Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VP010454, Chris Conway, Judge.
Keller, Weber & Dobrott, James E. Dobrott, Jr., and Jill Hunt for Claimants and Appellants.
Jay Oberholtzer for Petitioner and Respondent.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
Claimants Teresa Chavarin and Romy Acuesta appeal from an order directing return of real property to petitioner Joseph Chavarin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Adela Montenegro Chavarin. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Additional facts will be set forth in the discussion.
In August 1999, Adela Montenegro Chavarin (Adela) was living at her home of many years at 13129 Silverbow in Norwalk (Norwalk property). Also living in her home were her son, petitioner Joseph Chavarin (Joseph or petitioner), his wife and her teenage daughter.
Many of the individuals involved in the instant case have the same surname, Chavarin. Accordingly, to avoid confusion, each individual whose surname is Chavarin will be referred to by his or her first name.
On August 17, 1999, Adela’s daughter-in-law, Teresa Chavarin (Teresa), telephoned Adela. During their conversation, Adela told her that, a few days earlier, Joseph had gotten angry with Adela, grabbed her by the shoulders and shook her, then threw her on the bed and hit her with his fist in the stomach. After her conversation with Adela ended, Teresa contacted Adult Protective Services (APS) to report that Adela needed someone to go and talk to her. Accompanied by a law enforcement officer, an APS social worker went to talk with Adela at the house, learned of the alleged abuse, and took Adela into protective custody by placing her in a convalescent home.
In December 1999, Joseph was convicted by a jury of elder abuse of Adela. At the trial, Adela testified against him. Joseph was sentenced to 120 days in the county jail, to begin January 5, 2000, after he complied with the court’s order to vacate the house. As a condition of his sentence, Joseph was ordered to stay away from Adela.
After Joseph vacated the house, Social Services informed some members of Adela’s family that the house was not livable at that time and needed some work before Adela moved back in. Teresa, Romy Acuesta (Acuesta) and David Chavarin (David) began removing trash from Adela’s house. In the process, they discovered a significant leak in Adela’s bedroom. Teresa and Acuesta had a contractor assess the problem. The contractor reported that the house needed new roofing, but it could not be re-roofed in its current condition, particularly due to the termite and water damage to the structure supporting the roof. They were advised that other repairs were needed, in particular, to the flooring due to water and termite damage. The cleanup process and identifying needed repairs and options for completing them took months.
Adela’s son David and her daughter-in-law, Teresa, had been estranged for over 17 years but remained married. Teresa, however, had been living with a companion, Acuesta, since shortly after she and David separated. Acuesta had become friends with David over the years. David, Teresa and Acuesta were friends at the time APS took Adela into protective custody.
During the cleanup and repair process, Teresa and Acuesta paid Adela’s mortgage, including past due payments and related late charges, utilities, and other house-related expenses. They paid all cleaning and repair bills as they continued working to fix the house. The repairs included, but were not limited to, replacing the roof structure and roofing, installing new wood flooring and repairing the flooring supports, installing new windows and doors, repairing the porch, painting, and making the house handicapped accessible. The total amount Teresa and Acuesta spent fixing up Adela’s house was about $70,000 to $80,000. At the time, the Norwalk property was worth about $110,000 and was encumbered by a mortgage of about $65,000. The trial court did not take extensive evidence regarding all of the expenditures, but rather noted that the accounting cause of action had been bifurcated for consideration after the other causes of action were resolved.
Adela continued living in a convalescent home after Joseph vacated the Norwalk property while the cleanup and repair process continued. Family members kept Adela informed regarding the repair process and explained to her that she could not return home until the repairs were completed and the house was in condition for her to live there. Adela was frustrated with the slow progress and wanted to return home. Adela did not have the financial resources to pay for the repairs. Teresa and Acuesta were bearing the total responsibility and costs for the repairs.
