Opinion
372 CA 20-01559
07-09-2021
The ESTATE OF Kathryn ESSIG BY Executor Barry C. ESSIG, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Steven F. ESSIG, Defendant-Appellant.
LAW OFFICE OF KEITH D. MILLER, LIVERPOOL (KEITH D. MILLER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. JAMES G. DISTEFANO, SYRACUSE, FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
LAW OFFICE OF KEITH D. MILLER, LIVERPOOL (KEITH D. MILLER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JAMES G. DISTEFANO, SYRACUSE, FOR PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, TROUTMAN, WINSLOW, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the order and judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the 2nd through 5th decretal paragraphs, and as modified the order and judgment is affirmed without costs and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Onondaga County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Plaintiff, the executor of the estate of Kathryn Essig (decedent), commenced this breach of contract action alleging that defendant, a son of the decedent, failed to make payments pursuant to a note secured by a mortgage on real property that had been executed between defendant and the decedent. Defendant appeals from an order and judgment entered after a nonjury trial that, inter alia, awarded plaintiff damages and interest.
Defendant's contention that the evidence proffered by plaintiff at trial to establish the existence of the note violated the best evidence rule is not preserved for our review inasmuch as defendant failed to make a timely objection to the evidence on that basis (see Kaygreen Realty Co. v. IG Second Generation Partners, L.P. , 68 A.D.3d 933, 934, 893 N.Y.S.2d 76 [2d Dept. 2009] ; Matter of Rutledge v. Rutledge , 269 A.D.2d 852, 852, 703 N.Y.S.2d 807 [4th Dept. 2000] ; see also CPLR 4017 ). Defendant also contends that Supreme Court erred in admitting in evidence the decedent's bank statements because those documents were not properly authenticated. Defendant waived that contention inasmuch as defendant's counsel stated that he had no objection to the bank statements being admitted in evidence (see Matter of Humberstone v. Wheaton , 21 A.D.3d 1416, 1417, 801 N.Y.S.2d 868 [4th Dept. 2005] ; see also Matter of Cuttino v. New York State Comptroller , 80 A.D.3d 1067, 1068, 915 N.Y.S.2d 413 [3d Dept. 2011] ). Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that the court properly admitted in evidence an amortization schedule and the decedent's tax returns after concluding that such documents were sufficiently authenticated (cf. Fairlane Fin. Corp. v. Greater Metro Agency, Inc. , 109 A.D.3d 868, 870, 972 N.Y.S.2d 601 [2d Dept. 2013] ; see generally Kliamovich v. Kliamovich , 85 A.D.3d 867, 869-870, 925 N.Y.S.2d 591 [2d Dept. 2011] ; Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 9-103, at 703-704 [Farrell 11th ed]). We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in determining that plaintiff was entitled to recover for the entire amount of the note. "As a general rule, in the absence of an acceleration clause providing for the entire amount of a note to be due upon the default of any one installment, [a plaintiff is] only entitled to recover past due installments and [can]not unilaterally declare the note[ ] accelerated" ( Libeson v. Copy Realty Corp. , 167 A.D.2d 376, 377, 561 N.Y.S.2d 604 [2d Dept. 1990] ; see generally Barr v. Country Motor Car Group, Inc. , 15 A.D.3d 985, 986, 789 N.Y.S.2d 350 [4th Dept. 2005], lv denied 6 N.Y.3d 704, 811 N.Y.S.2d 337, 844 N.E.2d 792 [2006] ). "Rather, each default on each installment gives rise to a separate cause of action" ( Libeson , 167 A.D.2d at 377, 561 N.Y.S.2d 604 ; see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Brown , 186 A.D.3d 1038, 1039, 130 N.Y.S.3d 146 [4th Dept. 2020] ). Here, the record is devoid of any evidence of an acceleration clause and, thus, plaintiff was entitled to recover "only the amount of the installments past due at the time of trial" ( Admae Enters. v. Smith , 222 A.D.2d 471, 472, 634 N.Y.S.2d 750 [2d Dept. 1995] ; see Libeson , 167 A.D.2d at 377, 561 N.Y.S.2d 604 ).
Plaintiff nonetheless contends as an alternative ground for affirmance that the entire amount of the note is recoverable under the theory of account stated. That contention is not properly preserved for our review (see Breau v. Burdick , 166 A.D.3d 1545, 1549, 87 N.Y.S.3d 786 [4th Dept. 2018] ; Davis v. State of New York [appeal No. 2], 91 A.D.3d 1356, 1358, 937 N.Y.S.2d 521 [4th Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 802, 2012 WL 1538298 [2012] ; see generally Parochial Bus Sys., Inc. v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 60 N.Y.2d 539, 545-546, 470 N.Y.S.2d 564, 458 N.E.2d 1241 [1983] ) and, in any event, it is without merit (see Cameron Eng'g & Assoc., LLP v. JMS Architect & Planner, P.C. , 75 A.D.3d 488, 489, 903 N.Y.S.2d 755 [2d Dept. 2010] ).
We further agree with defendant that the court erred in awarding plaintiff damages on claims for past unpaid installments that were time-barred. "Where, as here, ‘a loan secured by a mortgage is payable in installments, separate causes of action accrue for each unpaid installment, and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date that each installment becomes due’ " ( U.S. Bank N.A. , 186 A.D.3d at 1039, 130 N.Y.S.3d 146 ; see Sce v. Ach , 56 A.D.3d 457, 458, 867 N.Y.S.2d 140 [2d Dept. 2008] ). As defendant correctly asserted as a defense, inasmuch as plaintiff commenced this action on July 13, 2017, any claims for missed installments that accrued prior to July 13, 2011 were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations (see Sce , 56 A.D.3d at 458-459, 867 N.Y.S.2d 140 ). We note that plaintiff's alternative ground for affirmance on that issue, i.e., that defendant should be equitably estopped from relying on the statute of limitations, is raised for the first time on appeal and thus is not properly before us (see Mitchell v. Nassau Community Coll. , 265 A.D.2d 456, 456, 696 N.Y.S.2d 866 [2d Dept. 1999] ; see generally Parochial Bus Sys. , 60 N.Y.2d at 545-546, 470 N.Y.S.2d 564, 458 N.E.2d 1241 ) and, in any event, is without merit (see Mitchell , 265 A.D.2d at 457, 696 N.Y.S.2d 866 ).
In light of the foregoing, we modify the order and judgment by vacating the 2nd through 5th decretal paragraphs, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court to recalculate the award of damages and interest consistent with our decision. Finally, we have reviewed defendant's remaining contention and conclude that it does not warrant reversal or further modification of the order and judgment.