Opinion
8:23-01071 JAK (ADS)
03-07-2024
DANIEL ESCAMILLA, Plaintiff, v. RICARDO LARA, et al., Defendants.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
THE HONORABLE AUTUMN D. SPAETH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Supplemental Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable John A. Kronstadt, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Daniel Escamilla filed a pro se civil rights action that challenges an insurance requirement imposed on bail fugitive recovery agents' applications for new licenses along with alleged misconduct by various California agencies. (Dkt. No. 26.) The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is the operative pleading in this case. (Id.) Defendant Ricardo Lara, California Insurance Commissioner, filed a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (“Lara's Motion”). (Dkt. No. 30.) Simultaneously, Defendant Kimberly Kirchmeyer, Director of the California Department of Consumer Affairs, filed a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (“Kirchmeyer's Motion”). (Dkt. No. 35.)
On February 20, 2024, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation, granting Lara's Motion and Kirchmeyer's Motion on multiple bases. (Dkt. No. 54.) Plaintiff filed no objections to the Report and Recommendation, which were due by March 5, 2024.
No new objection period is warranted due to the nature of the Supplemental Report and Recommendation.
In the Report and Recommendation, the Court premised a portion of its reasoning on the principle that Plaintiff did not judicially exhaust certain claims, although these claims are also subject to dismissal because they are unripe. On February 26, 2024, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Jamgotchian v. Ferraro, No. 23-55735, F.4th, 2024 WL 764080 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2024). After reviewing Jamgotchian, further discussion is warranted on the issue of judicial exhaustion even though the ultimate recommendation of dismissal without leave to amend stands.
II. JUDICIAL EXHAUSTION
Prior to Jamgotchian, certain cases suggested that Section 1983 plaintiffs needed to exhaust judicial remedies in state court before challenging a California agency's decision in federal court. See Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 891 F.3d 1147, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 2018). In Jamgotchian, the Ninth Circuit clarified that plaintiffs are not “required to seek review of [a] state agency's decision in state court before suing under § 1983.” 2024 WL 764080 at *1. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that such a requirement “is contrary to the ‘settled rule' that ‘exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'” Id. at *4 (citing Knick v. Twp. of Scott, U.S., 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2167, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019)). The Ninth Circuit then addressed its previous cases that suggested otherwise, including Doe, 891 F.3d 1147. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Doe seemed to impose a judicial exhaustion requirement on a Section 1983 plaintiff, but reasoned that such an exhaustion requirement is contrary to settled law. Jamgotchian, 2024 WL 764080 at *8. The Ninth Circuit did not “reach the issue of Doe's continued vitality” but reiterated that a Section 1983 plaintiff does not need to exhaust state remedies before filing a lawsuit in federal court. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
In the Report and Recommendation, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims alleging harassing conduct (the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action) on two grounds. First, the Court recommended dismissal because those claims are not ripe. (Dkt No. 54 at 15-18, 21-23.) Second, the Court recommended dismissal because the claims were not judicially exhausted. (Id. at 18-19, 21-23.) The Court relied on Doe and the now-reversed district court decision in Jamgotchian. (Id. at 19.) However, as the Ninth Circuit has clarified in Jamgotchian, there is no judicial exhaustion requirement for Section 1983 claims. Accordingly, the Court withdraws the portions of the Report and Recommendation that recommended dismissal based on a failure to exhaust judicial remedies. However, the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action remain subject to dismissal because they are unripe. (Id. at 15-18, 21-22.)
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Report and Recommendation's denial of leave to amend also stands. The Report and Recommendation denied leave to amend on two grounds: (1) amendment would be futile, including lack of exhaustion; and (2) Plaintiff had previously amended his complaint, suggesting he cannot allege facts sufficient to cure the deficiencies described in the Report and Recommendation. (Id. at 25-28.) In light of Jamgotchian, the Court withdraws exhaustion as a reason that leave to amend would be futile. However, leave to amend Plaintiff's harassing conduct claims would still be futile.
Denial of leave to amend for futility is proper where it is clear that the complaint cannot be saved by further amendment. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action were premised on allegations that Defendant Lara harassed Plaintiff by “repeatedly demanding information and documentation Plaintiff already submitted, making duplicative requests, falsely asserting required items are missing, and unjustifiably refusing to issue Plaintiff's license.” (Dkt. No. 26, ¶ 39.) The proposed Ninth and Tenth Causes of Action contained in the proposed Second Amended Complaint are premised on allegations that on September 5, 2023, after the filing of the FAC, Defendant Lara filed an administrative accusation against Plaintiff that seeks to revoke his bail license. (Dkt. No. 49-1 at 2.) The harassing conduct claims and two new proposed claims are all based on violations of substantive due process and equal protection. (Dkt. Nos. 26 at 8, 9, 11; 49-2 at 14-15.)
Leave to amend the harassing conduct claims remains futile because Plaintiff cannot plead facts to cure the deficiencies in the claims. To prevail on an equal protection claim where no suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, a plaintiff must show that (1) they are members of an identifiable class; (2) they were treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n, 539 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2003). Rational basis review applies to Plaintiff's substantive due process claims as well. See Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999).
As the Report and Recommendation explained, Plaintiff is not a member of a suspect class nor do his claims implicate a fundamental right, so rational basis applies. (Dkt. No. 54 at 13-14.) The Report and Recommendation previously addressed that there was a rational basis for the administrative accusation against Plaintiff that seeks to revoke his bail license, namely that Plaintiff made material misrepresentations on his license application. (Id. at 26-27.) The Report and Recommendation also addressed that there was a rational basis for the request for additional documents, namely that seeking additional information during a pending application is not irrational nor harassing when only one letter is sent. (Id. at 17.)
As the Court explained in the Report and Recommendation, “amendment would be futile because Plaintiff cannot allege new facts that would overcome rational basis.” (Id. at 26.) That remains true. See, e.g., Doe v. Garland, 17 F.4th 941, 950 (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court's dismissal of claims without leave to amend because amendment was futile even if there was further factual developments in the case); AMTAX Holdings 260, LLC v. Washington State Hous. Fin. Comm'n, No. 21-35789, 2022 WL 2953701, at *2 (9th Cir. July 26, 2022) (affirming denial of leave to amend where amendment would be futile because plaintiff could not plead facts to ripen claims). In addition, denial of leave to amend remains proper because Plaintiff previously amended his complaint which suggests he is unable to allege facts to cure the deficiencies identified in the Report and Recommendation.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Judge issue an Order (1) accepting the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No 54) and this Supplemental Report and Recommendation; (2) granting Lara's Motion (Dkt. No. 30); (3) granting Kirchmeyer's Motion (Dkt. No. 35); (4) denying Defendant Lara's Request for Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 31); (5) denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt. No. 49); (6) dismissing the FAC without leave to amend; and (7) entering judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.