While Adela was still living in the convalescent home, on May 17, 2000, Adela signed a deed of trust encumbering the Norwalk property for $22,000 and naming Teresa and Acuesta as the beneficiaries. Teresa testified that was the amount she and Acuesta had expended by that time with regard to the Norwalk property. No corresponding promissory note was produced at trial. The deed of trust was recorded. Shortly after the execution of the deed of trust, contractor assessments and estimates indicated that the scope of repairs needed was considerably larger and more costly. David testified that he looked into getting a loan on the Norwalk property, but there was insufficient equity.
On June 9, 2000, Adela signed a quitclaim deed transferring the Norwalk property to Teresa and Acuesta. Other persons present were Teresa, Acuesta, David, his daughter Veronica, Yolanda Lemon (Lemon), who was the former wife of Adela’s son Javier, and a notary public named Brian J. Hendricks. David testified that he had to translate the documents into Spanish for Adela to help her understand what she was signing. He admitted that he did not translate line by line, but rather summarized the documents, and that he told Adela that the quitclaim deed was “like a loan for her to get her house fixed.” Veronica testified that the notary read Adela the documents, in full, to make sure she was aware what she was signing, and when David was translating in Spanish, Adela cut him off and told him she knew what she was signing.
Teresa, Acuesta and David testified that Adela asked for the deed to be prepared and she had told them that she wanted to hand the Norwalk property over to Teresa and Acuesta so that she could live in it, but not have to deal with any further problems or headaches about the house. Both deeds were prepared by Acuesta’s attorneys.
After the house was repaired to a livable condition, Adela returned to the house. She never told Isabela Zavala (Zavala), her caregiver at the time, that she had deeded the house to Teresa and Acuesta. According to Zavala and Adela’s daughter, Margaret Salazar (Salazar), Adela continued to refer to it as her house.
Teresa and Acuesta allowed Adela to live in the house until she went to a medical facility shortly before her death. They paid all mortgage, repair, utilities and other house-related expenses. Teresa arranged and paid for caregiver services for Adela. David and Adela’s grandson, Robert, also lived in the house from time to time. They each paid $400 monthly rent to Teresa and Acuesta.
Adela died intestate on June 11, 2004. Her heirs included her sons Joseph, Javier, and David, her daughter Margarita, and the two daughters of Eddie, Adela’s son who predeceased her.
Joseph was appointed Special Administrator of Adela’s estate. He initiated the instant legal action on April 25, 2005 to have the Norwalk property returned to the estate. The first cause of action alleged breach of fiduciary duty and undue influence against claimants, in that they exercised undue influence to cause Adela to quitclaim to them the Norwalk property, valued at approximately $350,000. The complaint also alleged a second cause of action that claimants committed fiduciary elder abuse, in that they took advantage of Adela while she was in their care and in a vulnerable condition by taking title to her real property and otherwise retaining her real or personal property. The third cause of action sought imposition of a constructive trust upon the property, and the fourth cause of action was for an accounting by claimants for the property.
The trial court sat as the trier of fact. After the trial was concluded, the trial court issued its tentative decision and ultimately ruled that it constituted the statement of decision. The trial court’s statement of decision is summarized as follows:
Adela executed the quitclaim deed and the deed of trust while living in a convalescent facility. The evidence is conflicting. The more credible evidence clearly shows that, at the time of executing the documents, Adela was in a confused state, partially blind, unable to understand or read the English language in great detail and “was ‘preoccupied’ with being able to return to what she considered to be ‘her home’ for the rest of her lifetime.”
As a result of all of the circumstances, Adela was in such a state that she could not resist fraud and was susceptible to the exercise of undue influence by other persons. Pursuant to Civil Code section 39, subdivision (b), the rebuttable presumption arose that Adela was of unsound mind at the time she executed the quitclaim deed and the deed of trust. Claimants failed to meet their burden to rebut the presumption. Under Longmire v. Kruger (1926) 80 Cal.App. 230, “the burden shifted to the [claimants] to show affirmatively that the transaction was fair and free from influence. As set forth above, they have failed to do this.”
The signatures on the two deeds were slightly different. The signature on the quitclaim deed indicates that Adela may have had difficulty with her sight as testified to during the trial.
