Summary
dismissing plaintiff's claim for additional refund for tax years 1996, 1997, and 1998 for lack of jurisdiction
Summary of this case from Esposito v. U.S.Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-2196 (HAA).
February 15, 2005
Darlene R. Esposito, Maywood, New Jersey, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
Ivan C. Dale, Esq., United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the motion by Defendant, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (the "Commissioner") to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6) because the matter before the Court, inter alia, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, was filed by way of defective pleadings, and should not be heard due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons outlined below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
Background
Plaintiff, Darlene Esposito, is no stranger to this Court. Since 1990, she has filed no fewer than thirteen other actions with the District of New Jersey, all of which were summarily dismissed. See Esposito v. Citibank S.D., Civ. No. 01-6147 (filed Dec. 27, 2001); Esposito v. Cedar Oaks Care Facility, Civ. No. 99-3537 (filed July 26, 1999); Esposito v. Panebianco, Civ. No. 98-3114 (filed July 2, 1998); Esposito v. Sec'y, Health Human Svcs., Civ. No 92-3586 (filed Aug. 25, 1992); Esposito v. Juman Juman Corp., Civ. No. 92-1 (filed Jan. 2, 1992); Esposito v. Heritage Square at Rahway Inc., Civ. No. 90-4820 (filed Dec. 4, 1990); Esposito v. Cent. Jersey Orthopedic Assocs., Civ. No. 90-3901 (filed Oct. 1, 1990); Esposito v. Heritage Square Condo Ass'n, Inc., Civ. No. 90-2717 (filed July 16, 1990); Esposito v. Bd. of Review, Civ. No. 90-2532 (filed June 26, 1990); Esposito v. All State Ins. Co., Civ. No. 90-1810 (filed May 7, 1990); Esposito v. Juman, Civ. No. 90-1609 (filed Apr. 18, 1990); Esposito v. Tsekouras, Civ. No. 90-1593 (filed Apr. 19, 1990); Esposito v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Civ. No. 90-668 (filed Feb. 20, 1990).In 2000, Ms. Esposito petitioned the United States Tax Court for review of the Commissioner's determination of her 1996, 1997 and 1998 federal tax liabilities. Incredibly, Ms. Esposito argued to the Tax Court that she was entitled to certain deductions resulting from her "business" of filing various personal lawsuits in the District of New Jersey. Esposito v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1718 (2001). The Tax Court ultimately sustained the Commissioner's determination of Ms. Esposito's tax liabilities. Following this decision, Ms. Esposito unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. Thereafter, she filed an action with the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to appeal the Tax Court's decision. Because only the U.S. Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review a decision of the Tax Court, the District of Columbia dismissed Ms. Esposito's case. See Esposito v. Comm'r, 208 F. Supp. 2d 44, 45 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1)). The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court decision. Meanwhile, Ms. Esposito appealed the original Tax Court case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That court affirmed without opinion. See Esposito v. Comm'r, 64 Fed. Appx. 348 (3d Cir. 2003).
On May 10, 2004, Ms. Esposito filed a document entitled "Notice of Motion: Rule 60, 15(b), 26.1, 37.1 for Discovery" with this Court. This motion appears to relate to the prior proceedings in the Tax Court, the district court for the District of Columbia, and the Third Circuit. The motion seeks to bring to the Court's attention certain purported errors by the clerks' offices of these other courts, and requests that this Court "preserve the subject matter of the litigation pending in the US Tax Court." (Pl.'s Mot. Discovery at 6.) The clerk's office of this Court then docketed the "Notice of Motion" as a new matter and assigned it a new civil action number. On or about June 21, 2003, the Commissioner filed the instant motion to dismiss this civil action. On or about July 7, 2004, Ms. Esposito filed a document entitled "Plaintiff's Pretrial Narrative Statement on Motion to Dismiss." While this Court assumes this is an opposition to the Commissioner's motion, the document does nothing more than repeat many of the same claims that were set forth in her original pleading. Ms. Esposito does not provide any legal argument or reason why this Court should not dismiss her pleading.
Analysis
I. Standard of Review
The Commissioner has filed his motion to dismiss Plaintiff's "Notice of Motion" on several bases. First, the Commissioner claims that this action is barred because this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and it should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Additionally, the Commissioner contends that the matter should be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Finally, the Commissioner argues that this matter should be dismissed due to insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(4) and (5). In evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to these rules, the court "must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff; . . . dismissal may [result] only if the plaintiff alleges no set of facts which, if proved, would entitle him . . . to relief." Marshall-Silver Constr. Co., Inc. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593, 595 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds in Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280 (3d Cir. 1995); accord Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48 (1957); Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 685 (3d Cir. 1980).
A "complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient facts if it adequately put the defendants on notice of the essential elements of the plaintiff'[s] cause of action." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). As the Supreme Court has explained, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48.
Finally, "[i]t is an elementary principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, empowered to hear cases only as provided for under Article III of the Constitution and congressional enactments pursuant thereto." Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, this Court must dismiss any case, before considering the merits, where it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Id. As this Court ultimately determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's pleading, it will dismiss this case without comment as to its merits.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In every case filed with a federal court, the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction must appear on the face of the complaint. Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Additionally, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish the jurisdiction of the federal court. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188 (1936) (finding that party seeking exercise of federal jurisdiction must allege sufficient facts essential to establish such jurisdiction). Moreover, pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States can be sued only when it has expressly consented to suit. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992). A waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit and is strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Id.; see also Becton Dickinson Co. v. Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 345-46 (3d Cir. 2000).
Although the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service is nominally the defendant in this case, the action is against the Commissioner in his official capacity as an agent of the United States. As this is equivalent to suing the government itself, the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies equally in this matter. See Lang v. Rubin, 73 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450-51 (D.N.J. 1999); Breyer v. Meissner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 540, 544 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
It is very clear that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of establishing federal jurisdiction in this case or establishing that the government has consented to suit. First, the Court notes that the document, although labeled a "Notice of Motion," may be read as a complaint. The pleading appears to reflect Plaintiff's conviction that she was somehow wronged by the Tax Court, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the three decisions ultimately affirming her prior tax liability. Plaintiff seeks to "preserve the subject matter of the litigation pending in the US Tax Court and that, the function of the annexed Subpoena Duces Tecum will compel evidence to try the real issues of fact and law presented for hearing." (Pl.'s Mot. Discovery at 6.)
The Court notes that the subpoena referenced in the pleading and attached to the document is neither signed by the Clerk of the Court nor an attorney and as such could never be enforced by this Court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 45.
Plaintiff does make oblique reference to two federal statutes that, in other circumstances, might provide a basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, but the pleading does not provide any facts that would support the application of these statutes. First, the pleading references the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. However, the pleading does not allege that the Commissioner or the IRS improperly withheld agency records, nor does it seek any relief cognizable under FOIA. Second, the pleading references the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but does not allege that the Commissioner violated any of her civil rights. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to provide any legitimate basis for this Court to find that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. It appears that Plaintiff is seeking to continue a case which has been adjudicated on the merits to finality and has not provided this Court with any grounds to allow the purported complaint to continue on its merits. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
As an aside, the Court takes this opportunity to explain that to the extent that Ms. Esposito seeks review of the actions by the Tax Court, the District Court for the District of Columbia and the Third Circuit, such matters cannot be brought before the District Court for the District of New Jersey and do not present a cognizable cause of action. Any further pleadings or complaints filed in this Court seeking such relief will undoubtedly be summarily dismissed.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is GRANTED and the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice.