Summary
stating that plaintiffs' argument that it was illegal, in light of Rutan andMirabella, for prospective Democratic election workers to allegedly be ordered to join a particular Democratic club as a pre-condition of employment, "was certainly not frivolous"
Summary of this case from Thorsen v. County of NassauOpinion
00 Civ. 6469 (JSM)
September 4, 2001
OPINION and ORDER
Defendants David Rosado, Freddy Perez, Jr., Roberto Ramirez and the Bronx County Democratic Committee ("Defendants") move for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Their application is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 29, 2000, Plaintiffs brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the process by which election inspectors and poll-workers are appointed by the Democratic officials in Bronx County. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that loyalty to a particular faction of the party is an unconstitutional basis for appointment underElrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990). Plaintiffs sought immediate injunctive relief replacing 880 poll-workers who were scheduled to work in the upcoming primary election, and appointing Plaintiffs Charlotte McDuffie, Ethan McDuffie, and Betty Hillary as election inspectors. Plaintiffs claimed that these individuals were denied positions because they were not loyal to the South Bronx Regular Democratic Club. Defendants cross-moved to dismiss the complaint.
On September 7, 2000, this Court issued an oral ruling denying Plaintiffs' application for immediate injunctive relief because both Charlotte and Ethan McDuffie had been appointed to work in the election four days prior to the date that Plaintiffs filed their complaint, and because Betty Hillary's application had been delayed pending training, which she had since undergone. The Court also denied Defendants' cross-motion to dismiss the complaint.
In or about January 2001, Defendants served Plaintiffs with a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. On January 29, 2001, Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their complaint with prejudice. Defendants now seek to recover the fees that they incurred in defending against Plaintiffs' suit and in preparing this motion for fees.
II. DISCUSSION
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" incurred in litigating a § 1983 action. Where the prevailing party is a defendant, that party must demonstrate that the action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 422 98 S. Ct. 694, 701 (1978)). The heavier burden placed upon defendants serves to balance the policies in favor of encouraging private citizens to vindicate constitutional rights with those aimed at deterring frivolous or vexatious lawsuits. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S. Ct. at 701.
Before one reaches the question of frivolousness, however, a defendant must first establish that it is in fact the prevailing party. This is not a simple question when the case halts before a final adjudication on the merits. Defendants argue that they are the prevailing party in this action because Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was denied and because Plaintiffs later voluntarily withdrew their complaint after receiving Defendants' Rule 11 motion. Plaintiffs respond that because there was no adjudication on the merits of the action, it cannot be said that any party "prevailed." The Second Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether a defendant seeking fees under § 1988 should be considered the prevailing party where the plaintiff voluntarily withdraws its complaint. Other courts, however, have analyzed this question.
In Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit noted in the context of a motion for costs under Rule 54(d) that "generally the defendant is not considered the prevailing party when . . . there is a voluntary dismissal of the action by the plaintiff with prejudice." Five years later, in Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1985), the Court indicated that it had previously ordered that the plaintiff's request to dismiss its complaint with prejudice be granted "without prejudice" to an application for attorney's fees because the statement in Nemeroff indicated that "defendants might have been barred from seeking fees under § 1988." In Colombrito, the defendants had succeeded in having one claim dismissed before the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their other claims. Although it has not elaborated further, the Court has noted in passing that under the fee-shifting statutes a defendant is a prevailing party where the plaintiff obtains a voluntary dismissal of a groundless complaint (tracking the House Report language). See McGill v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 712 F.2d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1983)
In Marquart v. Lodge, 26 F.3d 842, 851-52 (8th Cir. 1994) the Eighth Circuit held that in order to merit prevailing party status, a defendant must benefit from a judicial determination going to the merits of the case. See Hughes v. Unified Sch. Dist., 872 F. Supp. 882, 884-88 (D. Kan. 1994). The Marquart court contemplated that this means a ruling on a summary judgment motion that addresses the merits of the case, as opposed to a dismissal on jurisdictional or statute of limitations grounds.Marquart, 26 F.3d at 852. Marquart also implicitly recognized an additional exception where the plaintiff withdrew its complaint to escape a disfavorable judicial ruling. Id.
Expanding on Marquart, the Fifth Circuit has focused on whether "the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff withdrew to avoid a disfavorable judgment on the merits." Dean v. Riser 240 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 2001). This approach calls for an examination of why the plaintiff sought a voluntary dismissal. For example, a defendant should not be considered a prevailing party if the plaintiff was merely pursuing a change in litigation strategy, such as choosing to bring its claims in state court rather than federal court, or if discovery of adverse facts or a change in the law caused the plaintiff to seek a dismissal. See id. at 510-11. Where, however, a "calculating" plaintiff obtains a dismissal in order to avoid an adverse ruling on the merits, the case for the defendant becomes more compelling. See id. Thus, a plaintiff should not be able to avoid paying attorney's fees by bringing a frivolous claim and then obtaining a dismissal before a ruling on the merits. This approach protects a defendant who has not yet had the opportunity to obtain a ruling on the merits.
In Fernandez v. Southside Hospital, 593 F. Supp. 840, 843-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), the district court required that a defendant seeking fees under § 1988 either vindicate rights by obtaining a judicial ruling on the merits or demonstrate that the complaint was dismissed because it was groundless. The court explicitly noted that a defendant who prevails on a plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief has a strong argument that it is a prevailing party. See id. at 843 n.l; see also Easily v. Norris, 107 F. Supp.2d 1332, 1341 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (denial of the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, where complaint requested only injunctive relief, was a judicial determination on the merits).