Substantial evidence showed that although Adela may have understood some English, her native language and “the one she was far more comfortable with was Spanish.” David testified that “he had to ‘translate’ the documents for his mother from English to Spanish in an effort to help her understand what she was signing.” David admitted he did not translate the documents line by line but attempted to summarize them for Adela. He told Adela that the quitclaim deed was “‘like a loan for her to get the house fixed.’ This testimony alone clearly indicates that [Adela] may not have clearly understood what she was signing.”
Zavala, Adela’s caregiver after she returned to the house, testified that Adela never mentioned deeding her house to claimants, and still referred to the Norwalk property as her house. Salazar testified that, after the deeds were executed, Adela believed the house was still hers. Teresa testified that she told Adela the deeds had been prepared in order to make it appear that Adela was living in her house as a tenant.
No promissory note related to the deed of trust was produced at trial. There was no satisfactory explanation as to where the note was at the time. The notary public, Brian J. Hendricks, who “might arguably have been the most impartial witness to the executions” of the deed of trust and the quitclaim deed, was not called as a witness.
For all the reasons set forth above, it is clear Adela did not understand or comprehend what she was signing. Therefore, the quitclaim deed and the deed of trust “must be set aside as having been procured by undue influence and by [claimants’] failure to meet their burden in this matter.”
As to the first cause of action, the trial court found in petitioner’s favor and ordered claimants to quitclaim the property back to Joseph as the personal representative of Adela’s estate and to execute all documents necessary to rescind the deed of trust. Joseph was awarded his costs as to the first and third causes of action.
After receiving objections to a proposed order directing claimants to return the Norwalk property, on August 8, 2006 the trial court ruled that the deed of trust was merged into the title of the Norwalk property when claimants obtained the quitclaim deed and the associated lien was extinguished. The trial court issued an order providing that (1) claimants must quitclaim the Norwalk property to petitioner; (2) claimants hold the property in constructive trust for the benefit of petitioner; (3) claimants must execute all documents necessary to cancel and rescind the deed of trust; and (4) the trial court made no finding on the cause of action for an accounting and reserves the accounting issue, including expenditures made by claimants to improve the Norwalk property, for further hearing.
DISCUSSION
Claimants’ primary contention is that the order is not supported by the evidence and, specifically, that the trial court erred in finding that they failed to meet their burden of proof to rebut the presumption that Adela was of unsound mind when she executed the deed of trust and the quitclaim deed, and that they failed to meet their burden of proof that the deed transactions were fair and free from the exercise by claimants of undue influence over Adela. Claimants also contend that the trial court erred in ordering that the deed of trust be deemed rescinded based in part on the court’s ruling of merger of the deed of trust with the invalid quitclaim deed. We disagree with claimants that the judgment with respect to the quitclaim deed is not supported by the evidence.
In considering claimants’ contention that the judgment is not supported by the evidence, we review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) Substantial evidence “is more than ‘a mere scintilla,’ and the term means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable man might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’ . . . . [¶] . . . It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be ‘substantial’ proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case.” (Estate of Teed (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644.)
The principle is well-settled that “‘[w] hen a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) We presume that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact and that the judgment is correct. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1658.) As the party challenging a factual finding, an appellant has the burden to demonstrate that the record does not contain any substantial evidence to sustain the finding. (Ibid.)
We defer to the trial court’s determination of credibility (Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1065) and do not reweigh the evidence (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630). To determine whether substantial evidence exists, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and resolve all evidentiary conflicts and indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.) If the evidence supports more than one inference, we may not substitute our inference for that of the trial court. (Veguez v. Governing Bd. of the Long Beach Unified School Dist. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 406, 422.) Even if an appellant were to demonstrate that inferences favorable to appellant are reasonable, we have no power to reject the contrary inferences drawn by the trial court, if they are reasonable as well. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1658.)
