's favor because he had a "stable and loving relationship" with petitioners and held them "out to the world" as "valued and loved member[s] of the family." In contrast, Bloom had almost no contact with Joanne and James during their childhood, and he died in 1999. Giancola considered Rainbow a part of Joan and Bill's family. The court's "resolution of the competing paternity presumptions in [petitioners'] favor" was not an "abuse of discretion." (J.R. v. D.P. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 374, 390; Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 607 [no abuse of discretion in weighing competing presumptions pursuant to section 7612, subdivision (b)].) Nadine does not persuasively argue otherwise.
We conclude petitioners established Bill is their "natural parent" under Probate Code section 6453, subdivision (a). Having reached this result, we need not consider whether petitioners are Bill's intestate heirs under section 6453, subdivision (b). Nadine acknowledges section 6453, subdivision (b) is an alternative means by which a parent child relationship may be established for purposes of intestate succession. (Cheyanna M. v. A.C. Nielsen Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 855, 867, fn. 14.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Petitioners are entitled to costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)
/s/_________
Jones, P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Simons, J. /s/_________
Bruiniers, J.