Opinion
B267859
08-02-2017
Estate of TOMMY ANTHONY CRUMP, Deceased. GWENDOLYN CRUMP, Petitioner and Appellant, v. TOSHIA JOHNSON, Objector and Respondent.
Gwendolyn Crump, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant. Carol A. Murdock for Objector and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP140704) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. David J. Cowan, Judge. Affirmed. Gwendolyn Crump, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant. Carol A. Murdock for Objector and Respondent.
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Gwendolyn Crump (Gwendolyn) appeals from a trial court order denying her petition to quiet title on real property pursuant to Probate Code section 850.
Because many parties share the same last name, for convenience, we refer to the parties by their first names. (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 475, fn. 1.) We mean no disrespect.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gwendolyn is the widow of Tommy Anthony Crump (Tommy). Gwendolyn has alleged that in 1998, Valerie Johnson and her daughters, Shane L. Johnson-Garner and respondent Toshia Johnson, defrauded their mother and grandmother, Sammie L. Crump (Sammie), into transferring her real property to them rather than to Tommy, Valerie Johnson's brothers and uncle to Shane Johnson-Garner and respondent. Moreover, according to Gwendolyn, Sammie's estate was improperly administered in 2006; but for the fraud of her sister-in-law and husband's nieces, she would have inherited certain real property as Tommy's surviving spouse.
On September 24, 2015, after entertaining oral argument, the trial court denied Gwendolyn's petition to quiet title.
This timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
"'A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Thus, in challenging a judgment, the appellant must raise claims of reversible error or other defect, and "present argument and authority on each point made." (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591; accord, In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 278.) "[F]ailure of an appellant in a civil action to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument in an opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed an abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal." (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.)
Gwendolyn failed to meet her burden on appeal. While she provides us with record citations and citations to legal authority, she offers no cogent legal argument compelling reversal. She alleges fraud, but offers no evidence in support. She ignores the trial court's finding that her claims regarding the administration of Sammie's estate, including her contention that Sammie's signature was fraudulently obtained, are untimely. And, we see no evidence of any conflict of interest because one of the relatives allegedly worked in the superior court. In short, she failed to demonstrate reversible error. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1050.)
Since the issues as raised in Gwendolyn's opening brief are not properly presented or sufficiently developed to be cognizable, we decline to consider them and treat them as waived. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19; In re David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1661.) Notably, her election to act as her own attorney on appeal does not entitle her to any leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure; otherwise, ignorance unjustly is rewarded. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Lombardi v. Citizens Nat'l Trust Sav. Bank (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 206, 208-209; Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
/s/_________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST We concur: /s/_________, J.
Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------
GOODMAN