If, without regard to conflicts in evidence and considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, there is substantial evidence to support the findings at issue, the findings must be sustained and the conclusion is final. (Field v. Mollison (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 585, 591.) If any “‘substantial’ evidence is present, no matter how slight it may appear in comparison with the contradictory evidence, the judgment must be upheld.” (Howard v. Owens Corning, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.) We may “‘overturn the trial court’s factual findings only if the evidence before the trial court is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain those findings.’” (Veguez v. Governing Bd. of the Long Beach Unified School Dist., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.)
The trial court applied standards in Civil Code section 39 and Longmire v. Kruger, supra, 80 Cal.App. 230 (Longmire) in determining that the burden of proof shifted to claimants to prove that Adela was not of unsound mind when she executed the quitclaim deed, and the transaction was fair and free from undue influence.
Civil Code section 39, subdivision (a), provides that a deed may be rescinded if, at the time the grantor signed it, he or she was of unsound mind, even though he or she had not been judicially determined to be mentally incompetent. Subdivision (b) of section 39 provides that, if it is shown that the grantor was substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or resist fraud or undue influence, then the grantor is presumed to have been of unsound mind and the burden shifts to the party asserting that the deed is valid to rebut the presumption by proving the grantor was not of unsound mind.
Civil Code section 39 provides: “(a) A conveyance or other contract of a person of unsound mind, but not entirely without understanding, made before the incapacity of the person has been judicially determined, is subject to rescission . . . . [¶] (b) A rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that a person is of unsound mind shall exist for purposes of this section if the person is substantially unable to manage his or her own financial resources or resist fraud or undue influence. Substantial inability may not be proved solely by isolated incidents of negligence or improvidence.”
In Longmire, a son sought rescission of the grant deed executed by his elderly, feeble mother to her adult grandson. Decades later, another appellate court dealing with the issue of whether a deed was procured by undue influence noted that “[i]t is said in Longmire v. Kruger, 80 Cal.App. 230, 238 . . ., that . . . with respect to gifts or conveyances inter vivos, the extreme age and infirmity of the grantor, together with slight evidence of circumstances from which it may be inferred that the instrument was the product of coercion, will suffice to shift the burden and require the beneficiary to show affirmatively that the transaction was fair and free from influence.” (Stewart v. Marvin (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 769, 775.)
The trial court found that, at the time of executing the deeds, Adela was living in a convalescent facility and “was in a confused state, partially blind, unable to understand or read the English language in great detail and was ‘preoccupied’ with being able to return to what she considered to be ‘her home’ for the rest of her lifetime,” and as a result, she “was in such a state that she could not resist fraud and was susceptible to the exercise of undue influence by other persons.” On this basis, the trial court ruled that the burden of proof shifted to claimants to rebut the presumption that Adela was of unsound mind that arose pursuant to Civil Code section 39, subdivision (b), and, under Longmire, to show that the transactions were fair and free from influence. The trial court concluded that claimants did not meet their burden, and consequently, the deeds must be set aside. The question before us is whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the trial court’s conclusions.
The record shows that at the time APS took protective custody of Adela and when she signed the two deeds, she was 79 years old. She was living in a convalescent home and during the months after Joseph vacated the house, frequently inquired about progress on the house repairs and when she could go home. Claimants contend that the fact that Adela was living in a convalescent home was irrelevant, in that she was there for reasons other than to receive medical treatment for an illness or injury. APS placed her in a convalescent facility temporarily in order to hold her in protective custody until Joseph and his family vacated the house. It was only the poor condition of the house after Joseph vacated that required Adela to continue living at a facility until the house was cleaned, repaired and ready to be occupied. Notwithstanding claimants’ contentions, however, the fact that Adela was not living at home, coupled with her repeatedly-expressed desire to return there as soon as possible, created circumstances which lend support to a reasonable inference that she was substantially unable to resist undue influence and that her execution of the two deeds was not free from influence.