The Riser and Fernandez courts essentially collapse the "prevailing party" analysis with the "frivolous or meritless" complaint analysis by calling a defendant a prevailing party if it can show that the complaint was withdrawn because the plaintiff knew it was groundless. This approach has nothing to do with a logical definition of "prevailing party," but serves to further protect a defendant from frivolous litigation.
Consistent with the analyses contained in these cases, it is appropriate for a court confronted with a defendant's § 1988 fee request, submitted after a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed its complaint, to examine the particular circumstances surrounding the litigation. A court should first ask whether there has been a judicial ruling on the merits in favor of the defendant; if so, then the defendant is a prevailing party as to the issues decided in its favor. If no ruling on the merits has been made, a court should conduct an inquiry into whether the complaint was voluntarily dismissed by a "calculating" plaintiff in order to avoid a judicial ruling on the merits, rather than for legitimate reasons relating to litigation strategy, new developments in the law, or discovery of additional facts. This approach, similar to that espoused in Fernandez, combines the approaches in Marquart andRiser in order to protect defendants who have either succeeded on the merits or defended frivolous or vexatious lawsuits. of course, in order to merit a fee award, defendants in either category must go on to show that the complaint was frivolous or unreasonable under the Christianburg standard, an analysis that will in some cases overlap with the prevailing party analysis.
Here, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to replace all poll-workers in the September election and to appoint the three named plaintiffs as inspectors, in part because those individuals who were claiming that they were wrongfully denied positions had in fact been appointed. The Court also denied Defendants' cross-motions to dismiss the complaint. Thus, while Plaintiffs' application for injunctive relief was denied in part because the requested relief had already been obtained, Plaintiffs' underlying constitutional challenge survived. As a result, Defendants can only be considered prevailing parties as to the claims relating to the motion for a preliminary injunction. See Marquart 26 F.3d at 851-52; McGregor v. Board of Cty. Commissioners, 130 F.R.D. 464, 467 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (defendants were a prevailing party only as to claim that was dismissed as legally insufficient), aff'd 956 F.2d 1017 (11th Cir. 1992)
The fact that Plaintiffs dismissed their suit after Defendants served them with a Rule 11 motion does not necessarily indicate that the underlying claims were baseless or that Plaintiffs dismissed their case to escape a ruling on the merits. It may be that because the plaintiff-applicants obtained the immediate relief that they desired (jobs as election inspectors), Plaintiffs simply lost interest in litigating the weightier constitutional questions raised in the complaint. Defendants present no other evidence that Plaintiffs dismissed their suit in order to avoid an adverse judicial ruling.
Once a defendant's prevailing party status has been determined, the next question under § 1988 is whether Plaintiffs' claims were "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or [they] continued to litigate after (the claims) clearly became so." Colombrito, 764 F.2d at 128 (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C. 434 U.S. 412, 422 98 S. Ct. 694, 701 (1978)).
Plaintiffs' underlying constitutional challenge was certainly not frivolous. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that prospective election workers were told that if they wanted to be employed as election officials, they would have to join a particular Democratic club and pay dues of $25. While there was District Court authority to support Defendants' claim that intra-party affiliation may be taken into account in appointing election inspectors, see Mirabella v. Board of Elections, 507 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), this Court is well aware from its own experience with appellate review that the views of a district court are far from the final answer. To pursue a claim in the face of an adverse district court ruling is not "unreasonable." Moreover, Mirabella did not involve a claim that a payment of money to a particular club as a prerequisite for public employment violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Thus, even though this Court may ultimately have ruled for Defendants on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, it cannot be said that those claims were "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."
Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief presents a closer question. Two of the plaintiffs who were seeking appointment as election inspectors had already obtained the relief requested when the complaint and order to show cause were filed, and the third (who had not attended training) had obtained relief by the time of oral argument. However, Plaintiff Jose R. Espada was a Democratic district leader who alleged that his right to designate a certain number of election officials was being wrongfully denied. Plaintiff Pedro Espada, Jr. was a candidate running in the primary for State Senator and alleged that the system of requiring the approval of certain Democratic Party officials threatened his right to a fair election. Plaintiffs thus sought the replacement of all poll-workers prior to the election. While the appointment of the other plaintiffs by the Board of Elections clearly weakened Plaintiffs' claim for immediate injunctive relief, it did not render their claims moot. Given the importance to the Espadas of having the election monitored by a fairly balanced team of poll-watchers and inspectors, it was not unreasonable for them to pursue their claims for injunctive relief.
Not only were Plaintiffs' claims not frivolous, but the policies underlying an award of fees under § 1988 suggest that such an award would not be appropriate in this case. See Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S. Ct. at 701. The rights of all contestants in an election to a constitutionally fair election process is essential to our democracy. Those who believe that the entrenched party officials are abusing their power in order to help a particular candidate should feel free to seek the aid of the courts to protect their right to a fair election. To confront them with the prospect of having to pay their adversary's attorney's fees simply because the court found their claims to be without merit would unduly chill the exercise of these important constitutional rights. See generally Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535 (1964).
For the foregoing reasons, the application for attorney's fees is denied.