Claimants correctly assert that Adela’s advanced age or her physical infirmities were not legally sufficient characteristics, in and of themselves, to establish that she was of unsound mind. Old age, sickness, extreme distress or debility of body do not negate a grantor’s mental capacity to make a conveyance, if sufficient intelligence remains. (Wilbur v. Wilbur (1925) 197 Cal. 1, 14-15; Brunoni v. Brunoni (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 215, 218.) To the extent, however, that they limited her ability to return home under her own power at whatever time she chose, it would be reasonable to infer that they also contributed to her substantial inability to resist undue influence.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports these inferences. They are reasonable and support the trial court’s finding that Adela was substantially unable to resist undue influence. Hence, the trial court properly ruled that claimants had the burden to rebut the presumption that, at the time Adela executed the deeds, she was of unsound mind (Civ. Code, § 39, subd. (b)) and to prove that the transactions involving the deeds were fair and free from influence (Longmire v. Kruger, supra, 80 Cal.App. at p. 238). As we noted previously, even if claimants were to demonstrate that their proposed inferences were reasonable, we have no power to reject contradictory reasonable inferences drawn by the trial court. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1658.)
We now consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling that claimants failed to meet their burden. The trial court concluded that Adela did not understand or comprehend what she was signing when the deeds were executed. Our inquiry is limited to determining whether there is any substantial evidence that Adela did not understand the significance of signing the deeds. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) If she had no understanding, it would follow that she could not have freely and voluntarily agreed to the underlying transactions. (Philbrook v. Howard (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 210, 214.) The test of whether Adela was of unsound mind or subject to influence “‘is whether or not [she] was mentally competent to deal with the subject before [her] with a full understanding of [her] rights.’” (Ibid.) If there is any substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion, we must uphold it. (Ibid.)
Claimants offered considerable evidence tending to show that Adela had the requisite mental capacity and understanding to enter into the deed transactions and did so of her own free choice. Claimants contend that they have provided sufficient evidence to show that Adela desired to transfer title to the house to claimants in return for their agreement to allow her to live in the house during her lifetime and to care for her. Evidence also showed that claimants fully performed their obligations under the claimed agreement. They made extensive repairs to the house and remodeled it to be handicapped accessible. They allowed Adela to live there and provided care for her for the rest of her lifetime.
Claimants assert that the circumstances in the instant case, and therefore, the inferences drawn from them, are similar to those in Johnson v. Studley (1926) 80 Cal.App. 538 (Johnson) and Nagle v. Valadez (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 51 (Nagle), in which deeds were determined to be valid, and in direct contrast to the circumstances in Longmire, the case relied upon by the trial court, in which the deed was declared void as procured as a result of undue influence. In Johnson as well as Nagle, the reviewing court upheld a conveyance by a feeble elderly grantor to a grantee who promised to, and did, care for the grantor until the grantor no longer needed his or her care. (Nagle, supra, at p. 55; Johnson, supra, at pp. 560-561.) In Longmire, by contrast, the reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s judgment to set aside a deed executed by an elderly grandmother conveying her home to her adult grandson as the result of undue influence exercised by the grandson. (Longmire v. Kruger, supra, 80 Cal.App. at p. 242.) The grandson had previously lived with and helped her at her home for several years. Then her son moved her into his home to provide her with the care she needed. The grandmother executed a will dividing her estate equally among her son, the adult grandson and another grandson. Within six months, the grandson took her back to her home to live with him for several days. (Id. at pp. 241-242.) It appears that he desired to create the impression that he was going to resume caring for her in her own home. He had a lawyer prepare a deed to the home, which would have constituted the bulk of the grandmother’s estate. (Id. at p. 241.) At the end of the week, the attorney presented the deed to the grandmother to sign. Immediately after she signed the deed, the grandson took her back to her son’s house, explaining to her that he could not care for her. The grandson kept the transaction secret and did not record the deed until the son inquired about the home after the grandmother’s death. (Id. at p. 242.)
As claimants assert, substantial evidence supports a finding that, like the defendants in Johnson and Nagle, Teresa and Acuesta honored their claimed agreement with Adela, in that they did what they told Adela they would do if she conveyed the house to them. Rather than engaging in secrecy like the grandson in Longmire, they involved other family members and disinterested parties, with Adela’s knowledge, in their actions which culminated in the execution of the deeds by Adela. They did not wait until Adela had passed away to record the deeds. They recorded each of them shortly after it was signed.
There are differences between Nagle and Johnson, as compared with the instant case, however, in regard to the evidence to show that the grantor understood and considered the effect of executing the deed. In Nagle, three witnesses, including the notary, testified they were present when the deed was signed and it was read aloud to the 80-year-old grantor, who was alert and not confused. (Nagle v. Valdez, supra, 202 Cal.App.2d at p. 53.) The grantor’s physician was not present at the signing but testified that in the time period during which the grantor signed the deed, he was well-oriented and alert. (Ibid.) In Johnson, three disinterested witnesses, a notary, a banker and a bank cashier, testified to their personal knowledge of the grantor’s understanding and soundness of mind in negotiating and executing a written agreement between the grantor and Studley that grantor would deed all his property to Studley in return for Studley’s commitment to take care of and provide a home for the grantor so long as he lived. (Johnson, supra, 80 Cal.App. at pp. 549-551.)
By contrast, in the instant case, there was no such personal knowledge testimony of similarly disinterested witnesses regarding Adela’s alleged proposal of a plan to give all her property in exchange for claimants’ promise to care for her and allow her to live in the house so long as she lived. The trial court noted that there was no testimony by the notary, even though he was present at the time both deeds were executed. Claimants offered the testimony of two disinterested witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim deed, but neither’s testimony provides such clear evidence that Adela knew and voluntarily intended to give up title to the house. There was only testimony that the notary read the quitclaim deed to Adela. It was given by Teresa’s daughter, Veronica, and the trial court may well not have given it the same weight as testimony by someone not related at all to Teresa. There was testimony also by Lemon, Adela’s former daughter-in-law, that the notary was present and that Adela had told her that Teresa would be coming by to take care of something about the house.
Although claimants may demonstrate that considerable substantial evidence supports a finding favorable to them, that is not determinative on appeal. (Veguez v. Governing Bd. of the Long Beach Unified School Dist., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.) Our power is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, and if so, to affirm the conclusion. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1658.) The trial court concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Adela understood the legal effect of executing the deeds. Such understanding would be prerequisite to proving that Adela knowingly and voluntarily, free of undue influence, entered into the deed transactions. Our inquiry is limited to whether there is any substantial evidence that Adela did not understand the significance of signing the deeds and that claimants failed to meet their burden to prove otherwise. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.)
The record shows that Adela understood some spoken English, but her native language was Spanish. David acted as an oral translator for the deeds. He did not translate each deed verbatim, but only summarized them. As to the deed of trust, David told Adela that the deed of trust was “for a loan.” No promissory note corresponding to such a loan was produced at trial. No testimony was offered by anyone that he or she personally read any such note, the deed of trust or the quitclaim deed in Spanish or English to Adela. Although there was testimony that a notary public was present and explained the quitclaim deed to Adela in English, the notary was not called as a witness.
The trial court also looked to testimony offered by claimants’ witnesses as evidence that Adela was misinformed about and did not understand the effects of the deeds in relation to her property rights in the house. As to the quitclaim deed, David told Adela that the deed was “like a loan for her to get the house fixed.” Teresa told Adela that the transactions were done in order to make it appear that Adela was living in the house as a tenant. Other witnesses testified that, after Adela returned to the house, she continued to refer to the house as her house and did not disclose she had conveyed it to claimants. No testimony was offered to counter this evidence.
We conclude, therefore, that there is substantial evidence that Adela did not understand the deed transactions and claimants failed to prove that she did. Accordingly, the trial court’s findings and conclusions to that effect are supported by substantial evidence and we must affirm them. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) We conclude that the trial court properly applied Civil Code section 39 to its findings and conclusions to rule that the deed of trust and quitclaim deed must be “set aside as having been procured by undue influence and by [claimants’] failure to meet their burden” to rebut the presumption that Adela was of unsound mind when she signed the deeds.
The order is affirmed. Each party shall bear his or her costs on appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, Acting P. J. ROTHSCHILD, J.